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A Sociovidistic Approach to Children's Filmmaking:
The Philadelphia Project
Richard Chalfen
Introduction

Literature on Children's Filmmaking

During the summer of 1966 I had the good fortune to
work as a research assistant to Sol Worth and John
Adair on their National Science Foundation project entitled "The Use of Film in Cross-Cultural Communications." During that time I had the rare opportunity of introducing filmmaking technology to selected members
of non-Western society-the Navajo-and, subsequently, to observe the production of six Navajo-made
documentary films. Impressed by the unexplored research potential of this approach, I began to organize a
sequence of film communication projects in Philadelphia. Between 1967 and 1979 I worked with eight
groups of lower- and middle-class teenagers, a women's
liberation group, a politically active lesbian group, a
sample of middle-class home moviemakers, and most
recently, a sample of Polavision users.
In 1970 Sol and John asked me to write a report of
comparative research findings for inclusion in their book
on the Navajo Project. That paper, originally entitled
"Socio-Documentary Filmmaking in an Urban Setting,"
appeared as Chapter 15 in Through Navajo Eyes-An
Exploration in Film Communication and Anthropology
(1972). The purpose of that chapter was, first, to provide
comparative data on utilizing a particular research
method grounded in ethnographic and participant observation techniques ; and, second, to compare examples of film communication across several groups of
teenagers from different sociocultural backgrounds. The
need arose to explain how Worth's "bio-documentary"
techniques-originally developed from work with graduate students enrolled in a documentary film workshop
(Worth 1963, 1965) and later used in the Navajo Project-could be applied to groups of teenage novice filmmakers. In addition further evidence was sought regarding the speculation that the first use of 16mm filmmaking
technology neutralized different social and cultural variables in the production of filmic symbolic forms.
The following article is intended as a clarification, expansion, and updating of several points made in
Through Navajo Eyes.

In 1972 we reported an enormous growth in the frequency and variety of teenage filmmaking projects
across the country. Settings for these projects include
elementary schools, high schools, storefront centers,
settlement houses, church clubs, various workshops,
mental health clinics, art centers, detention homes, and
jails, among others. Given this diversity in settings, we
also find considerable variety in teaching techniques, in
relationships between adults as instructors and young
people as students and in the motivations, objectives ,
expectations, and rewards of different personnel.
In a recent review of the literature on children's filmmaking , Aristarco (1980) outlines three predominant
categories of activity . A variety of reports have been
published on filmmaking projects in primary and secondary schools (e.g., Brasso 1974; Carrico 1969; Culkin
1966; Hilton 1973; Hodgkinson 1964; Kohl 1975; Reinecke 197 4). Another collection of publications reports
on movies made by workshops and film clubs in different
communities and neighborhoods (e.g., Anderson 1969;
Bigby 1968; Larson 1966, 1969; Lidstone and Mcintosh
1970; Peavy 1969; Robbin 1966). A third category of
writing describes films produced as part of structured research projects (e.g. , Achtenberg 1967; Chalfen 1974;
Chalfen and Haley 1971; Norlin 1966; Sutton-Smith
1977, 1979; Evans et al. 1979).
Two characteristics of this literature limit the possibilities of its use in communications research . There appears
to be a reluctance for or disinterest in writing detailed reports of individual projects-successful ones as well as
unsuccessful ones-that include descriptive information
on social and cultural context. Second, few observers attempt to concentrate on similarities and / or differences in
filmmaking experiences and films produced by similar or
different groups of teenagers. Generalizations regarding
all teenagers are more common than comparative statements. In short, interesting research questions regarding
the production of symbolic forms in differing sociocultural contexts have been generally ignored. Interest in the
successful production of teenage movies has eclipsed
any sustained inquiry into how film works as a mode of
film communication for young people. 1
With these general limitations in mind, I want to include
several unusual comments that relate to the research described in this article. Several reports contain insightful
hints of social and cultural variation in the production and
interpretation of teenage-made films. In one, John Bigby
described the results of a third-grade teacher who had her
students use cameras in Harlem in 1965:

Richard Chalfen is Director of the Masters Program in
Visual Anthropology at Temple University. His recent
work includes studies of home mode visual communication , tourist photography, and media anthropology.

The thing I can't forget about those movies, made by eightyear-old black children , is their awful vision ... . I remember
crossed steel everywhere . The folding gates across store
windows, the metal fences around the schoolyards . . . the
physical barriers everywhere .... Those Harlem filmmakers
showed me, in flickering images on the wall of a real slum
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school with real rats, why I was afraid . . .. I keep wondering
what over-privileged kids could see with an 8mm camera.
[1968:20-21]

David Mallery in his chapter on "The Young Film
Makers Explosion" says that some people seeing films
made by young people were:
impressed by how technically polished they were. Others
spoke of the creativity, imagination, and reflection of young
people's background, personalities and concerns shown in
the films and in the conversations [about the films]. Still others worried over a kind of "we"-and-"they" division between middle-class students with their film and the slum
students with theirs . [1968 :23]

Mallery goes on to say parenthetically:
There continues to be a lot of talk and study about some of the
noticeable differences in the action, subject matter , and the
styles of the films made by young people in the ghettos and
those made in the "advantaged" schools and areas. [ibid .]

However, in spite of the fact that Mallery mentions this
"interest and study," he gives no reference to any such
work in what is otherwise a well documented and referenced publication.
In two separate newspaper reports of Rodger Larson's
work with the "Movie Bus" on the Lower East Side of
New York, a correlation is suggested between the class
or the socioeconomic status of the filmmakers and the
films they produce. Larson is quoted as saying:
The films that come out of poor areas are often about
fights ... . In the middle class, they're very narcissistic: at fifteen or sixteen if a girl makes a film the camera lingers lovingly on a girl; if a boy is behind the camera the camera
lingers lovingly on a boy. And the upper class, those films
aren't about people; they're abstract, the people are symbols. [Roddick 1967:2]

But again there was no comparative follow-up to these
observations. And in another write-up of the University
Settlement House work with Larson:
The teenagers at Montefiore are mostly middle class on the
economic scale, some decidedly upperclass, and the concerns and interests differ markedly, naturally enough, from
those of the University Settlement group. Here again the
film titles-"Only a Dream"; "Yesterdays"; "Arabesque"are indicative of the content, in these cases more introspective and hooked on "poetic" images than their counterparts
downtown. [O'Connor 1967]
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In another brief article about films made in primary and
secondary schools, Paul Carrico remarks that in "innercity schools they [student-made films] tend to be about
people interacting with other people. Affluent students
make more abstract films replete with alienation and protest" (1969:16).
Infrequent observations of this kind beg many important questions relevant to a sociocultural approach to
communication research. The need arises to examine
carefully how film communication is organized and
works for different groups of people. If adolescents are
making different kinds of film that are provoking positive
and negative reactions, can any generalizations be
made to account for the likes and dislikes, the similarities
and dissimilarities? Are different patterns of film communication involved? What are the different groups relating
to, and reacting to, when asked to see and evaluate a
film? Are non-overlapping social contexts involving
class, race, and sex structuring the production and interpretation of the film communication? Exploration of
these questions is facilitated by using a structured plan
of observation described in the following pages.

A Sociovidistic Perspective
Several instructive differences exist between the way
Worth and Adair chose to discuss the Navajo materials
and the methods of description and analysis operationalized for the Philadelphia research. Both projects
utilized a codes-in-context approach to visual communication (Worth and Adair 1972:139, 233). While Worth
emphasized the level of film code (especially observed
encoding habits and conventions), I explored the use of
a structured approach to code context. This difference is
better understood by clarifying and comparing notions
of "vidistics" and "sociovidistics."
In 1966, while reviewing the problematic conceptualization and status of film as "language," Worth proposed
the notion of vidistics:
Vidistics in this early state is concerned, first, with the determination and description of those visual elements relevant to the process of communication. Second, it is concerned with the determination of the rules, laws and logic of
visual relationship that help a viewer to infer meaning from
an Image-Event, and the interaction of Image-Events in sequence. Film as if it were language, as studied vidistically,
is thus thought of as the study of specified elements, elements in sequence, operations on those elements, and cognitive representations of them that act as a mediating agent
in a communications process between human beings-between a filmmaker and a viewer- between a creator and a
re-creator. [1966:331]

4
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It is apparent that Worth used a vidistic formulation when
he organized the Navajo Project and when he analyzed
the results: "We have decided to build our analysis
around a presentation of differences between our films
and the Navajo films on the level of code'' (1972: 141 ; emphasis added). Worth concentrated on several vidistic
elements: (1) narrative style, (2) syntactic organization
and "sequencing of events and units of eventing," (3)
cultural, perceptual, and cognitive restrictions influencing
organization and structure, and (4) relationships between
film structure and verbal language structure (1972: 140).
Thus a continuity was maintained that emphasized encoding and decoding as cognitive activity, rule-like sequence of visual units, and speculative relationships between culturally structured communicative codes.
Whereas Worth found cognitive and syntactic features
of the code most fruitful for comparative analysis, research described in this report stresses the social dimensions of the vidistic formulation, hence the term "sociovidistics. '' 2 Sociovidistics is understood as the
systematic description and analysis of visual (pictorial)
symbolic forms as embedded in a process of social communication. Sociovidistics suggests that the production,
use, and interpretation of pictorial forms be studied as a
social process, operating in social contexts-a process
that is determined by, and identified as, culturally structured behavior. Borrowing from Byers and Worth, sociovidistics studies the entire cultural enterprise of
people constructing and producing pictorial forms, becoming symbolically represented in pictorial forms, and
using, viewing, and interpreting pictorial forms. Furthermore, specific attention is given to the social and psychological functions related to code use and to the dynamics of implication and inference that operate
between image-makers and image-viewers.
The thrust of reformulating certain vidistic principles
was to clarify how specific contextual features constitute
a useful mode of description and analysis of filmmaking
activity-activity that constitutes film as a symbolic form
of visual communication. 3
Sociovidistic theory implicitly asserts that the patterning of pictorial forms of visual communication must go
beyond discovering laws of "grammar" or conventions
of syntactic structure to understand the relationship of
pictorial imagery to social life. While sociovidistics has
been suggested as a term for an area of research that integrates concerns in vidistics, visual communication,
and cultural anthropology, the "ethnography of pictorial
communication" designates a particular mode of inquiry
devoted to explicating the patterned organization of pictorial and sociocultural domains. 4

A sociovidistic scheme of description serves as a
guide for doing ethnographies of pictorial (in this case,
film) communication. By use of ongoing research in sociolinguistics, specifically the ethnography of speaking
(Hymes 1964, 1972), parallels were developed between
speech events and film communication events. In the latter it becomes necessary to study four kinds of events:
(1) planning events, (2) filming events (which necessarily include the two subcategories of "on-camera"
events and "behind-camera" events), (3) editing events,
and (4) exhibition events. In turn, each of these communication events should be cross-referenced with a series
of ''components.'' Whereas Hymes has suggested as
many as sixteen components relevant to speech events
(1972:58-65), only five have proved useful for film communication: (1) participants, (2) topics, (3) settings, (4)
message form, and (5) code. Cross-referencing these
events and components produces a type of sociovidistic
etic grid (Chalfen 197 4:1 0-16). Formulation and use of
this grid force a recognition and consideration of relationships between contextual features that otherwise remain unproblematic. The sociovidistic framework provides a means of producing systematic descriptions and
comparisons of visual communication-across a variety
of pictorial forms, across different photographic and
filmic genres, and across production and use of images
in different cultures. Specific examples of how this
framework can be applied to children's "sociodocumentary" filmmaking is the subject of the following pages.

The Philadelphia Project: Sociodocumentary
Research Design
The research was designed, in part, to be compatible
with previous fieldwork by Worth and Adair (1972) and
with similar efforts by Worth and his students (1964,
1965; Achtenberg 1967). The basic similarity of these
projects is that research subjects were taught, observed,
and interviewed as they produced 16mm films about
themselves for the first time. Care was taken to standardize procedures and specify research conditions to facilitate future studies for additional comparative findings. 5
Subjects for the project were selected according to a
pattern of social characteristics. Eight groups of five 14to 16-year-olds were invited "to make a movie." Although each group came from different neighborhoods,
all subjects lived within the city limits of Philadelphia.
Each group was a "natural" group-members were
neighborhood friends who socialized together for various leisure activities. In addition, all the selected groups
had easy access to one of the buildings of the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic. Since groups of people
were making a film together, the term "sociodocumentary" has been used instead of "bio-documentary"
(Worth and Adair 1972:231-232).
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Initially I attempted to contact a sample of subjectgroups that conformed to a 2 x 2 x 2 experimental
paradigm. Using independent variables of social class,
ethnicity, and sex, I wanted to compare the filmmaking
behavior of middle-class vs . lower-class teenagers, 6
blacks vs. whites, and males vs. females. However, not
all the required groups could be contacted.

Introductory Procedures
All subjects were introduced to sociodocumentary filmmaking in the same manner. Identical instructions, methods, and equipment were used with each participating
group. The standardized schedule of activities and operating procedures consisted of four sections: (1) introductory /practice sessions, (2) film planning sessions,
(3) film production sessions, which included filming and
editing, and (4) film exhibition sessions.
The first section consisted of seven meetings which
were more standardized than the others. According to a
verbal contract-agreement each group was invited to
learn 16mm filmmaking and produce a movie on any
topic of their choosing in exchange for letting us (in this
case, Jay Haley7 and myself) do research on their filmmaking behavior. As a group they had to choose (1)
what the film was about, (2) where to shoot (any location
was permissible within a 15-minute driving radius of our
regular meeting place), (3) who (if anyone) and/or what
(if anything) was to be in the film, (4) the production personnel, (5) the length, and (6) an appropriate sound
track. Each subject was required to have a parent sign a
legally drawn release form for their participation either in
a movie or in the making of a movie.
The first seven sessions were devoted to introducing
the general idea of the project, to demonstrating the filmmaking equipment, having subjects practice their filming
in both indoor and outdoor conditions, viewing practice
rushes, and discussing ideas for their film. At the conclusion of the seventh session the group was informed that
they could start their cooperative production whenever
they felt ready. Subjects were reminded that their film
was to be a cooperative effort; group agreements were
important. They understood that I could help only with
technical matters. A time limit of 6 months was stressed.
Accor.ding to the research design, the second and
third sections of the project began after the seventh session. The group worked at conceiving, developing, or
changing their film ideas, shooting film, viewing rushes,
editing, and recording a sound track.
When the group agreed that their film was complete,
there was a recess in the regular meeting schedule while
the film laboratories made A and B rolls, transferred the
sound to an optical track, and made the first answer
print. The filmmaking group was then reconvened for the
fourth set of sessions which consisted of screening their
finished film and viewing other project-made films.

5

Observational Methods and Technical Specifications
Data on events, activities, and behavior occurring as
part of each filmmaking project was recorded by several
methods. (1) A written journal of relevant observations
was maintained for each project. (2) Tape recordings
were made of nearly all 225 sessions and have subsequently been totally or selectively transcribed. (3) 35mm
black-and-white still photographs were regularly taken at
different phases of each group's project. (4) A film log
was organized to record each piece of film shot by each
subject in each project; thus each shot was identified
and cataloged by cameraman, description of content,
length and type of shot, and so on. (5) In addition,
35mm black-and-white still negatives and prints were
made from representative 16mm frames of each practice
shot made by each filmmaking group. Contact sheets of
these negatives were then inserted into the film log for
further identification.
All the sociodocumentary filmmakers worked with the
same pieces of professional 16mm filmmaking equipment. All subjects used Bell and Howell Filmo 70 DH and
DR triple lens turret cameras equipped with Angenieux
lenses of 75mm, 25mm, and 1Omm focal length; Norwood Seconic light meters and a Quick Set tripod. A 50foot tape measure was available for correct focus settings. All the filmmakers used the same equipment to
edit their 16mm workprints, specifically, Griswold splicers, Zeiss Moviscop viewers, and Moviola rewinds.
Sound recordings were made on %-inch magnetic tape
with a Sony 800 recorder. The black-and-white film
stock was a standard Kodak Plus X (ASA 125) and 4X
(ASA 500) negative film. Film processing was done in
both New York and Philadelphia laboratories, thereby facilitating the return of rushes in less than a week. All filmmaking subjects also learned to use a Kodak Pageant
projector to screen their rushes and edited workprints.

The Emergence of Three Sociovidistic Patterns
When the results of the eight sociodocumentary film
projects were examined by use of the sociovidistic
framework, three distinct patterns of behavior emerged.
Two of these patterns will be described as "stable" and
one as "unstable." Summaries of the films produced by
each group are given in the Appendix.
Patterns of filmmaking behavior were labeled stable
when subjects appeared to develop a consistent
strategy for making a movie. The filmmakers, as a group,
maintained a similar and consistent way of working
throughout the moviemaking process. They reported
consistent attitudes toward shooting, editing, and showing their films. These filmmakers seldom changed their
choices of appropriate subject matter from their initial
practice footage through the completion of the project.
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Table 1
Tabular Summary of Filmmaking Activity
Stable Pattern I
Group Number
Total Sessions in Each Project
Planning Sessions
Filming Sessions
Editing Sessions
Exhibiting Sessions
Practice Footage
Total Footage
Length of Final Film
(min./ sec.)
Shooting Ratio

2
23
10
6
3
4
200'
700'
271'
7'30"
1:1.8

21
9
5
5
2
200'
600'
478'
13'17"
1:1.3

Unstable Pattern Ill

Stable Pattern II
4
49
17
13
16

3
9
7

2

3
400'
2100'
251'
7'00"
1:6.3

300'
300'

6
8

5
54
17
16
17
4
600'
3100'
493'
13'42"

7

200'
200'

1:5.1

7

8

53
15
19
18

8

6
2

400'
3100'
1407'
39'05"
1:1.9

400'
400'

Table 2
Comparative Times INumber of Sessions) Devoted to Each Event by Each Film Group
Number of sessions
0
10

20

40

30

Stable
Pattern I
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3':'

Stable
Pattern II
Group 4
Group 5

Unstable
Pattern Ill
Group 6':'
Group 7
Group 8':'

'~ Completed

practice footage only

Planning

Filmfng

•

Editing

•

Exhibiting

50

60
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In contrast , the unstable pattern is characterized by
"shifting behavior. " Behavioral shifts occurred in several
ways: filmmaking subjects drastically changed their
choices of appropriate subject matter or camera technique after they viewed their practice rushes. In another
instance, the filmmakers might decide to start over after
filming several hundred feet of film. Examples of other
inconsistencies were observed more frequently in the
filmmaking of the unstable groups than the stable ones.
Characteri stics of Stable Pattern I (SP I) emerged from
three projects comprised of black lower-cl-ass groupsone group consisted of all girls, two groups, all boys
(groups 1, 2, and 3 in Tables 1 and 2). In marked contrast , characteristics defining Stable Pattern II (SP II) developed from observations and analysis of two white
middle-class groups-one male, the other female
(groups 4 and 5 in Tables 1 and 2). In contradistinction
to these two stable yet contrasting patterns, an Unstable
Pattern (USP Ill) of sociovidistic behavior emerged from
three other groups in the project (groups 6, 7 and 8 in
Tables 1 and 2) . Subjects in this third pattern came from
black middle-class and white lower-class backgrounds.
A summary of quantitative data associated with each
sociovidistic pattern and each filmmaking group appears
in Table 1. A schematic representation of comparative
event activity is found in Table 2. Discussion of selected
points in Tables 1 and 2 and descriptive summaries of
SP I and SP II will be presented next. Characteristics of
Unstable Pattern Ill will be described later.

Stable Pattern 1: Characteristics of Black LowerClass Filmmaking
(a) Stable Pattern I is characterized by devoting more
time to planning than any other event. During the planning sessions, group members tended to ask more
questions related to social aspects of the project than to
technical (camera-related) ones. In addition, many topics other than filmmaking were discussed. Members of
SP I groups found it difficult to mutually agree on any
single film idea during their planning sessions. One idea
was accepted by the group after one member wrote an
outline or script for a film.
(b) Stable Pattern I filmmakers tried to finish planning
their movies before they did any filming. Planning for SP
I groups included a lot of preparation for shooting, such
as deciding who would be allowed to act in specific
roles, who could watch their filmmaking, what everybody
sh uld wear, how a room (or set) should be decorated,
and similar questions.
(c) The second most time-consuming event, and the
event of most interest to SP I filmmakers, was filming.
Members of these groups spent more time filming than
either editing or exhibiting.

7

(d) The filming emphasis for these groups was on
their on-camera rather than behind-camera activity.
They competed for on-camera appearances, which usually took the form of acting in short sequences, scenes,
or skits. Their acted performances were often rehearsed
and often directed by the author of the script. For groups
in SP I, making a movie meant being-in a movie. They
tended to deemphasize behind-camera activity.
(e) In addition, the SP I groups shot much less film than
other groups. They tried to photograph their subject matter only once and to shoot their film in the order prescribed
by the scripted story line. Members of these groups
tended not to experiment with the filmmaking equipment.
(f) Stable Pattern I groups did not like to edit their
footage. They spent less time in editing than in planning
or filming. One or two of the group members (in contrast
to other patterns described below) did m'ost of the cutting and splicing which was predetermined by the shooting plan and the story line.
(g) Exhibition events in Stable Pattern I received the
least amount of attention.
In characterizing the components of Stable Pattern I,
participants will be described first. These filmmakers
were self-selected from larger social groupings (gangs
and clubs), and the groups tended to enlarge beyond a
five-member group as the project progre·ssed. However,
the general behavior of the participants changed in different events. For instance, all group members tried to
participate equally when they were being filmed (in oncamera activity). However, individual group members
had to perform tasks related to planning, behind-camera
filming, and. editing.
In addition, SP I members generally insisted on having
certain contemporary "familiars" involved in their film
and filmmaking; only their group members and selected
friends , who temporarily joined their extended group,
could be in their movie. Non-group-affiliated people and
strangers were kept out of their footage. They also
chose audiences of familiar people to see their films.
Stable Pattern I groups selected local and familiar settings for their films. They preferred to film in places
where they were known (but not in their own homes)
and in places where they frequently socialized. SP I filmmakers consistently selected familiar urban-residential
environments as shooting locations.
These filmmakers consistently filmed topics, themes,
and activities that involved showing themselves doing
.the familiar things that they liked to do on a day-to-day
basis. A regularly recurring set of activities included
acted skits of fighting, drinking, dancing, forms of competition, and sports activity.

8
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In terms of message form , SP I subjects preferred to
work from a script (girls more than boys) and to record
realistic and familiar versions of common events in their
lives. Their films contained a story line which consisted
of short episodes with distinguishable or logical beginnings and ends. These films take their forms from theater
and their content from street life. SP I filmmakers preferred to make films as visual records that documented
and glorified their lifestyles.
Code characteristics of the Stable Pattern I groups
deemphasized the manipulation of cinematic units. Most
of their original footage remained unedited in their finished films. Sequences of action contained few cuts,
and there was a minimal amount of time and space manipulation or alteration. These filmmakers wanted sound
and image to match and hence they attempted syncsound filming. Finally, these films were characterized by
very low shooting ratios.

Illustration 1

The following photographs have been taken from individual
frames of 16 mm film shot during practice sessions.

Illustrations 1-12
Fighting, dancing, smoking, and drinking were chosen as highpriority activities for on-camera performance by SP I groups. In
all of these examples, the teenagers chose to film themselves,
resulting in a meta-message of' 'look-at-me ." In contrast, neither of the white middle-class groups selected these kinds of
on-camera topics .

Illustration 2

1 2 Scenes of the filmmakers fighting with one another appeared in practice and final films made by all three SP I
groups - male and female.
3 Related to fighting ability, demonstrations of strength - specifically muscle-flexing-were filmed by members of Group 2
(females) and Group 3 (males).

Illustration 3
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Illustration 4

Illustration 6

Illustration 5

Illustration 7

4 5 The two male SP I groups (Groups 1 and 3) enthusiastically filmed long scenes of themselves in several types of
sports activity. Scenes included football , basketball , track
events, and Ping-Pong . Competition between group members
both for athletic superiority and for the best on-camera performancewere very common . In contrast, neitherSP II group
filmed sports activity, though the female group shot scenes of a
football game between teams from the .police department and a
local rock radio station.

6 7

9

Some form of dancing was filmed by all three SP I groups .
Importance was given to' 'center stage' ' performance and the
demonstration of dance style .

10
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8 9

Demonstration of smoking style was another form of favored on-camera activity . Smoking appeared as another informal kind of competition between group members.

10 Drinking and acting drunk played central roles in both final
films produced by SP I groups . Scenes of group drinking were
closely tied to partying and fighting . In contrasr, these activities
were absent from SP 11-made films .

11 12 When SP I filmmaking groups had to decide where they
wanted to shoot their practice films, they immediately chose a
familiar neighborhood environment . Graffiti-covered walls in
these areas often included names of the filmmakers . In contrast, the SP II groups preferred simply to shoot their films
where we regularly met.

Illustration 8

Illustration 11

Illustration 9

Illustration 12

Illustration 10
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Stable Pattern II: Characteristics of White
Middle-Class Filmmaking
(a) Stable Pattern II filmmakers spent nearly equal
amounts of time in planning, filming, and editing . Their
planning was characterized by lengthy and "heavy" discussions and controlled arguments regarding ways to
make a movie. They tended to ask a lot of technical
questions on the potential and limitations of the filmmaking equipment. Members of these groups found it
difficult to settle on one idea for their film during their
planning sessions. They preferred not to let one group
member decide what the film would be about. SP il filmmakers were hesitant to commit themselves to one idea
in any kind of written form.
(b) Stable Pattern II groups were very anxious to begin
shooting; they did not feel that theirfilms had to be completely out Iined before beginning to use the cameras.
(c) For these filmmakers', less time was spent in filming than in either planning or editing.
(d) Stable Pattern II filming events were characterized
by an avoidance of on-camera appearances. These filmmakers seldom put themselves in the movie. The majority of their filming attention was paid to behind-camera
activity; they competed for use of the camera and
sought praise for getting the "neatest" shots. SP II filmmakers emphasized testing the abilities of the camera
and attended to image composition much more than any
of the other groups. For groups in SP II, making a movie
meant conceiving, shooting, and editing the movie and
not being in the movie. They tended to deemphasize oncamera activity.
(e) In addition, the SP II groups tended to shoot much
more film than SP I groups. These filmmakers tended to
shoot a lot of film of the same subject matter, knowing
that anything could be eliminated; they looked forward
to the editing process.
(f) In Stable Pattern II, editing was treated as a very
important event. There was a sense that this is where
films were really made. Cutting and splicing was done by
each group member in equal amounts. Slightly more
time was spent in editing than filming and slightly less
time than planning.
(g) Stable Patterns I and II are similar in that exhibition
events received the least amount of attention.
In characterizing the components of Stable Pattern II,
further contrast is seen to the behavior pattern outlined
for Stable Pattern I. In terms of participants, the size of
the SP II groups remained constant at four members instead of enlarging beyond five people.
None of these subjects were members of larger
groups such as neighborhood gangs or social clubs. All
group members generally contributed equally to planning, behind-camera filming, and editing events. Oncamera appearances by these filmmakers were very infrequent and much shorter than performances in Stable
Pattern I. When these groups needed people in their
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films, they readily filmed strangers. In exhibition events,
these filmmakers preferred audiences of strangers who
would objectively evaluate their films rather than audiences of familiar friends and relatives :
Stable Pattern II filmmakers selected primarily rural
and nonresidential settings within the urban confinements of the project. They displayed no desire to produce their film in local and/or familiar settings. Filming
provided an impetus to visit and explore new locations.
Topics, themes, and activities selected by these
groups usually involved nature, animal life, and, in some
cases, inanimate objects. A recurring set of topics included sunlit leaves, branches, trees, birds, rivers or
streams, and the like. SP II subjects never filmed themselves doing what they would "naturally" do. Their film
themes involved their feelings about some subject of
personal concern.
In terms of a message form, there was some reluctance
to outline their film on paper (boys more than girls). There
was no urgency in this matter since they felt that the film
could be "made" in their editing sessions. SP II filmmakers gave little thought to the need for a storyline. Visually, the films contained few logical or distinguishable
beginnings or ends. These filmmakers emphasized producing an original form for their movie; they preferred to
make a film as visual art, that is, as an aesthetically pleasing, original, and intellectual statement.
Code characteristics of SP II movies included a lot of
shot manipulation and frequent editing. These films contain many jump cuts, unnatural time and space juxtapositions, and sound tracks that are relatively independent
of their visual tracks. High shooting ratios also characterize these movies.

12
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Illustrations 13-20
In contrast to the Stable Pattern I preference for filming scenes
of human activity-usually of themselves-SP II filmmakers predominantly selected scenes of nature , arch itectural elements,
and inanimate objects.

Comparative Analysis of Event-Component
Relationships
Having stated the existence of two distinct and contrasting stable patterns (and before describing the unstable
pattern), we can now examine sources and details of
these findings. Specific examples of qualitative data will
be explained using the sociovidistic framework of communication events and components. The richest sources
of data are found in the pattern of X-marked cells in
Table 3.
Ideally each of these important cells (relationships)
would be examined for further similarities and differences that constitute the sociovidistic patterns under
discussion. For the purpose of this abbreviated report,
however, only examples of selected relationships will be
discussed. Since both subcategories of Filming Events
have emerged as very important events, being significantly related to four out of five components, the following discussion will be limited to these relationships.':'
In the following analysis no attempt will be made to
isolate the importance of individual sociocultural variables. Groups of varying sociocultural composition were
used in part to provide a variety of examples of a film
communication process. Data collected from this research simply do not bear the weight of a more rigorous
analysis of individual variables such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and 1 or sex.

Illustration 13

Illustration 14

Table 3

Components
Events

Topics

Form

Code

1

3

4

5

Filming
behindcamera

2
X

Planning

Filming
on-camera
* Description, comparison
and analysis of data comprising cell numbers 1, 4,
6, 7, 8, 9, 11 , 12, 14, 17,
18, and 19 can be found in
Chapter 7 of Film as Visual
Communication : A Sociovidistic Study of Filmmaking (Chalfen 197 4) .

Participants Setting

6

X

9

X

X

12

X

14

10
X

11

Editing

13
X

15

16

18

17

X

X

19
Exhibiting

8

7
X

20
X

21

22
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13-17 Frames taken from the practice films made by the white
middle-class girls' group show a marked avoidance of human
activity. More attention is given to image composition and finding unusual views, which , in turn, constitutes a "look-at-mesee' ' perspective . Scenes of nature and objects became important parts of their final film entitled God.

18-20 When the SP II girls filmed people (only occasionally
themselves) they would keep a person surrounded by scenery. The relationship of the person to the environment was
more important than just the appearance of the person . In addition, they liked to film unknown people who were unaware of
being photographed.

Illustration 15

Illustration 18

Illustration 16

Illustration 17

------------~~--~----=
Illustration 19

Illustration 20
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Illustrations 21-28
The other SP II group (white middle-class males) demonstrated a similar pattern of choices when making their outside
practice films.

21-24 Scenes from nature , architectural elements, and "interesting" objects were favorite on-camera subject matter .
Scenes similar to these play an important role in their final
film , entitled WPFG-M1 . In contrast , SP I filmmakers never
considered any of these topics.

Illustration 21

Illustration 23

Illustration 22

Illustration 24
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25 26 In conjunction with finding unusual views, SP II tee nagers sought to create unusual views by testing and manipulating the abilities of the camera . Shooting with the camera on
an angle or changing the speed of the motor was done by
both SP II groups in both practice and final films. In contrast ,
SP I groups were more interested in " straight " views.

27 28 In most of the SP II practice footage, people tend to appear very small withintheoverallframe; backs of people areas
likely to be seen as fronts. In contrast to the SP I results, the filmmakers are never seen asagroupinthefilm. In the maleSP ll film
we again see a person set in a particular environment. This contrasts with the SP I tendency to concentrate on just the person .

Illustration 25

Illustration 27

Illustration 26

Illustration 28
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The non-overlapping patterns of behaviors ill ustrated in
Figures 1 and 2 are most striking and perhaps most sign ificant in establishing two stable but different sociovidistic
patterns. The on-camera / beh ind-camera distinction
highlights a series of differences that are masked when
we merely study " filming. " To say that one group likes
filming more than another raises more questions than it
answers. '' Wanting to make a movie '' can mean different
things to different people : the d istinction and associated
find ings ill ustrate th is point qu ite we ll.
By preferring to be and , in some cases , insisting on
being on-camera , subjects are expressing a need to be
the symbolic material of a film ic communication ; emphasis is placed on using one 's physical self to encode information . To be on-camera means that images of one 's
physical self will directly be the center of attention and
discussion at a later time. Value is placed on how well
one manipulates one 's on-camera presentation as the
visually symbolic material.

Filming as a Communication Event
As previously suggested , Filming as an event is too large
a unit to work with . To report that a group emphasized
"filming" ignores characteristics that potentially distinguish examples of a film communication process. Subcategories of "on-camera filming" and "behind-camera
filming '' immediately become relevant.
Stable Pattern I groups emphasized both the planning
and the on-camera division of filming, whereas Stable Pattern II groups much preferred behind-camera filming activity as well as editing. SP I and SP II groups consistently
emphasize different events in the film communication
process. The recurrence and significant implications of
this finding shall be discussed frequently in this analysis.
Further clarification and differentiation of filming behaviors associated with on-camera and behind-camera
events are outlined in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1
On-Camera Filming Activities
SPI
1
2
3
4
5

SP II

Attention and desire to perform on -camera

X

Need for rehearsals

x (F)*

Attention to " acting"

X

Emergence of a " director"

x (F)*

Attempt to synchronize dialogue while on-camera

X

~' (F) indicates that females were more likely than males to engage
in the specific behavior listed .
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Figure 2
Behind-Camera Filming Activities
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SPI
Attention and desire to use and operate camera and/or
equipment

2
3
4

- - - -

SP II
X

Attention to manipulating and / or testing abilities of camera
Need for retakes

X

Compete to get " best " or "neatest" shots

X

X
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By preferring, on the other hand, to be behind-camera, and only infrequently on-camera, subjects are expressing a need to manipulate a different set of symbolic
materials in filmic communication . Subjects became very
selective in their filming of specific bits and pieces of the
environment; they also chose to manipulate the recording of the visual material in terms of distorting motion,
action , focus, horizontal and vertical axes, and so on.
Emphasis was placed on encoding technique and manipulating information in an "artistic" manner. Value was
placed on what one could do with the recorded images
rather than as the recorded image.
Being black, being poor, and wanting to appear oncamera in contrast to being white , middle class, and not
wanting to appear on-camera are important when we
consider the unexamined claim that our young people
are a " visual generation" (Mcluhan 1964; Youngblood
1970) and that visual communication is a more natural
mode than a verbal one (Arnheim 1969). My research
findings indicate that, in actuality, not all sectors of the
population feel this way.

The clearest distinctions between Stable Patterns I
and II are seen in items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8. The black
lower-class groups thoroughly enjoyed performing oncamera, and extra people joined the group for this activity. The consistent tendency of these groups was to film
people, but not any group of people. They restricted the
on-camera participants mainly to themselves; occasionally, their close friends and Chalfen were included.
There were many indications of the Stable Pattern I
preference to appear on-camera. During one of the introductory sessions, the following discussions took
place with the group of SP I girls.
Chalfen: And then you've got to figure out who might be in
it-who will be in the film .
You pick the people in it.
Haley:
TM:
Me, I want to be in it (a couple of the other girls
say, "Me, too .").
VW:
All five of us want to be in , everybody wants to be
in it . .. if you make it you gotta be in it .

And later in the same session:
VW:

On-Camera Filming Events and Components
Cell 6 in Table 3 represents the interaction of on-camera
filming and the component "participants." A comparison of behavioral characteristics that characterize this
interaction appears in Figure 3.
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Haley:
VW:

Like I said before, somebody gives a dance and
we invite the people, a party rather and show how
they (different couples) met .. .
Well are you gonna throw a dance and let them
meet this way?
Uh huh . A play dance-just with us in it and a few
other people but they ' re not going to be in it, just
some other people for background. We gonna be
in it the most, right?

Figure 3
Cell 6 Event-Component: On-Camera FilmingParticipants
Characteristics SP I
Original size of group enlarged during and because of oncamera filming

X

2

Original size of group remained the same

3

Tendency to consistently put people in the film

X

4

Use of filmmakers themselves

X

Use of peer group friends

X

15
6
7
8

SP II

X

Use of parents and/or adult relatives
Use of Chalfen-project director
Use of outsiders, people personally unknown to filmmakers

X

X
X
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Figure 4
Cell 7 Event-Component: Filming-Setting
SPI

Characteristics

SP II

Filming inside home of filmmakers
In neighborhood of filmmakers

X

In urban-residential areas

X

2
3
4
5
6

In areas where filmmakers were known

X

Restricted use of settings

X

7

Frequent changes in settings

8

Tendency to arrange setting before filming

In rural-urban nonindustrial nonresidential areas

X

X
X

Figure 5
Cell 8 Event-Component: Filming-Topics
Characteristics
Frequent appearance of people in films

2

Avoidance of using people in films

3
4

Use of people acting and aware of an operating camera

5
6
7
8
9

SPI

SP II

X
X

(M)':'

X

Use of people seen in "natural" behaviors unaware of
operating camera

X

Frequent attention to sports activity

X

Frequent attention to fighting activity

X

Frequent scenes of dancing, drinking and/or smoking

X

Frequent use of scenes of nature and animals

X

Frequent appearance of inanimate objects

X

':'(M) indicates male tendency

The white middle-class groups did not emphasize putting themselves in the movie; they preferred to film unknown people when they required some form of human
activity. Thus, Stable Pattern I is characterized by the
filming of the filmmakers themselves and their friends,
whereas SP II filmmakers infrequently filmed themselves,
never filmed their friends, and preferred to shoot unknown people.
Cells 7 and 8 in Table 3 are collapsed cells representing the relationships of both "on-camera" and "behindcamera" filming events with the "settings" component
(Cell 7) and with the ''topics'' component (Cell 8). These
cells are integrated because the setting or location of
one event almost always coincided with the setting or location of the other event. A similar overlap was noticed
for the topic component.
Additional differences betweeen SP I and SP II are evident when we examine the data for Cells 7 and 8.
Summarizing the data for Cell? we see that SP I
groups were more likely to select a local and familiar setting in their neighborhood but not so intimate a zone as
their own homes. In contrast, SP II groups tended to ignore both their homes and neighborhoods in favor of
quasi-rural settings that were usually some distance
from their neighborhoods.

An unexpected dimension of filmmaking behavior
emerges to differentiate the two patterns. Differences for
findings on the use of local and familiar vs. nonlocal and
unfamiliar settings (see Figure 4) and the use of known
and familiar vs. unknown and unfamiliar on-camera participants (see Figure 3) appear to be consistent for Pattern I and Pattern II groups respectively.
Referring to Cell 8, while the different subject-filmmakers could have filmed almost any set of topics, activities, or events, it appears that five of the eight groups
did not select a vastly divergent array of subject matter.
The data indicate that topic selection·s of the five groups
can be neatly arranged into two relatively uniform patterns, which, in turn, correspond to two socially defined
filmmaking contexts. Thus the existence of two stable
sociovidistic patterns is further strengthened.
The first four items listed for Cell8 in Figure 5 are
closely related to findings reported for Cell 6, which represented the relationship of ''participants'' and ''oncamera filming." In the latter instance, we were asking
"who" appeared in the sociodocumentary films; in Cell
8, when people are listed as a topic, we are more concerned with "how" people are shown and the context of
human activity. However, the component "topics" is not
restricted to people.

A Sociovidisitic Approach to Children's Filmmaking

Item 1 in Figure 5 is interesting in that all groups
showed people in their films at some point . However, the
groups greatly differed with respect to how people were
shown , how human activity was emphasized , and , in
some cases , how it was avoided.
One general finding is that all three black lower-class
groups in SP I show people in nearly every shot of their
practice and final films. The people may not always be
the filmmakers themselves , but some form of human activity is con sistently shown. The white middle-class
groups of SP II, especially the male group (see item 2,
Figure 5), tended to avoid filming people or treated the
human image in equal importance to either animal life or
inanimate objects (see items 8 and 9, Figure 5).
A lack of interest in filming humans, human activity,
and / or human products was carried to an extreme by
the male SP II group. Information on this topic restriction
came out during a discussion during their 28th session ,
on the use of a shot with a person in it.
DR :

" Jetty and People ," [reading from a shot list] do
we have that in there? Number 7?
TM:
" Jetty and People ," what 's that? Is that checked ,
Chuck?
CM :
Yeah [meaning it is still in film].
DR :
Take it out .
Chalfen : Isn 't that the one where one or two people walk
down on the jetty?
CM:
Could I see, what does it look like?
TM :
We can 't use it ; it 's got people in it anyway.
DR :
I know .
CM :
All right . Use number 9. Even though there is Tim
in it , it's probably one of the prettiest shots there .
Chalfen : People can 't be in it because they are produced?
TM:
Well let's put it this way , Dick, we 've set rules , but
what we 'll do is, uh, the rules are flexible. All
right?
Chalfen : What is one of the rules? What do you mean; I
don 't understand what you mean by rules .
TM :
.. . no people , no man-made th ings , no cars ; well
the thing is that what we also mean by "manmade ," another way of putting that would be, you
know, ugly, protruding , you know , and it happens
that person there , it is a very pretty shot with that
person there, with the sun coming along behind .
CM:
It 's actually as though he's not really alive.
TM :
Yeah . . . I would keep it in; I really don't know
where it will fit into our film .
I would keep it in too ... I think it 's the prettiest
CM :
shot there .

So, in discussing a "violation" we learn more about
tha norms, or "rules," that have been imposed on topic
selection. It appears that humans were appropriate as
long as they don't look "alive."
Thus, again, we see that what could have been a very
diverse and heterogeneous choice of subject matter appears also to have a nonrandom and structured quality.
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The last component relevant to on-camera filming
events, in a sociodocumentary context, is "message
form. " The general concern of this event-component
relationship (represented in Cell 9) is how the subject
matter, as arranged in front of an operating motion picture camera, becomes the message form of the film itself. This information contrasts with appropriate data for
Cell 12, which examines how the message form may be
structured by behind-camera activity, in which cases the
visual content of a film is more a result of camera manipulation than the stream of behavior that occurred in front
of the camera.
Characteristics of Cell 9 are outlined in Figure 6.
While Cell 9 is not very rich in data, the distinctions
between items 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the findings for item 5
are particularly important, though not too surprising.
In light of earlier findings for Cells 6 and 8 (see Figures 3 and 5), and the next findings for Cell 11 (Figure
7) , it is logical that we see Stable Pattern I filmmakers
preferring to use the presence and activity of their own
bodies as the focal point of their message forms. In
many respects, these young people are metaphorically
asking to be looked at for the integrity and importance of
themselves . In this sense, the meta-message of this message form is "look at me. "
In contrast to this perspective, for the white middleclass filmmakers, the focal point of scenes using people
(who were usually not the filmmakers) was a juxtaposition of people within a specific environment. In most
cases , this was a "found " relationship rather than a
staged one. Thus, the meta-message of these message
forms is " look at me see. "

Behind-Camera Filming Events and Components
It appears that behind-camera filming events are equally
as important as on-camera events but for quite different
reasons . Both types of filming events have four relevant
component interactions, and, as previously noted , two
cells are " held" in common. Relevant relationships shall
be discussed in analysis of Cells 11 and 12.
Cell 11 represents the relationship between the "participants " component and " behind-camera " filming
events. The general concern is who was involved in the
use of the camera and related filming apparatus, and the
behavior of the group while this event took place.
Findings for Cell 11 are important in further presenting
evidence for the two stable but different patterns of sociovidistic behavior. Whereas SP I groups enlarged during filming events, it was obvious that the interest and
enthusiasm was for on-camera participation and not
behind-camera participation (see item 1, Figure 3). It became clear that the interest of SP II groups was more
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concentrated on behind-camera filming, but they did not
allow extra people to come to their sessions for this reason (see item 1, Figure 7).
Items 2 and 3 of Figure 7 illustrate an interesting reciprocal relationship between filming attitudes expressed by
subject-filmmakers from the two stable patterns. Members of the black lower-class groups hoped that someone in the group would take over the technical matters
and want to do the actual filming . Use of the equipment
was a low-priority activity when compared to an opportunity to be on-camera (see Figure 3). The excitement of "making a movie" did not include an enthusiasm for behind-camera activity after the initial
learning and practice were completed .
One answer to the disinterest in filming appears in item 5;
these groups asked Chalfen to film the movie for them . But
wh ile SP I groups would ask Chalfen to use the camera, neitherthey roor any other group in the research asked an outsiderto shoottheir movie(see item4).
Characteristic behavior of SP II for Cell 11 sharply
contrasts with attitudes and behavior that have been outlined fo r SP I. Instead of having difficulty getting any one
group member to do the shooting , members of the white
middle-class groups insisted that each person have an

equal opportunity to use the equipment and to film in his
or her preferred manner. There was an impl icit agreement that behind-camera duties were to be shared
equally ; one group member could not become " numberone cameraman .''
For Stable Pattern II groups, beh ind-camera filming
was a high-priority activity in " making a movie. " Field
notes from the 11th session of the boys ' group read as
follows.
One point was ve ry striking to me today. In terms of what I
have called " the shooting event " [now called " behindcamera filming events "], it is very clear that the emphasis of
these boys is on what the camera does and what the shot
looks like . There is a lot of value placed on shooting and
composing the images. At times, I saw all 4 boys behind the
camera , hudd led , trying to see how it was going to look ....
This is just opposite from the black fil mmakers who each
demanded to be in the footage , and often neglected to
leave someone to shoot the film .

Figure 6
Cell 9 Event Component: On-Camera Filming-Message Form
Characteristics

SPI

Presentation of self (usually the filmmakers) as message form

X

2

Rehearsals of on-camera presence

X

3

Use of costumes, makeup, props, etc.

X

4
5

Focus of attention is behavior of person(s) on-camera

X

Focus of attention is relationship between people and
surroundings that appear on-camera

SP II

X

Figure 7
Cell11 Event-Component: Behind-Camera Filming-Participants
Characteristics

SPI

SP II

Original size of group enlarges because of behind-camera
filming

2

Attitooe: Any group member does filming

3

Attitooe: Every group member does filming

4
5

Outsider asked to do filming
Chalfen asked to do filming

X
X

X
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Figure 8
Cell 12 Event-Component: Behind-Camera Filming- Message Form
Characteristics
Tendency to shoot film in the sequence prescribed by script or outline

2

Tendency to shoot film "out of sequence"

3

Simple use of camera technology

4
5
6
7

Elaborated use of camera's abilities

Camera used to produce a record or copy of reality

8

Camera used to collect, distort, and manipulate imagery

Preference for long camera takes of fabricated scenes

SPI
X

X
X
X
X

Preference for short ca:nera takes of "natural " scenes

Later in my notes from the same session :
There was an emphasis placed on finding the best shot. Remarks included: "Oh, that 's pretty ... shoot it! . . . Chuck's
got one .. . No , Dave 's is better .... " Again the emphasis
was on getting the camera to do neat shots. This was really in
the form of excitement. Whereas I used to have trouble keeping everybody interested in what was going on while only one
person could use the camera at a time (Pattern I groups),
these boys were always finding things to check up on or in
looking for the next shot . At one point I heard "the setting-up
staff'' mentioned . They were in charge of the camera placement, f-stop and the focus . Each one [memberofthegroup]
would check the shot . A lot of cooperation indeed.

It is very significant that SP II groups stressed the
"recording" aspects of moviemaking rather than "being
recorded ." The meta-message of their film communication, expressed as "look at me see," is again evident.
The second important event-component included in
behind-camera filming is represented by Cell 12. In the
relationship of "message form" and "behind-camera"
filming, we are concerned with how the message form of
the film is primarily structured by specific ways of using
the camera. Behavioral characteristics of this relationship are outlined in Figure 8.
Findings for Cell12 reaffirm several SP 1-SP II differences and are internally consistent with findings reported
for other cells. Stable Pattern I groups were more likely to
produce a story line, and their behjnd-camera activity
chronologically followed time sequences according to
the story line. Stable Pattern II groups, less likely to develop a story line, preferred to film different' 'sections'' or
''scenes',· of their films according to needed settings that
were easily accessible and convenient. Thus, SP II groups
favored shooting their film out of sequence, if a sequence
had been determined during planning.
SP I and SP II differences found for items 3 and 4 are a
logical extension of attitudes toward filming reported in
both Cells 6 and 11 (Figures 3 and 7). The groups that
attended more to on-camera performance (SP I) tended
to simplify the use of the camera by using it primarily as
a recording or copying device (see items 3 and 7). For
these groups, individual shots were frequently the length

SP II

X
X
X

of a full camera wind and contained scenes of prearranged, and often rehearsed, settings and I or sequences of acting (see item 5).
Stable Pattern II groups, on the other hand, in attending to behind-camera activity, tended to elaborate and
exploit the camera's potential. In doing so, they preferred to make short shots, sometimes as brief as a few
frames, which were frequently composed as still life images. In collecting sequences of these short shots, the
camera was also used to distort the imagery by changing the speed of the camera, changing the focus, or running the camera on its side or upside-down (see item 8).
Findings reported in Figure 8 allow us to extend our
thinking on the SP II preference for manipulating units of
symbolic material. Findings reported in response to
questions raised by this event-component offer visible
manifestations of this preference as well as a comparative paradigm of opposite behavior characteristic of SP I
filmmaking.
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Unstable Pattern Ill (USP.III)
It remains to reapply the sociovidistic framework to examine the filmmaking projects of three other groups that now
comprise Unstable Pattern Ill. Subjects in these groups
come from black middle-class and white lower-class
backgrounds (groups 6, 7, and 8 in Tables 1 and 2).
Groups have been included in USP Ill because distinct
changes were observed in their filmmaking process and
not because all the changes were the same. For instance,
the subjects could change their choice of shooting locations, themes, or topics for the film; they could reorganize
themselves for shooting, acting, or editing the film; or they
could rewrite and reshoot sequences of action.
In retrospect, it appears that the three USP Ill groups
either "borrowed" traits or shifted between traits identified as characteristic of either Stable Pattern I or Stable
Pattern II. Relatively few new behavioral traits were introduced in the analysis of USP Ill. Specific examples will
make this clearer. Analyzed event-component relationships will again be limited to activities associated with
filming events.

USP Ill Filming Events and Components
Several relevant examples of behavioral shifts occurred
during the filming events of the black middle-class girls'
group (see Group 8, Tables 1 and 2). On-camera and
behind-camera behavior changed during the making of
their practice films. The four girls began their outside
practice footage by enthusiastically shooting nearly all
200 feet of film on scenes of themselves in short oncamera skits. Many scenes included themselves posing
and looking directly at the camera. In terms of the behavioral characteristics outlined for Cell 6 (see Figure 3),
this group exhibited a strong tendency to film people,
using themselves as participants in on-camera events.
They also filmed Chalfen but generally avoided filming
people who were unknown and/or outside the film
group (see items 3, 4, 7, and 8 of Figure 3). According
to these results, this group initially conformed to the sociovidistic behavior of Stable Pattern I.
However, when the rushes of this practice film were
first seen, the girls were quietly upset. They were unhappy with what they saw, and two girls were noticeably
embarrassed. After their second session of practice
shooting, the girls verbalized a dislike for being in the
movie so much of the time:
Chalfen: Well, listen, I think you liked this 200 feet better
than that first 200 feet.
CM:
You know why? ... We weren't really, we weren't
in it as much as the other one, we were really in
that one.
Chalfen: Yeah, that's true, you're not in this one as much.
CM :
Well we were ... But, everything but the faces.

The second practice footage made by this group looks
very unlike their first efforts. People appear much less
frequently, and there are only a few full body shots of
members of the film group. Face-camera interactions are
almost totally absent. This time, the girls tended not to
use themselves as on-camera participants and were
more willing to film outsiders or just headless bodies
when they needed humans on-camera (see items 3, 4,
and 8 of Figures 3 and 9). This remarkable change in the
relationship between participants and on-camera events
now conforms much more to characteristics of Stable
Pattern II. This set of changes is illustrated in the righthand columns of Figure 9.
In other words, the filmmaking behavior of this USP Ill
group, initially conforming to characteristics of the black
lower-class groups, shifted toward the behavioral pattern
characteristics of the white middle-class groups.
A shift in just the opposite direction was observed for
another Unstable Pattern Ill group comprised of white
lower-class girls (see Group 7, Tables 1 and 2). In their
first practice footage, shot in a large park near a creek,
they avoided filming each other as appropriate on-camera participarrt&. Instead they used the telephoto lens to
film people in different parts of the park. Their oncamera subjects neither knew the filmmakers nor were
known by the filmmakers. The girls quickly panned over
a vast area of trees, hills, parkland, and buildings across
a street in order to film a mounted park guard, two
young boys playing near a drain pipe, four people sitting
under a tree smoking, and other people walking dogs or
driving by in cars and busses.
In terms of behavioral items listed in Figure 3, it is significant that most of their on-camera participants were
unknown people. Members of the film group were initially reluctant to be filmed and kept ducking away from
the camera. This USP Ill group was first like SP II groups
for item 2 (the size of the group remained the same),
item 4 (they did not tend to film themselves), and item 8
(they did film unknown people). These girls were also
like SP I groups only in item 3, the tendency to consistently put people in the movie.
However, this pattern of behavior significantly changed
later in the same afternoon when the girls continued shooting their second 100 feet of outside practice film. They
asked metodrivethemto a local cemetery. Again, they
concentrated their filming on people. This time, however,
they almost exclusively filmed themselves in various oncamera skits. When the girls later saw the rushes of this
footage they verbalized their shift in behavior.
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29-31 In the first practice film made by Group 8 (black
middle-class girls) the teenagers enjoyed using themselves as
on-camera participants-in scenes of group dancing, modell ing , hamming for the camera , and short dramatic skits .
The ir first tendencies were to produce a Stable Pattern I
model of moviemaking .

32-34 The second practice film shot by Group 8 contained very
few shots of group members posing for the camera. This time
they much preferred to film interior scenery, objects, designs ,
and only body parts rather than whole people. They also began
to manipulate the camera-creating slow motion and trick photography. Their changes were producing a version of Stable Pattern II, characteristic of white middle-class filmmaking.

Illustration 29

Illustration 32

Illustration 30

Illustration 33

Illustration 31

Illustration 34

Illustrations 29-34
Unstable Pattern Ill is characterized by distinct shifts and observable changes in filmmaking behavior.
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Referring to Figures 3 and 10, these girls changed
their behavior to conform more to a Stable Pattern I set
of characteristics, specifically in item 1 (they continued
consistently to film people), item 4 (they now almost exclusively filmed themselves) , and item 8 (they ignored
unknown people). The girls also made several shots of
Chalfen (see item 7), in conformance with behavior observed for all the film groups. These changes are illustrated in Figure 10.

You know what was funny about it? In the beginning we just all filmin ' all of our-everything, and
then ... at the end of it it's all us, and all people .
That was funny; in the beginn ing was all about
buildings and stuff, and at the end it was all
people in it. Why did we do that? . .. I think we
were bashful at the beginn ing .. . .
That 's what I think we should do with the movie,
film people , because when you just film scenery I
don 't like it . Do you?

.

~
·-··:·:·:·:·:·::::::: ::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;.:':':<·:·:::·==:·..::::;all
; - - - - - · ·:::::::::::.:::::·... . ······ ···· ········ ·
·~~:::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::;::::::::::::::::::::~~

:;:;:;:;::;:;:;:=::<:::::::::::::::::;,'-::-::i<IJil!lll!lllllllll!lllllll-llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll!IIIJIJIII!m
':.~=:.·:.=.•:=••=.=,..=.=:.·=,=,:,.:.:,.:_:, ·.·.=,=.=,:.=,:.=,:.=,:. .=. =.=,=..=.=•.=.=..· ..'==..=...= =.=.=...:==..=.=..=.=.·. :.·=,..: =·=.:. =.·.=.==.:::::=
.
..:=::=:::::::=:=::::;:;:;:;::
..::::~::::::::::;:;:;:;:::::::::;:;:.:;:;:;:;:;:;:·:-:;:-:;:;:-:-:; ::;:::::::::;:;:;:;::::::::;:::;~~~
::......~- ~

Figure 9
Cell& Event-Component: On-Camera FilmingParticipants

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Stable
Patterns
I

Characteristics
Original size of group enlarged during and because of on -camera
filming
Original size of group remained the same
Tendency to consistently put people in the film
Use of the filmmakers themselves
Use of peer group friends
Use of parents / or adult relatives
Use of Chalfen-project director
Use of outsiders , people personally unknown to filmmakers

Unstable
Pattern Ill
1st time *

II

2nd timet

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

':'Refers to first 200 feet of practice filming
tRefers to second 200 feet of practice filming

Figure 10
Cell& Event-Component: On-Camera Filming- Participants

Characteristics

Stable
Patterns
I

Original size of group enlarged during and because of oncamera filming

X

2

Original size of group remained the size

3
4
5

Tendency to consistently put people in the film

X

Use of filmmakers themselves

X

Use of peer group friends

X

6
7

Use of parents and/or adult relatives
Use of Chalfen-project director

8

Use of outsiders, people personally unknown to filmmakers
'~ Refers to first 100 feet of first practice filming
t Refers to second 100 feet of first practice filming
t Refers to second session of 200 feet of practice fi lming

II

Unstable
Pattern Ill
1st
100' '~ '~

X

X

2nd
100't

later*
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Illustrations 35-44
Another Unstable Pattern Ill group (white lower-class females)
appeared to shift toward behavior characteristic of Stable Pattern I.

35-39 Group 7 filmmakers chose to make their first practice
film in a large open park known as Cobbs Creek. While surrounded by trees, grass, and open space , they sought out instances of human activity. Instead of filming objects of nature,
they focused their cameras on unknown people-a mounted
policeman, several boys playing in a creek area, three people
smoking while sitting next to a tree, a man on the sidewalk,
and the driver and occupants of a bus .

Illustration 35

Illustration 38

Illustration 36

Illustration 39

Illustration 37
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40 Group 7 filmmakers were initially unwilling to appear in
their movies. Several times they were observed ducking away
from the camera . Unknown people were selected as on-camera participants.

Later practice filming conformed to behavior described
for their second roll of outside shooting. The majority of
their footage again showed people, and the filmmakers
themselves were most frequently seen. However, they
also filmed anyone and everyone (including Chalfen) who
came into the area where they were shooting. In this latter
behavior, these girls shared the SP II tendency to film unknown "outsiders" (see item 8, Figure 10).
Even within sessions devoted to practice filming, a
change in preference for on-camera participation has
been observed. Though the sociovidistic behavior of this
lower-socioeconomic white group drew on characteristics of the two Stable Patterns, the observed shift located this group's preferences much closer to the pattern
established for the lower-class way of making a movie.
It is expected that sociovidistic behavior is coordinated across cells; shifts found in one cell should be related to , and expected from, shifts found in other cells.
With reference to the first Unstable Pattern Ill group
(black middle-class girls) relevant relationships between
filming events and topics (Cell 8) and message form
(Cell 9) deserve attention .
A very noticeable change in choice of appropriate
film topics occurred between the first and second practice sessions. These girls initially filmed only themselves
performing on-camera skits. These skits included activities such as synchronized dancing, modeling clothes,
and scenes of gun-dueling and a melodramatic farewell.
In terms of findings for Cell 8 (see Figure 5), their behavior conformed to Stable Pattern I for items 1 and 3 and
also included the dancing activity listed in item 7.
However, after the girls viewed this footage, and during the second practice filming, they radically altered
their on-camera presence and their choice of appropriate on-camera activities and topics. As previously
mentioned, people in general and the filmmakers in particular appear much less frequently. There was some attempt to catch people in natural behaviors, unaware of
an operating camera. Much more attention was paid to
inanimate objects such as doors, books, elevator buttons and numbers, toilets, Kotex dispensers, sculpture, a
water fountain, coffee and cookie machines, and patterns of dots on a wall. Again, with specific reference to
items 2, 4, and 9 in Figure 5, the shift has been in the direction of SP II as illustrated in Figure 11.
The last example of shifting behavior to be described
for the black middle-class film group involves the relationship of filming and message form. Findings
presented in Figures 6 and 8, for Cells 9 and 12 respectively, indicate that Stable Pattern I groups tended to
present themselves and their actions as the message
form. The focus of attention was the behavior of someone (usually a member of the film group) while oncamera . It should be clear that these characteristics accurately describe the behavior of this Unstable Pattern Ill
Qroup, as illustrated in Figure 12.

Illustration 40

However, while we notice that findings in Cell 9 are
more relevant to Pattern I, characteristics of Cell 12, the
relationship of behind-camera events and message
form, are more relevant to Pattern II. As outlined in Figure 13, the filmmakers in the black middle-class group
changed their filming attentions to manipulating the
camera and testing its potential in purposefully altering
the message form. Emphasis shifted away from a total
preoccupation with what happened in front of the camera and using the camera primarily as a recording device. These girls began to explore using the camera to
manipulate and possibly distort imagery as well as collect it (see items 4 and 8 of Figures 8 and 13).
In the second 200 feet of practice, se\(eral behindcamera skits were attempted that resembled behindcamera performance of the white middle-class boys'
group . Thus for several additional items, the changes
noticed in the analysis of Cells 9 and 12 again indicate a
shift for the black middle-class girls toward Stable Pattern II sociovidistic behavior.
The patterned changes of the black middle-class
group has clearly put them closer to a white middleclass way of making a movie than to the pattern established by the black lower-class groups. It is very tempting to speculate on parallel findings on social mobility
and changes in sociovidistic behavior. While this topic
deserves additional attention, it is not the central theme
of this report.
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41-44

The girls in Group 7 dramaticallychangedtheirchoices
during the second practice shooting. Choosing to film in a cemetery , they decided tofilmthemselveswhilesmoking , and while
dancing in short skits, and they enjoyed mugging for the camera .
These changes produced a version of Stable Pattern I filmmaking, characteristic of lower-socioeconomic-class
teenagers.

Illustration 41

Illustration 44

Hints of Collaborative Evidence

Illustration 42

Illustration 43

Since completing the Philadelphia Project, considerable
time has been given to locating and examining potential
sources of comparable data. A search has been made
for examples of teenage filmmaking that might confirm
or negate results from Philadelphia. I have profited
greatly from discussions with Rodger Larson, Brian
Sutton-Smith, Tony Hodgkinson, Rick Weise, Maureen
Gaffney, Sven Norlin, DeeDee Halleck, Kit Laybourne,
and Bob Aristarco-all of whom are professionally concerned with children's filmmaking. In almost all cases
teenage films have been produced under different circumstances; different teaching methods, motivations,
and expectations have guided other projects. 8 While almost everyone could offer some form of anecdotal contribution in general agreement, few specific examples
could be produced and directly related to the sociovidistic findings reported in this paper.
The most interesting example of similar results may be
found in a film entitled Young Filmmakers (1968). 9 This
film documents the "World's First Conference of Young
Filmmakers" organized by John Culkin. Approximately
one quarter through the film a narrator asks the following questions: ''If a man is suddenly given a new voice,
what would he say? With new eyes, what would he look
at?" We wanted an answer in our context (of children's
filmmaking). The narrator continues: "So we chose two
groups of very dissimilar boys and gave each the
chance to make an instant movie in the same limited environment." The first group of four upper-middle-class
white teenagers came from a private school in suburban
Philadelphia. These boys had learned basic filmmaking
in their school's media course and had made two films
before this experience. The other group consisted of five
black and Puerto Rican teenagers from the Lower East
Side of New York. Four members were high school dropouts. They had learned filmmaking at the University Set-

28

studies in Visual Communication

..' '"''':·:·:·:·:·:·
-=··=-~=:::::::::::::::;:;:;:;:;
•--lllllllll!llllllll!ll!ll'ilill"~

:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:::: :.:-:·:·:·:

'·' :·':''.:..,:·.·:.':·.=',=..=.==·. .:.::·.·.'',.',='. ,':.·..,:,:.:,:.=·..,:,:=.,=:..,·.::,=
. ,'.','·=
.,'.·',=._
:.··.=.•.-_~.'·::~
.>"".><>.=- - - - :::::;:;:::::::::;:;:;:;:;:·:;:: .:-:-:-:·:.:-:-:·::::::::::::::::::':':':':·:·:·:·:·::::::~=~$:>"'>>:>=
:;:;:;:·:;::;:;:::::;:;:;:;:;:;::::::::::::::::::::*::;~;:;:~:::::=mll!l!l!lllllllllllllll!lllllllll!l!l!llllllll--lllllllllllllllllllllll!llll!llfm·.'::·,·::;: ':''.::,.::,.::,·.::..·.:,:.':,.',:·:.,:'.·:'·'=

Figure 11
Cell 8 Event-Component: Filming-Topics

Stable
Patterns
I

Characteristics

Unstable
Pattern Ill
1st timet

II

1

Frequent appearance of people in films

2

Avoidance of using people in films

3
4

X

5

Use of people acting and aware of an operating camera
Use of people seen in "natural" behaviors unaware of
operating camera
Frequent attention to sports activity

6
7

Frequent attention to fighting activity
Frequent scenes of dancing, drinking and/or smoking

X

8

Frequent use of scenes of nature and animals

X

9

Frequent appearance of inanimate objects

X

'~ (M)

indicates male tendency

2nd time*

X

X

x(M) ':'

X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X

t Refers to first 200 feet of practice filming
tRefers to second 200 feet of practice filming

Figure 12
Cell9 Event-Component: On-Camera FilmingMessage Fonn

Characteristics
1

Stable
Patterns
I

Unstable
Pattern Ill
1st time *

II

X

2

Presentation of self (usually the filmmakers) as message form
Rehearsals of on-camera presence

3

Use of costumes, make-up, props , etc.

X

X

4
5

Focus of attention is behavior of person(s) on-camera
Focus of attention is relationship between people and
surroundings that appear on-camera.

X

X

2nd timet

X

X

X

X

Figure 13
Cell 12 Event-Component: Behind-Camera FilmingMessage Form

Characteristics
Teooency to shoot film in the sequence prescribed by script or
outline
2
3

Tendency to shoot film "out of sequence "
Simple use of camera technology

4

Elaborated use of camera's abilities

5
6
7

Preference for long camera takes of fabricated sce nes
Preference for short camera takes of "natural " scenes
Camera used to produce a record or copy of reality

8

Camera used to collect, distort and manipulate imagery
*Refers to first 200 feet of practice fi Iming
t Refers to second 200 feet of practice filming

Stable
Patterns
I

Unstable
Pattern Ill
1st time

II

2nd timet

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
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tlement Club, a federally funded project directed by
Rodger Larson (Roddick 1967; O'Connor 1967) and
had cooperated on the production of several films. Both
groups were given 16mm cameras and film stock and
were asked to make a film using the same spaces in a
hotel. The young filmmakers were given half an hour to
plan their film and one hour to shoot it. Each group
worked independently, and presumably neither group
knew what the other was doing.
Results of this informal experiment strongly resemble
several findings presented in this report. The New York
teenagers made a gangland-type film which featured the
misadventures of two "businessmen" trying to see "the
boss" about a $1 million "investment." Following an organized story line set to the theme music from Goldfinger, these filmmakers chose to include themselves in
every scene. Their characterizations of unusual types required actors to dress up and to "act up" for on-camera
performances.
In contrast, the private school teenagers from Philadelphia produced more of an abstract movie "about"
the production of a film. Accompanied by music from a
Moog synthesizer, this film consists of many sequences
of isolated objects (e.g., a script, desk, camera, reels of
films, synchronizer, tape recorder, pieces of sculpture,
water fountain, newspaper headline) shot in short takes
and edited into a quickly paced montage. The filmmakers or any form of human activity are almost never
seen. The film ends by having a film box-presumably
the completed film-placed in an elevator.
The material presented in Young Filmmakers demonstrates considerable overlap with the sociovidistic results
discussed in this report. Two groups of teenagers from
different sociocultural backgrounds produced distinctively different kinds of films. 10 We are given independently produced examples and evidence for the existence of several key characteristics of Stable Patterns I
and II as they emerged from the sociodocumentary research projects in Philadelphia. Preferences for oncamera vs. behind-camera performance were maintained; contrasting patterns of topics, message form,
and code appear once again.
.
For instance, both groups independently decided to include an elevator scene in each film. When the elevator
doors open in the New Yorkers' film, we see two members
of the group·dressed as gangster' 'toughs.'' The other
filmmaking group chose to shoot the same elevator by
using a point-of-view camera technique. This scene includes interior details of the elevator and adjacent office;
however no people are in these shots. In this comparative
examj)le, characteristics of Stable Pattern I are illustrated
by the lower-socioeconomic-class teenagers' preferences for on-camera performance and for using themselves
as centers of attention. In contrast, Stable Pattern II preferences for behind-camera activity, reluctance to be' 'in''
the movie, and a look-at-me-see meta-message are evident in the middle-class film production. In addition, other
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choices involving story line, use of inanimate objects,
editing techniques, and synchronized sound further differentiate the two·Stable Patterns.
In summary, many questions remain regarding the
generalizability of these findings. It is very difficult to find
comparable examples of nondirective projects-projects
that allow a freedom of indigenous expression with
respect to both content and form.

Conclusions
Primary objectives of the Philadelphia Project were to apply sociodocumentary methods to generate comparative
examples of teenage film communication and to observe
the influence of social and cultural factors in several examples of film production. The purpose of this report has
been to demonstrate the systematic application of a sociovidistic scheme of description and analysis to the
products and processes of teenage film communication .
The research demonstrated that film communication
can be studied through a series of event-component
relationships; the proposed sociovidistic scheme has
provided us with a productive tool for discovering patterns of similar and different behaviors across several
filmmaking projects.
In turn, research findings have produced a better
understanding of the variable nature of a film communication process. The process looks quite different when different culturally defined groups organize film communication for the first time. It is not surprising to find that all
teenage subjects could learn to use 16mm professional
filmmaking equipment with considerable ease and confidence. It is perhaps more relevant to understand that
while all groups of young people were intellectually and
physically capable of making movies, not all groups
wanted to participate in moviemaking in the same way,
and some groups did not want to participate at all.
Perhaps the most substantial and provocative finding of
the Philadelphia Project has been the emergence of two
distinctly different patterns of sociovidistic behavior.
Young people from two unlike subcultures have produced two unlike but stable patterns of film communication. Specifically, filmmaking subjects from black and
lower-socioeconomic backgrounds preferred to
use and manipulate themselves and familiar aspects of
their immediate environment in their symbolic communication. In contrast, the white and more affluent subjects
preferred to use and manipulate (more than record) images of unfamiliar things and people, other than themselves, found in areas away from their familiar environment. This finding has several interesting relationships to
work done on the importance of class and ethnic variables.
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The ethno-class differences, suggested by the separation of Pattern I and Pattern II behaviors, have many implications for future inquiry. For instance, there may exist a direct relationship between a preference for
manipulating symbolic events and a feeling for control
over one 's environment. It is also suggested that a desire
and ability to actually explore and manipulate an environment of natural events may be correlated with a preference to explore and manipulate symbolic events.
The findings for Unstable Pattern Ill further emphasize
the importance of the "social class" variable . When films
were made by anomalous groups (from black middleclass and white lower-class backgrounds) , the sociovidistic shifts seemed to be controlled by the class variable. The black middle-class group of girls tended to act
more like the white middle-class groups of Stable Pattern
II, and the white lower-class groups shifted their behavior to conform more to the black lower-class Pattern I.
Further implications of this study are related to the development and demonstrated application of the sociovidistic scheme of analysis. Investigators now have a theoretical and analytical foundation for future work. 11
However, the appropriateness or usefulness of this
scheme of events and components for other film genres
and other codes and modes of pictorial communication
remains problematic for the moment.

Notes

2

3

4

5

These comments are not offered as negative criticism of many interesting projects and articles on children 's filmmaking . It is acknowledged that projects, articles, and reports are produced for many reasons satisfying different needs, questions and audiences. This report
does not include filmmaking projects done outside the United States.
This is not to say that Worth and Adair paid no attention to context or
had no plan for describing context. They list six "areas of context ": (1)
the learning situation , (2) the choice of Navajo students, (3) the students' choice of actors for their films, (4) their choice of film subjects
or themes, (5) their method of working (technical and perceptual) , and
(6) the interrelation of their filmmaking and their community (1972:139140). The point here is that the sociovidistic scheme incorporates and
realigns these six areas within a framework more directly related to another communicative modality, namely, speech.
Further explanation of these points will appear in a forthcoming paper
by the author entitled : "From Verbal to Visual: Sociolinguistics, Vidistics
and Sociovidistics." In future discussions it may prove useful to distinguish Worth's predominant interests as " psychovidistic " from work described in this report as sociovidistic. With specific reference to children's filmmaking, see Sutton-Smith (1977, 1979) for examples· of the
former , and Chalfen (1974) and Chalfen and Haley (1971) for the
latter.
I am, in part, making certain paraphrases from the work of Dell Hymes
(197 4:83) and Bauman and Sherzer (197 4:6), substituting visual terms
for linguistic / verbal references.
The project was supported by a three-year research grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (No . S-R01-MH17521) entitled' 'Exploring Social Perception with Film ." The grant was administered by the
Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic where I worked as a Research Associate between 1967 and 1972.

6 I am fully aware that the terms "social class, " " middle class," and
"lower class " have had precise meanings for different social scientists.
When the adjectives "lower" or "middle" accompany the use of "social class," they are meant in a relative frame of reference. Thus some
groups were " higher" or " lower" relative to other groups in the study.
NO invidious comparisons are implied.
7 Jay Haley was Director of Research at the Philadelphia Child Guidance
Clinic. He served aschiefconsultanton the NIMH research grant.
8 The Minnewaska Symposium on Child-Made Films provided an excellent opportunity to examine results of many alternative filmmaking programs for young people (Chalfen 1977; Covert and McBride 1977;
Shapiro 1977).
9 This 25-minute black-and-white film was produced by David Hoffman
as part of his work for Public Broadcast Laboratory. The conference,
which attracted 7 40 young filmmakers and 500 teachers, was held in
New York's Park Sheraton Hotel. Young Filmmakers may be rented
from Brandon Films.
10 In the last section of Young Filmmakers, the two groups of teenagers discussed their films after seeing both productions. They questioned why
they didn 't make the same kind of film. One black teenager from the
Lower East Side presented a cogent explanation: " I have not had the
same experiences [as the white upper-middle class teenagers]
. .. They take stuff and make it into life. To me , this is like a dream ; I don't
know what it is to them. If I had the time to sit back and look around and
put things together, I could make a wonderful thing. I know they have
time for this- I don't have time- I don 't have so much feel for that. I make
a film of the first thing that comes to my head, and what I know-how
people carry on. And that 's what I think will catch the audience's
attention.' '
In contrast, a spokesman for the upper-middle-class Philadelphia
group explained: "We were making the film today as an experiment.
We were not trying to prove any points, not that there 's no point in
terms of moral or underlying social meaning. The point is that the visual
imagery was supposed to create some idea ."
11 To my knowledge, three studies have used the sociovidistic scheme,
namely Musella 's work on snapshot communication (1980), lntintoli's
(1979) proposal for studying the production of television documentaries, and Aristarco 's fieldwork on children's filmmaking (1980). At the
time of this writing results of the Aristarco project are not complete.

Appendix: Summary of Sociodocumentary Films
Stable Pattern 1: Black Lower-Class Groups
Group 1. The first group of boys produced a 13-minute film titled What
We Do on Saturdays on Our Spare Time. In their outside practice footage , shot in a local parking lot, the boys filmed themselves playing
football, fighting, acting drunk, and getting fresh with two girls. A lot of
posing for the camera characterizes these shots . Practicing inside a
settlement house, they filmed themselves playing Ping-Pong, dancing,
and being interviewed.
Their sociodocumentary film is about what they like to do as a group
on a typical Saturday. We see them playing Ping-Pong and enjoying
themselves in the recreation basement of the settlement house. The
film shows the group walking upstairs and out the front door. While
walking to a parking lot two blocks away, they window-shop, check a
telephone box for forgotten change, and buy french fries . The major
portion of their film is devoted to scenes of playing football. In the
middle of the game, an argument develops into a mass fight scene.
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The boys make amends and continue to play football. Later, they leave
the parking lot, to reappear , staggering in a drunken manner. Fighti ng
again erupts , followed by another truce . In the end, the boys leave the
parking lot, presumably on their way home . The film 's sound track
consists of an interview by the boys (on why they like having a film
club) and a jazz piece titled " Moejoe ."
Group 2. The second group to make a film was a girls ' club called the
" Soul Sisters." They produced a ? Y2 -minute film titled Don 't Make a
Good Girl Go Bad. In their practice footage , the girls concentrated on
filming themselves in scenes of dancing and fighting; other forms of
competitive behavior include fle xing their arm muscles and cigarette
smoking. The girls we re not interested in using the camera or in editing activities .
The story line of their finished film involves a conflict between an
adolescent unwed mother and her mother. After an argument and
several mutual insults, the daughter slaps her mother and is thrown
out of their home. The unwed daughter and her infant child then visit a
girlfriend's apartment and are invited to stay as long as needed . The
girls in the apartment celebrate the arrival of their new roommates with
a party . An adequate supply of liquor, cigarettes , and drugs are enjoyed as the girls appear in scenes of dancing , drinking, smoking,
swearing , etc. Eventually the party evolves into a drunken brawl. When
one of the girls tries to get additional drugs, she is discovered by the
police . The police raid the party and jail all the girls except the unwed
mother and her baby. The elder mother then enters the apartment and
takes away her grandchtld. The daughter gets up from lying drunk on
the couch and follows her mother out the door to end the film . (For a
more complete account of this project, see Chalfen and Haley 1971 .)
Group 3. A group of black teenage boys called the " Nobleteens"
comprised the third filmmaking group. In their outside practice shooting , these boys emphasized the filming of themselves playing basketball , standing in front of a graffiti-laden wall , and in scenes of hamming
for the camera . For their inside practice, they again shot scenes of
themselves fighting and of the mugging and robbing of an adult drunk.
Although the boys had ideas of making a film of their street life, no
major film was produced .

Stable Pattern II: White Middle-Class Groups
Group 4. In the first project with middle-class teenagers, a group of
boys produced a ?-minute film titled WPFG-M1 . Practicing outside ,
these boys concentrated on filming buildings , brick walls, cement surfaces , bushes , trees, pipes, lamp posts, etc . They infrequently filmed
themselves, using slow motion and pixilated motion techniques . Their
inside practice footage shows clocks , desks, chairs , corridors , coat
hangers, and IBM machines.
WPFG-M1 is a quickly paced film which starts with a scene of a sun
rising accompanied by the !heme music from Kubrick 's 2001 . A series
of intercut short shots of a dog , of lettering that reads "I AM ME, " etc.,
lead into many scenes of animal life (such as ducks, birds , swans, butterflies, a rabbit, etc.), filmed in heavily foliated surroundings of
streams, ponds , and the like. The boys are seen in very short scenes
of batting a peanut with an extended tripod and dancing in pixilated
motion. Some shots are as short as two and three frames and occasionally are edited upside-down . The film ends as one of the boys
gives an obscene finger gesture to the camera .
Group 5. The fifth group in the project was a group of girls, who made
a 14-, ninute film titled God. These girls devoted equal parts of their
outside practice to filming other people (only occasionally themselves) , fountains, buildings, and foliage. For their inside practice, they
filmed short skits which involved sexy dancing on a table, an elevator,
and a glass flower. Some of the shots were made with the camera on
its side, and, in one case , in slow motion.
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God begins with 45 seconds of black leader while "Every Night " is
heard on the sound track. One of the girls reads from Gibran's The
Prophet over many scenes of sunrays and branches, reflections in rivers, and dogs running in a park. Other music is then heard over
scenes of unknown people pushing a baby carriage, playing football,
etc .; many scenes of animals such as dogs, horses, ducks, and swans
are intercut with shots of human activity. The girls appear briefly in the
film as they skip around a water fountain. The film ends with a sequence of statues of human figures and the word "God ... " which is
followed by 3 minutes of black leader over James Taylor singing
"Country Road."

Unstable Pattern Ill
Group 6. A group of white lower-class boys from southwest Philadelphia comprised the next group. Outside practice filming was done
in a neighborhood park. They concentrated on forms of human and
animal life by filming people walking through the park ("faces reacting
to the camera " ), young children playing on a park bench, dogs running , playing and mating, etc. They filmed themselves several times
and regretted they had not brought a football with them.
Although no final film was produced , they suggested subjects such
as parts of their everyday lives, especially when they were doing
something bad or illegal; staging a football game in a trolley car; and
making a "geographical film" at a university biology pond .
Group 7. The next film project was completed by a group of white
lower-class girls who made a 39-minute film titled The Life of Man .
Outside practice footage was shot at Cobbs Creek and a local cemetery . They mainly shot people (kids playing , a park guard on horseback , people in passing buses and cars), and they filmed themselves
in short skits. They duplicated this behavior when they practiced filming indoors.
The Life of Man begins with the Biblical past as Adam accepts and
bites into an apple from Eve. A 4-year-old boy and girl are heard to say
"sugar and spice and everything nice, that's what little girls are made
of" and "snakes and snails and puppy dogs' tails, that 's what little
boys are made of. " The following shots show us infants in hospital
beds and in cribs at home; young children are shown as happy and
sad. Other young children are shown sitting on sidewalks and smoking
followed by a shot of a youngster studying. Scenes that follow include
adolescents dancing, jumping rope , and taking drugs. As the film
progresses we are shown examples of good and bad parents, people
loafing and others at work, and then bums on Skid Row . The film ends
with an old lady dying in her rocking chair followed by a cemetery
scene with a man (Chalfen) kneeling and praying in front of a gravestone . Each section of the film, which usually consists of only one
scene , is accompanied by a different piece of music ; the film ends in
silence when the cemetery scene appears.
Group B. The last filmmaking project involved a group of black middleclass girls. This group concentrated on shooting short dramatic and humorous skits for their outside practice . More often than not, they chose
to film themselves in dancing and modeling poses . There were several
attempts at trick photography in terms of having people appear and disappear from one frame of the film to the next. For their inside practice ,
they chose to film other people as well as themselves in a library, a bathroom , and on an elevator. Again the emphasis was on performing humorous extemporaneous skits. The camera was again used to make
people appear and disappear quickly, and there were several slow- and
fast-motion shots .
Before these girls decided not to produce a film as a group, they
struggled with agreeing on such suggested topics as a film about children , something about their school life, or the problems of a polluted
environment .
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Decoding the Worlds of Television
Leona Jaglom and Howard Gardner
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Introduction
Nearly all American children watch countless hours of
television , even in their earl iest years. The activity of television viewing may appear at first thought to be simple
and straightforward-the child sits in front of the television set, watches , listens, and understands. In fact ,
however, the process behind th is watching and listening
turns out to be quite complex and , as yet , little understood . Just as learning to read or speak requires the development of a multitude of symbol-using capacities , so ,
too , does acquiring the ability to interpret, understand ,
and draw inferences from television programming (Wolf
1979; Worth 197 4; Worth and Gross 197 4).
Far from awakening one day with a full vocabulary of
words with which to communicate , children progress
gradually through a series of developmental stages in
their acquisition of language. Similarly, they must gradually acquire methods of mastering the communications
of the television world . To ach ieve this mastery , children
must accomplish two principal tasks. They must establish television 's symbolic status, that is, its relation to
their world of daily experience ; and they must sort its
various elements-such as types of programming-classifying them and organizing them into a coherent medium of communication .
Consider some of the problems faced by the young
ch ild bent on decoding television . To begin with, its
ever-changing images and sounds are beyond the
child 's control. He cannot manipulate or reexamine particularly interesting characters , objects, or events, for
they are contained within a box and separated from him
by a piece of glass. Yet the objects, characters, and
events often appear so similar to those which actually
exist around the child that the two forms may at first
seem indistinguishable. For this reason , it is possible
that the child may have difficulty acknowledging the
symbolic status of television (Worth and Gross 197 4).
The child may confuse events on television with natural
events, attempt to act directly upon them, and thus imbue them instead with " existential meaning. "
In order to master the world of television, he must explore the images and sounds which emerge from it and
eventually recognize their various relationships to his
own experience, to worlds or symbol systems with which
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he is already familiar. As Nelson Goodman aptly states,
''Worldmaking as we know it always starts from worlds
already on hand; the making is re-making" (Goodman
1978). The child must establish the fact that television is,
in fact, a world of its own, one which contains elements
that relate directly to the "real" world, others that are
completely fantastic and exist only in the world of television, and still others that combine both real and fantastic elements. He must determine the nature of the
boundary or, as we have come to term it, the membrane
between the two worlds, the extent of its permeability,
impermeability, or semipermeability .
In addition to establishing the fact that (and the
manner in which) television transmits its various symbol
systems, a newcomer must also learn to decode the inner workings of this medium, its organization and its format. To a sophisticated viewer, the world of television is
a neatly packaged, clearly organized, simple and convenient form of entertainment. This viewer is able to
choose exactly which shows he wishes to watch, to turn
the set on for these shows alone, and to be attentive to
the degree that he desires. This control and the choices
made by a sophisticated viewer are dependent, however, upon the construction of a complex classification
system or, in Sol Worth's words, a series of "conventions for ordering the unE\terse" (1974) of television .
The television world is c
prised of many types of
fare , each of which has idenffying features that must be
learned and that differentiate one type of fare from another. For example, commercials interrupt other types of
fare (such as cartoons or situation comedies), featuring
music, familiar jingles, sudden increases in volume ,
and 1or lettering across the screen. Narrative cartoons
are distinguished from most other types of shows in that
they are animated and often very fast-paced. News
shows have characteristic " factual " information: they often beg in with a logo and an anchorperson seated behind a desk and feature shots for weather, sports, and
commentary. Some shows are intended for children,
some for adults. Some shows are comedies designed to
make people laugh, while others are thrillers meant to
frighten people. Still others are educational, providing
accurate information about the "real " world or about
other symbol systems (e.g., music or art).
Given our knowledge of symbolic capacities in young
children, it is at best i'mplausible to assume that a child with
no exposure to the medium possesses the innate cognitive structures necessary for assimilating its diverse images and sounds. Rather, it is more likely that a child will
progress through a series of developmental phases in determining the proper relationship between television and
the real world and in classifying appropriately the communications of television, including show types with their individual visual and audio features (Bruner, Olver, and
Greenfield 1966; Gardner and Wolf 1979; Piaget 1952,
1954; Vygotsky 1962 ; Wolf and Gardner, forthcoming) .
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Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses

Expectations

In a longitudinal study of early television competence, we
examined the development of preschoolers' television
viewing skills and the processes of change which underlie
their growing sophistication in understanding the symbol
system it embodies. In particular, children's comments regarding the relationship between television and real life
and their associations between the two realms were analyzed. Furthermore, we examined the development of
preschool children's understanding of the relationship
between various types of television fare and their ability to
establish categories to distinguish these types, to group
shows according to common characteristics or features,
to recognize their beginnings and endings, and to learn
the time schedules of various shows.
Following examples of earlier work cited above, we
followed three subjects intensively over a 3-year period,
from the time they were 2 years old to the time they were
5. In addition, nine other subjects were monitored in a
less regular and less formal way. Though this additional
group broadens our sample, three well-studied cases do
not of course constitute an adequate sample, and therefore any generalizations must be considered tentative.
In this effort, we have found it particularly helpful to invoke the image of "membranes ." As we see it, the child
must take the relatively undifferentiated experiences of
televised and daily life and, over the course of several
years, construct a set of membranes: membranes which
define the relationship between what is shown on television and what occurs in the realm of daily mundane experience; and membranes which define the relationship
between the various types of programs and program features which populate the several channels of television.
We favor the term ''membrane'' over the more conventional usage of "category " and " boundary" for two
reasons. First, many of the distinctions which obtain in
the area of television viewing are much less rigidly defined than conventional and long-standing categories,
and indeed change quite rapidly across television seasons. Second, the way in which children's own conceptions of television fare shift are reminiscent of different
types of organic membranes: sometimes impermeable,
sometimes completely permeable, and, eventually, semipermeable in nature.

Clearly, the development of children's abilities to perceive the membranes which organize the inner world
transmitted on television and which separate this world
from the real world relates to the development of their
more general abilities to classify and form categories .
Children's emerging abilities to classify objects, people,
and words have been studied in depth (Denney 197 4;
Kagan, Moss, and Sigel1963; Rosch et al. 1976; Rossi
and Rossi 1965; and references cited above).
In accordance with the earlier literature, we expected
only an incipient ability to categorize at age 2. Ch ildren
can categorize to some extent at the level of the basic
object; that is, they will term a passing object " cat "
rather than using the superordinate term "animal" or the
subordinate terms " Siamese" or " tabby cat " ; and they
show a tendency to ferret out prototypical exemplars
from a category . However, categorization at other than
basic object level proves beyond their reach . There is a
strong predilection for thematic or functional classifications rather than abstract or hierarchical ones, and
there is considerable tendency to either overgeneralize
or undergeneralize the extension of categorical labels.
Little capacity is shown for multiple or dual classification. During the preschool years , increasingly fine
precision attends the application of labels, but other immature tendencies endure well into the school years.
We expected that the classification of the television
world in terms of adult perceived categories would present
difficulties for preschoolers: our subjects would therefore
vacillate between overly broad and overly rigid categorical
distinctions. For example, cartoons might be defined initially by a young child as any show involving one of the
chi Id's preferred characters, regardless of whether that
character was animated or not; alternatively , cartoons
might be defined as only those shows on which characters
chase each other. These definitions are equally erroneous
in that both exclude the crucial element of the visual appearance of cartoons-their animation .
Certain categories were expected to be beyond the
grasp of our 5-year-olds, owing to the abstract concepts
entailed in their definition, such as producer intent or
designated target audience. For example, adult shows
are not only those shows watched by the child's parents,
as a young child might believe, but any show designed
for viewing by an adult audience.
Our expectations could not be-and were not-drawn
solely from developmental research on classification,
however. Television is a medium which differs significantly from the world of physical objects of language. It
presents an unusual if not unique set of stimuli-a conglomeration of several different symbol systems including
language, music, and movement and a variety of visual
forms such as animation, drawing , puppetry, and live-action , not to mention numerous special effects. As a result,
children's processing capacities may be tested to a
greater extent by television than by traditional media, and
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they also may be tested in different ways-for example, in
terms of the reality status of different segments.
Adding to the difficult task of decoding the television
world is the fact that television is a novel medium. It is so
new, in fact, that our culture has not yet invented ways
of presenting it or teaching its structure to children.
Therefore, much more so than in the case of traditional
media (such as books), the child is left to his own devices in making sense of television. Both the difficulty
and the novelty of television lead to the hypothesis that it
may offer particularly daunting challenges to the young
child's classificatory powers.
Fortunately, a small body of research has begun to
accumulate on children's processing of, and understanding of, television during the opening years of life.
The attention of young children has been related both to
formal features of programs (Watkins et al. 1980) and to
certain cues which signal the imminent appearance of
semantically digestible materials (Collins et al. 1979;
Newcomb and Collins 1979). It is this body of research,
in combination with the more general developmental
findings cited above, that indicates the hypotheses
which have guided our research.
We hypothesized that, initially, children will make no
distinctions between what they see on television and
events in their daily world. Similarly, they wi II fai I to appreciate distinctions among kinds of television programs and
the boundaries or beginnings and endings which separate
those programs from one another. We expected that,
rather than making distinctions, children will primarily
make connections between television and real life and between various types of programming. Membranes organizing the television world and separating it from real life
will be perceived as permeable, if perceived at all.
The appreciation of differences between television
and real life and between types of shows was expected
to emerge later, with the most obvious and straightforward differences to be noted first. For example, children might distinguish cartoons before Sesame Street
because their visual appearance or animation is so strikingly and consistently different from that of other shows.
The Sesame Street format and appearance, on the other
hand, changes often both within one show and from
show to show. In addition to this "simplicity" hypothesis, we expected the age at which children distinguish
one type of show from another to be determined by their
preference for and exposure to a certain type of show. In
establishing categories of program types and in noting
differences between the world presented on television
and their daily experiences, children should adhere
clcsely to their newly formed conception of membranes
and to apply this conception very rigidly. Characters will
be considered show-specific and unable to cross show
boundaries to appear on other shows. Children will also
perceive characters as unreal and unrelated to real
people. Membranes both between television and reai life
and within the world of television will be perceived as impermeable or firm, and similarities will be overlooked.
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Finally, with increased exposure to and experience
with television, children should demonstrate the more
complex capacity to note both similarities and differences, to establish more flexible categories of program
types, to accept the fact that certain programs might fall
into more than one category, that characters might be
able to appear on more than one show, and that certain
television characters comprise a combination of real and
fantastic elements. The membranes of television will be
perceived ultimately as flexible in their permeability-at
times permeable, at other impermeable, and at still others, semipermeable.
This ultimate conception is quite complex and very
possibly beyond the grasp of the preoperational child. It
involves considering more than one element at a time,
thus overcoming the concentration on one element
which dominates this age or stage of development. It is
possible, however, that the repetitive nature of television,
in conjunction with the great amount of exposure to the
medium which young children receive, will facilitate the
development of their understanding of its symbolic
status and its organization as well as their ability to decode the symbol systems it conveys .

The Study
Population
Subjects were three first-born children from middle- and
lower-middle-class families living in a suburb of Boston.
They belonged to high-viewing households where little
or no regulation of television took place and where the
television was often on for most of the day. Subjects
were 2 years old when the study began and 5 years old
when data collection was completed.

Methods
The majority of the data were collected at biweekly home
visits to the subjects. These visits were conducted by the
same experimenter for two years and by a different experimenter (trained by the first) during the third year of
data collection. The experimenter brought a variety of
play materials to home visits in order to ascertain the
child's competence in various skills relevant to the televisio·n medium. Among the areas examined were the
abilities to discriminate among program types, to relate
television content to real life experience, to recognize
and recall character names and attributes, and to sequence story material (Jaglom, Wilder, and Fagre 1979;
Robinson, Jaglom, and Wilder 1980; Vibbert, Jaglom,
and Wilder 1980).
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Tasks were designed to probe children's abilities in
these various areas. For example, photographs of television fare were presented to the children and they were
asked to place together the ones that belong together," or, sometimes more specifically, to put "all the
cartoons / commercials / news / kids' shows / etc. together." In this way, it is possible to uncover children's
notions about a particular category and their ability to
discriminate between various program types . Another
frequently administered task consisted of a guessing
game in which the child and experimenter alternated
hiding television characters behind their backs , providing each other with clues regarding the character's attributes and guessing which character was hidden. In
addition, information on the ways a televised segment
was processed was obtained by asking children to order
and narrate individual photographs from a single television bit or story. Symbolic or "pretense" play proved
to be another revealing vehicle. The experimenter provided the necessary props for re-creating a scene
viewed on television but little information as to how the
story actually progressed. The child's reenactment was
then studied for its verisimilitude to the televised segment and for the information it provided about the child's
concept of specific characters, their prototypical behaviors and attributes, and of the format or sequence of
television content in general (e.g., how television bits or
shows begin and end, the fact that stories are often interrupted by commercials). During all biweekly visits,
children's television program preferences were noted,
and one-half hour of the child's natural television viewing was observed.
A supplementary method of data collection consisted
of the viewing of videotapes of various types of television
fare on a quarterly basis. Children were brought into the
Media Center at the Harvard Graduate School of Education and were shown the tapes in a comfortable and natural setting. Presentation of these tapes to the population of subjects provided a systematic way of
determining how children's understanding and experience of, and reaction to, the same types of television
fare changed over the course of development. All sessions, both home visits and videotape sessions, were recorded on an audio cassette tape recorder. Children's
viewing of videotapes was additionally recorded on
videotape in order to preserve facial and physical reactions to various types of fare. Typed verbatim transcripts
were kept of all sessions.
A final method of data collection relied on the parents'
cooperative efforts as coresearchers. Parents participated in biweekly interviews with the experimenter and
kept diaries of their children's television-related comments and experiences.
I I

Television-Real Life Associations: Establishing
Television's Symbolic Status
Analysis
All instances in which children related television content to
real life experience, as well as all instances in which real
life experience was related to television content, were extracted from transcripts of home visits and videotape sessions and also from parent diaries. The majority of associations were made spontaneously, though some were
prompted by the parents ' or experimenter's questions.
The children 's associations were classified in terms of
their directionality. An association made while viewing,
from the television to the real world , was labeled a Television-Real Life (hereafter TV-RL) Association. An association made in the context of daily experience and related to content previously viewed on television was
labeled a Real Life-Television (hereafter RL-TV) Association. TV-RL associations were recorded by both parents and the experimenter, while RL-TV associations,
owing to their unpredictable nature, were recorded primarily by parents. The data were scrutinized and associations grouped into descriptive categories or types characterizing their various qualities. Associations were then
examined at 6-month intervals for the frequency of the
various categories described below. Some of these
types of associations lend themselves to nonverbal association (e.g ., noticing Similarities or Imitation), while others are necessarily verbal (e.g., Statements of Representation or Differences).
Types of Associations. Two major types of associations were established: Investigating Similarities and Investigating Differences. Within these major categories
were several subcategories. For example, in Investigating Similarities children made Over-generalizations
which indicate a belief that televised events are identical
to and have immediate and direct influence upon the
child's own life and, concurrently, that the child can directly influence televised events. One such Over-generalization was a child's fear that a frightening television
character was in his room. They also made Statements
of Similarity, linking an object, event, or character in one
world to a similar one in the other, but not necessarily indicating a belief that the two are identical. For example,
one child saw a rubber duck in real life and associated it
with one on Sesame Street saying, "Rubber ducky, just
like Ernie's."
Children also applied information gained in one realm
to similar situations in the other (Application); imitated or
reproduced television situations (Imitation); identified
with television characters by linking themselves with
those characters (Identification); made requests for televised objects, indicating an understanding that those objects exist and are available in the real world (Requests);
and finally, made Statements of Representation, recognizing the fact that television programming sometimes

Decoding the Worlds of Television

actually represents or provides information about real
world events. In Investigating Differences between the
two realms, children were found to make Statements of
Differences, such as "That's a monster, that's just makebelieve," recognizing that some characters or situations
exist only on television and are not reproducible in the
real world. They also asked questions about differences
such as "Why is it night on TV and day here?" to help
them determine the relationship between television and
daily experience or to clarify an uncertainty about this
relationship. They combined Similarities and Differences, recognizing similarities between situations or
people in the two worlds but simultaneously recognizing
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discrepancies between those situations or people: making statements such as "I have a cat like the one on TV,
but my cat doesn't talk." Finally, children over-differentiated between television and real life, overlooking all
similarities and insisting that nothing on television is real
or relates to the real world.
These categories of associations capture the fact that
children are actively concerned with the nature of the
membrane between the televised and real worlds. Children investigate similarities between the two (stressing
the membrane as permeable), the differences between
the two (stressing the membrane as impermeable), and
the occasions on which there exist both similarities and
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Table 1
Age of Onset of Association Trends

2-3 Years

3-4 Years

4-5 Years

TV-Real life
Over -generalizations
Identification

I

Applications _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,.
Requests
Imitation
Similarity Statements ~------------------------------.~
Difference Statements
Difference Questions
Similarities and Differences
Statements of Representation
Over -differentiation

Real life-TV
Over -generalizations
Similarity S t a t e m e n t s - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
Applications - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - •
Identification-------------------.
Imitation------------------•
Statements of Representation
Difference Questions
Requests
Difference Statements
Over -differentiation
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differences (a membrane which we label semipermeable).
Additionally, there are times when children magnify the
reality status of television content in order to make it seem
more like their own experience and perhaps easier to assimilate. They even attempt to act upon events occurring
within a television set, overlooking the fact that there is an
actual glass boundary separating the two worlds. At other
times they perceive this boundary as so complete that
they ignore all similarities, deny them even when they are
readily apparent, and dismiss any possibility of transfer
between the two realms.

Results
Each association category was examined in terms of the
age at which it occurred most frequently both as a TVRL association and as an RL-TV association. The frequency of occurrence of a particular type of association
was computed yearly as a percentage of the total number of that type of association made across all three
years. For example, 72 percent of all Over-generalizations occurred during the period from age 2:0 to age
2:11 as TV-RL associations , while only 12 percent occurred between 3:0 and 3:11 and 16 percent occurred
between 4:0 and 4:11. Statements of Representation,
however, occurred primarily (65 percent) durin,g the children's fifth year (4:0 to 4:11 ), while only 7 percent occurred between ages 2:0 and 2:11 and only 28 percent
occurred between ages 3:0 and 3:11. Detailed percentages may be obtained from a recent Project Zero report
(Jaglom, Wilder, and Fagre 1979). A summary of the
trends uncovered can be found in Table 1. In what follows we will review the principal trends by age.
1. Age two years to three years. Children were surprisingly competent and gave examples of most of the kinds
of TV-RL associations in their third year of life. They acknowledged the frequent permeability of the membrane
between the two worlds as well as noticing the times at
which this same membrane was impermeable owing to
lack of correspondence between television and real life.
Nonetheless, there were a number of signs of incomplete understanding. For example, children made Overgeneralizations. While exploring the similarities and differences between the two realms they often perceived
parallels between them where parallels did not exist, indicating a belief that the two worlds are identical and
denying television content's status as a symbol system.
RL-TV associations were fewer than TV-RL associations(% ratio) and did not necessarily follow the same
patterns of frequency with age. Between the ages of 2
and 3 years, the majority of RL-TV Over-generalizations
occurred, and , as with TV-RL associations, this type
dropped off, though less sharply, after the age of 3
years. Increasingly, children went beyond simple statements of correspondence to import information from
televised into real life situations.

2. Age three to four years. Children continued to
make the types of associations which emerged at age 2
during the period from age 3:0 to 3:11. No new types
appeared at this age, and Over-generalizations declined
greatly in frequency . At this age children did begin to
imitate and identify with television characters as RL-TV
associations or when the television set was off and not
serving as a direct stimulus. They performed whole
scenes of television shows such as Gilligan 's Island, Batman, and The Six-Million Dollar Man , indicating a fascination with these characters and a need to test out their
roles and abilities in real life.
3. Age four to five years. The majority of children 's
Statements of Representation , all statements regarding
both Similarities and Differences, and all Over-differentiations occurred between the ages of 4:0 and 4:11. In addition, children's first RL-TV Requests occurred at this
age. Thus , 4-year-olds asked for objects they had seen
advertised on television but which were not present at
the time they made the request. They were also able to
make statements such as " I have one of those [a cat]
but mine doesn 't talk" (Kathy, 4:5) , and "The things on
the news are real, they really happen " (John, 4:11 ).
These types of statements indicate an understanding
that television may actually represent or provide information about the real world , and a recognition of situations
in which certain elements may correspond to real life situations while others may not correspond to real life in
any way. In making Over-d ifferentiations, children demonstrated an emerging belief that nothing on television is
real or relates to real life.

Discussion
Certain general trends characterize our findings regarding the development of children 's understanding of the
symbolic status of television. TV-RL associations emerge
consistently earlier than RL-TV associations, and they
occur twice as frequently as well. This finding may be
explained by the fact that when a TV-RL association is
made, the stimulus for the association is immediately
present, while for RL-TV associations, the television material must be internalized and the child must have a
mental representation of it. In addition, the greater frequency of TV-RL associations than RL-TV associations
may be illuminated by a consideration of Goodman 's
(1978) notion of worldmaking . If, as he suggests, worldmaking starts from worlds already available, then the
fact that children are more concerned with comparing
television to the real world rather than with comparing
their daily experiences to television content is not surprising, as the child has had much less experience with
the television world than with his own world. It is instructive, however, that even with the accumulation of many
viewing hours, daily experience remains the point of reference for determining the status of television content.
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Borrowing from linguistic theory, we can say that television continues to be the' 'marked'' world while real life
is "unmarked" (Clark 1973). At least in our population,
television never acquires so dominant a position that
daily experience begins to be compared to television
content for determination of its reality status.
From the very first, children are aware that correspondence exists between the two worlds, that the membrane between them is permeable at times, and that in
exploring the world of television, certain aspects of the
real world may be useful. Concurrently, children this
young are aware of instances marked by a lack of correspondence between the two worlds and realize that television content may exist in a different form in the real
world or may not exist at all. Thus, they are aware that
the membrane may also be impermeable at times and
real experience may not be useful in understanding television at these times. We see an active and continuing
effort to sort out the various contents of television and to
relate them to information known in the "real" world. In
Piaget's terms (1954 ), there are perpetual efforts at assimilation and accommodation: the child seeks to assimilate
televised information to the categories with which he
cognitively processes daily experience, or, alternatively,
to accommodate television information so that it becomes more readily congruent with knowledge gained in
real world experiences.
Nonetheless, the children initially are confused about
the actual relationship between events and objects that
exist on both sides of the boundary. This confusion is
emphasized in the Over-generalizations which characterize this age. Children indicate a belief that the two
spheres are identical, not separate and self-contained.
The membrane is perceived, at these times, as fully permeable; the glass screen and electronic images of the
television world are overlooked. Television's status as a
conveyor of a symbol system and a world with an order
and meaning of its own has not yet been established
fully in the child's mind.
At the same time, however, children appear to be testing their belief in the similarities between the two worlds
by assuming the roles of television characters and making statements about wanting to be like them. For example, one child, while watching The Three Stooges, began throwing punches at his mother just as the three
stooges were doing to each other. Children seem to be
determining whether they can take on some of the characteristics of television personalities, or whether the
boundary between the two worlds is too rigid and the
characters totally unreal. In sum, the child between the
ages of 2 and 3 is aware of the membrane but is more
impressed with its permeability than its impermeability.
He even perceives parallels, points of permeability, and
direct relationships which do not exist.
By age 3, children have realized that they cannot influence events occurring within the television set, and although some fears of television content persist and may
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even magnify, children have, for the most part, realized
that events or characters visible on television cannot immediately affect them. Over-generalizations fade; the
boundary between the two worlds has at least provisionally been formed; the lack of immediate, direct, total correspondence between the two worlds has been recognized; "communicational meaning" has been attributed
to television content.
At this age children also begin to make statements indicating identification with television personalities and to
imitate television characters outside the television context. For example, they act out whole scenes from their
favorite shows without having seen the show that day.
They discover that some similarities exist between television and their own lives or personalities, that some
characteristics may exist or be reproduced in the real
world, but that others are fantastic and do not exist
across the membrane. A lack of direct stimulus may explain why these types of statements and role-modeling
cluster a year later for RL-TV associations than for TVRL associations. Without television as a direct stimulus,
the child must internalize the character roles and personalities in order to emulate their behaviors. Such internalization requires considerable mental representation
and seems more sophisticated a function than simply
copying behaviors straight off the screen.
At age 4, children begin perceiving subtleties in the
relationship between television and daily experience.
They start to understand some of the ways in which the
two worlds actually relate, how the permeable and impermeable parts of the membrane combine, and how
content in one realm may have direct influence upon or
applicability to the corresponding content in the other
realm. These more sophisticated perceptions are indicated by the appearance of statements introducing both
Similarities and Differences and Statements of Representation, such as "the news tells what's really happening in the city."
Concurrently, however, a new problem arises for children at age 4. They have developed a rule with which
they override this newly acquired understanding of the
membrane's permeability: "Nothing on television is
real," regardless of the extent to which it parallels real
life. This appearance of Over-differentiation at age 4%
indicates two things: first, that the 4-year-old's definition
of the word "real" differs from that of an adult; and second, that this definition involves an awareness of a
boundary which radically separates television from a
mundane perception of reality and the real world. This
total rejection of any relation between the ''real'' and the
"representational" world is reminiscent of the tendency
among children of a somewhat older age to reject any
kind of figurative language or nonrepresentational
graphic depiction in favor of literal descriptions (Gardner
and Winner, forthcoming).
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Development of a Classification System:
Establishing Membranes within the Television
·World
Analysis
All instances in which children attempted to classify or
distinguish between types of television content were extracted from the transcripts. This information included
spontaneous remarks made by the subjects while watching television or playing with television-related toys as
well as their responses to probes made by the experimenter. These structured probes by the experimenter
were of two types. The first involved a task situation in
which children were asked to sort piles of photographs
of television fare into specific groups, or to re-create various types of television action with props inside a
wooden television frame. In the second structured situation, the experimenter asked questions regarding the
specific shows being watched during the particular
session.
All statements, bits of information, or items pertaining
to categories used by adults to classify the elements of
the television world were first grouped according to the
specific categories to which they pertained. These categories were cartoons, advertisements, news, shows designed for viewing by adults, those designed for viewing
by children , and a subcategory of children's shows ,
Sesame Street. This last subcategory was included because many of the children's first attempts at classification were found to revolve around the identification
of Sesame Street segments.
Data were examined in 6-month intervals. In the first
step of analysis, we examined the ages at which each of
the three children mastered the specific adult-perceived
program categories as well as the average age of mastery across all three children. Next, we turned our attention to the process by which these categories are
created: we investigated children's recognition of show
beginnings, endings, and interruptions, their knowledge
of show scheduling , their understanding of charactershow connections, and their use of various cues (e.g.,
theme songs, station logos) in classifying the television
world. These abilities were believed to be important
markers in the task of sorting out the seemingly ceaseless and disorderly progression of images across the
television screen .
Children's abilities to separate shows into categories
were traced by use of strict definitions of program types.
These types were defined by their content and explicit
purpose independent of their visual appearance and formats., For example, an animated advertisement may
look like a cartoon, but its content indicates that it is an
advertisement as well. Conversely, cartoons and other
children's programs often share the same intent but differ in form .

The fact that two program types may be classified in
two words is an understandable source of confusion to
children , as Piaget's work on the intersection of classes
has documented (lnhelder and Piaget 1964). Items indicating such confusion were labeled ''duals.'' As described below, items were considered to demonstrate
correct understanding of program type or incorrect understanding, or they were considered to be "dual" in nature (see examples below). Understanding was incorrect
when any part of a statement or action violated the commonly accepted definition of a category; correct when it
corresponded to the commonly accepted notion of that
category; "dual correct " (de) when children focused on
the content of a show rather than or in conjunction with
its visual appearance (e.g., an animated advertisement is
an advertisement even though it looks like a cartoon) ;
and " dual incorrect " (di) when the visual appearance of
the show or show characters took precedence over the
content of the show (e.g. , since Flip Wilson or Fonzie is
on Sesame Street, it is not Sesame Street).
The child received credit for category recognition
when judgments about this category were consistently
greater than 75 percent correct. Independent judges obtained reliability of 92 .5 percent in the correct , incorrect,
and dual assignment of items. Final scores were agreed
upon through discussion of individual items.
It should be noted that classification tasks were especially important in uncovering the point at which children
seemed to distinguish correctly the program categories.
In this task , children were given five to nine pictures from
television shows and were asked either to free-sort them
or to make piles of specific categories. Many of the children 's category judgments were also made spontaneously , as can be seen in the examples given below
(Note: i =incorrect, c =correct):
News example (c): Child says "That's the news," having
heard only the news audio from the television screen . The
picture had not come in yet. (Donny, 4 :6)
Children 's-show example (i) : Child labels all the shows
he watches " kids' shows " and he watches some adult
shows such as soaps and news. (Donny, 2:11)
Sesame Street example (i): Child says that only the bits
with puppets are Sesame Street and denies that anything
else is on Sesame Street. (Kathy, 2:1; Donny, 2:11)
Sesame Street example (c): Child identifies all Sesame
Street bits on videotape which consist of gamut of types of
television fare. (Donny, 4:6)
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Category Acquisition

2. Discussion. When the three children's ages of acquisition are averaged, advertisements constit~te the
first category acquired. There are several possible explanations for the early mastery of this category. First, exposure may play a large role. Unless there are children
who watch only public broadcasting, all children are exposed to many advertisements regardless of their specific program preferences. Second, appeal may be ~n
important factor in that many advertisements, especially
those broadcast during children's programs, are designed expressly to appeal to children. Their fast p~ce
and short length or formal features may capture children 's attention, and their overall format may stand out
for children, making a boundary separating them from
other show types easier to distinguish (Lorch, Anderson,
and Levin 1979; Watkins et al. 1980).
Finally, it is possible that the disruptive nature of ~d
vertisements may stand out for children in that they Interrupt their shows and cause their favorite characters to

1. Results. The 6-month interval during which each
child consistently began to distinguish each category
correctly more than 75 percent of the time is presented
in Table 2. The average 6-month interval across all three
children during which each category was correctly distinguished from the others is given as w_ell. In a?ditio.n,.
the ages at which dual items were consistently 1de.nt1f1ed
in terms of show content or intent as opposed to v1sual
appearance are indicated for each child in T~ble ~·The
two predominant dual situations were case~ 1n wh1ch
animated advertisements were compared w1th cartoons
and those in which animated Sesame Street bits were
confused with cartoons. Kathy also demonstrated some
confusion when characters from other shows appeared
on Sesame Street. At these times, Kathy denied the fact
that the show was Sesame Street until she reached age
4:5 when she consistently took content into account
over visual or character appearance.

Table 2
Age of Acquisition of Principal Program Distinctions
Category

Age of Acquisition
John

Kathy

2:0-2:6

3:7-3:11

Donny
3:7-3:11

Average

Advertisements
Cartoons

2:7-2:11

4:0-4:6

3:7-3:11

3:7-3:11
(early in interval)

" Sesame Street"

4:0-4:6

3:0-3:6

4:0-4:6

3:7-3:11
(late in interval)

3:0-3:6

News

3:7-3:11

4:7-4:11

4:0-4:6 ':'

4:0-4:6

Children's Shows

4:7-4:11

4:0-4:6

4:0-4:6

4:0-4:6
(late in interval)

Adult Shows

4:7-4:11

4:0-4:6

uncountable

4:0-4:6

'~Although Donny obtained 75% during t~is interval , he ~xhibited
confusion between news shows and ads dunng the 4:7 to 4: 111nterval.

Table 3
Age at which Dual Items Are Correctly Classified
Type uf Dual

John

Kathy

Donny

Average

Animated Advertisements
vs.
Cartoons

4:6

4:2

4:1

4:3

Animated "Sesame Street"
vs.
Cartoons

4:3

4:3

4:2

4:2%
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disappear temporarily from the screen. In our observations of the subjects of this study we have found that, in
their second year, the disappearance of characters is a
source of consternation. Children become very upset
and sometimes even cry when their favorite television
personalities leave the screen . Advertisements may then
be identified easily by children as the disruptive part of
television which causes shows and their favorite personalities to vanish. Any one of these explanations or a
combination of them may explain the fact that the
boundary separating advertisements from other television shows is the first boundary to be established and
perceived by children in their attempt to organize the
world of television.
The order in which the children acquired the cartoon
and Sesame Street categories conforms to the "exposure" hypothesis described above. John and Donny
both distinguished cartoons before they did Sesame
Street, while Kathy distinguished Sesame Street before
she did cartoons . John and Donny also both watched an
enormous number of hours of cartoons from the time
they were 2 years old , and though they did watch Sesame Street quite regularly, the total number of Sesame
Street hours did not even approach the number of cartoon hours. Kathy, on the other hand, was not allowed to
watch cartoons until she was over 3 years old, while
from the age of 2 she watched Sesame Street religiously
and loved it. The exposure hypothesis would thus, at
least partially, account for the order of acquisition of
these two categories or boundaries. Format and visual
appearance may also play an important role here. Cartoons are animated and their visual appearance is radically different from that of any other type of show. Thus,
cartoons would be more easily distinguishable in that
children would need only glance at the screen or at a
picture of a show, attend to its visual features, identify it
as animated, and label it a cartoon.
The salience of the visual appearance of cartoons for
young children is supported by the fact that in the majority of the dual items children consistently labeled a show
a cartoon until they were 4:0, regardless of the category
in which the animated item actually belonged (Sesame
Street, advertisements, or cartoons). The visual appearance was salient for all three children, although the content or information provided within that visual and 1 or
audio format was secondary and often even ignored.
Furthermore, the fact that Sesame Street was acquired
later than cart?ons may be explained by its use of a
magazine format incorporating segments with diverse
visual formats and character types. Although children
may watch this show regularly from a very early age, it is
not surprising that they have difficulty identifying its
many different elements as being part of a single show.
Indeed, the specific bits on Sesame Street may be

viewed as instances of readily learnable "basic objects,"
while the overall category of Sesame Street represents
the "more difficult to learn" superordinate category
(Rosch et al . 1976).
The categories of children's and adult shows are acquired relatively late. Furthermore, when acquired, these
categories are defined egocentrically as "shows I
watch" and "shows Mommy and Daddy watch." Both
these findings are instructive since, as will be seen
shortly, children do not grasp abstract concepts such as
producer's intent or target audience until past the age of
4 . They seem unable to transcend their personal experiences to consider the motives or intentions of such remote figures as the producers of programs. In addition,
children's and adult shows may be thought of as' 'superordinate categories," ones which contain heterogeneous mixtures of all the shows designed for and
watched by either children or adults. In the first few
years of attempting to sort out the confusing elements of
the television world, children are concentrating on making distinctions between shows. It follows, then, that
children are initially more aware of the obvious differences between shows such as Happy Days and The
Flintstones (e.g ., nonanimated vs . animated) and have
difficulty grouping them on the basis of the relative abstract similarity which obtains among children's shows.
The exposure hypothesis would appear to account for
the late acquisition of the news category. All children
had an open aversion to watching the news; they
avoided it at all costs. This implies that they must have
recognized it when it came on the screen, since they
were consistent in their statements of dislike. When
shown pictures of various types of programming, however, children often could not identify the news shows
and demonstrated confusion between news shows and
commercials. Perhaps, while viewing, children were so
quick to turn away from news shows that they did not
absorb their entire format. The evidence indicates that
children also did not fully absorb news content until age
4:5, at which point they were able to describe its purpose and its relationship to the real world.

Other Findings
1. Television characters. Television characters appear to play a large role in the development of children's
understanding of the organization of the television
world. Changes in children's perceptions of television
personalities as organizing elements are described
below.
(a) Two to three years.
Children appear to be
quite confused about the status of television characters
during this year of development, but characters appear
to play a large role in the 2-year-old's conception of the
world of television. Any deviation from a show's regular
cast bewilders the child and causes him to question
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even a very familiar show's identity. Prototypical and
preferred characters were focu sed on in identifying specific shows. Concurrently, and somewh at paradoxi cally,
children 's conceptions of individual shows and the
boundaries between them are very insecure, and characters are perceived as being independent of their
shows. They are believed to be able to appear on any
channel at any time , roaming throughout television -land.
Thus Roosevelt Frankli n, a Sesame Street character , can
appear on Mister Rogers, a ch ild would say, but if this
were to occur, the same child might very well deny that
the show was , in fact, Mister Rogers.
(b) Three to four years . Our evidence suggests
that, by this time , characters are perceived as belonging
to SP,ecific programs. Donny , at 3:5, for example, correctly listed the characters in The Flintstones and Family
Affair, and when he saw Big Bird and Grover on a game
show at 3:2 , John assured his mother that they would
return to Sesame Street. Indeed , shows are now identified not only by attractive characters but by other elements (e.g., format , content) as well.
(c) Four to five years . There appear to be several
elements of confusion for the 4- and 5-year -olds bent on
exploring links between characters and their shows.
First, most television characters do belong to specific
shows and children appear to have grasped this fact by
age 4. Television characters are, however, all on film and
therefore potentially can be filmed on any show, on any
channel , and with any other characters . This is where
children encounter difficulties. By age 4 they know that
characters are primarily associated with one show , but
they often encounter televised situations in which a
character appears on a show other than his own . Unaware of the technology and mechanics behind television production , they have trouble recognizing the
flexible , manipulable link between characters and their
shows and are hesitant to suggest that such situationsa character appearing on several shows-can occur.
These situations violate their newly formed boundaries
between programs and program types.
2. Producer 's intent ! target audiences. We have seen
that by age 5 , children have acquired several categories
in which to organize the many types of television fare.
The data suggest , however, that although boundaries
may be established between certain types of programming , the various purposes or intentions of television
production teams may not be understood . Advertisements may be the first correctly distinguished category ,
but as late as age 5, children do not appear to understand that their primary purpose is selling products. Children make requests for advertised products as early as
age 3, yet when asked what advertisements do, children
say that they " do nothing" (Donny, 5:2), and that they
are " for no one and for nothing " (John, 4:6). Although
children occasionally demonstrate some understanding
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of the intent of commercials-"want you to eat them
[Hershey's chocolate]" (John, 4:9), or they "tell you
what you can get and what's on" (Donny, 4:3)-there
are as many examples which clearly indicate a lack of
such understanding-"Ads do not want you to buy anything" (Kathy, 4:1 0) and "You can't get those cookies"
(John, 5:1 ). This denial of the selling motive may reflect
or mimic parental statements that all advertised products
are not necessarily available to children, but it may also
reflect a genuine misunderstanding .
The purpose of previews, a special type of advertisement which attempts to sell television programming,
seems to be grasped by children earlier than the purpose of normal advertisements for goods and services.
Children are able to explain the fact that previews tell
you what a show will be about and when it will be on by
late in their third year. The early understanding of this
particular type of advertisement may be accounted for
by the fact that children 's television viewing is directly
affected by them. Somewhat fancifully , we might regard
previews as hypotheses which are confirmed by subsequent data (Kagan, Kearsley, and Zelazo 1978). A
preview announces a show, the show appears, at which
point the previews cease to appear. This is a straightforward, identifiable sequence of events. Moreover,
while most ads suggest behaviors to be carried out in
the external world , previews stand out as an instruction
to carry out a television-specific behavior.
Children appear to understand the purpose of the
news at the same time that they master the category . By
age 4:5, children relate the news to the real world and
appear to understand its role-providing information
about the real world. For example, Donny, at 4:7 , said
that the news "tells real city life, the weather, dangerous
things like cigarettes " and John, at 4:5, said that the
news is about " real guys, the weather . It's a real show. "
As late as age 5, children define the children's and
adult show categories according to what they watch and
what their parents watch . Although application of this
classification may often lead to a correct classification, it
is egocentric and does not take the producer's intent
into account; at other times , therefore, use of this definition leads to incorrect categorizations. For example, if a
child watches soap operas with his mother every day, he
will put soap operas into both the children 's and the
adult show categories, even though soap operas are not
intended for children but solely for adult audiences.
These findings suggest that, while children may, by
the age of 4, organize the world of television in terms of
certain program categories, they use concrete elements
such as costumes or locations to define these categories. More abstract concepts , such as the producer's
intent and target audience, and superordinate categories, such as children 's or adult shows, are more difficult for children and are only begun to be comprehended after age 4.
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3. Temporal organization of television. Within thiscategorydata were included that indicated children's knowledge of television schedules in terms of the sequences of
shows, relevancetotheirown lives, or personal schedules
(e.g., Sesame Street is on during dinner) as well as their
recognition of the beginnings, endings, and interruptions (e.g., commercial breaks) of shows.
(a) Two to three years. During this year, children's
conception of television's temporal organization is quite
undeveloped. Television shows are perceived as continuously available throughout the day, and show endings
are often not recognized and are confused with commercial breaks. In addition, children are concerned with
the disappearance of characters from the screen. They
appear to reassure themselves by mimicking television
language such as "They'll be right back" when shows
are over as well as when they are interrupted by
commercials.
Eventually, children between the ages of 2 and 3 do
begin to master the sequence in which their favorite
shows appear, but this knowledge is mostly limited to
that small number of shows which they watch most
frequently .
(b) Three to four years. At this age, children still appear quite confused as to the timing and beginnings and
endings or boundaries of television shows. Children still
have difficulty accepting the fact that they cannot control this medium, that the timing and availability of their
favorite fare is completely out of their hands and even
out of the hands of their parents. They have not fully
identified television as a conveyor of symbol systems, a
separate world with its own rules and schedules, and, indeed, as a symbol scheme in its own right.
Concurrently, however, children begin to decode
some of those rules . They recognize the beginnings and
endings of their favorite shows, especially when a theme
song is played, providing them with a clear cue. They
begin to expand their knowledge of show schedules by
associating particular shows with general time of day.
They note previews which inform viewers of scheduling
changes and begin to make comments such as "They're
coming back'' only at such appropriate times as during
commercial breaks. Just as children are beginning toestablish categories for and boundaries between types of
television fare during this year, they are also beginning
to recognize temporal boundaries and rules which organize and regulate the television world.
(c) Four to five years. Children display far more
knowledge of television scheduling during this year.
They are able to make distinctions between shows which
are on every day (e.g., the news), those which are not
(e.g., basketball), and specials which take the place of
regularly scheduled shows and are on only rarely. They
are often able to state the specific days and times at
which various programs are broadcast.
Children have also incorporated the mutually exclusive relationship between advertisements and shows,

making statements such as "when shows come off, ads
come on" (Donny, 4:4; John, 4:6). Concurrently, they
correctly identify those commercials which interrupt a
program and those which signal the end of one program
and the beginning of another. Children have become
consistently correct in their recognition of show beginnings and endings, expanding the cues they use from
songs alone to include logos, station signals, credits,
and advertisements.
By the age of 5, children have become quite sophisticated in their comprehension of the temporal organization of the television world. They have been exposed to a
great deal of television fare and have, with considerable
success, unraveled the confusion of show segments, interruptions, and the connections between show times and
real world times and events. They have established
boundaries not only between television and real life and
between various show types, but between elements within
those show types as well. They have successfully begun
to decode the symbol scheme of television, acquiring an
understanding of its temporal rules and organization.

Conclusions: The Emergence of Membranes
Our guiding assumption, that children with little exposure to television would lack the cognitive structures
necessary for assimilating its diver'se images and
sounds, has proved useful. As with the development of
other symbolic capacities, such as language or storytelling, children appear to progress through a series of
developmental stages in determining both television's
relationship to their own world and the organizational
system employed by the medium. Given the nature of
this study, we have examined this development in terms
of the changes which occur during each year of a 3-year
period. As a means of recapitulating our findings, we
present here the phases of development observed during these 3 years.

PHASE I Television's Initial Potency: The Lack of
Boundaries
The 2-year-old experiences a great deal of confusion
around the world of television. The images and sounds
emerging from this box are new and chaotic. Yet the
television is clearly a forceful, stimulating part of the
child's daily life. It may often even be considered a member of the family. As such, it demands respect and, ultimately, understanding.
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Of course, television is merely a physical object, not a
literal family member. Its relation to daily life is complex,
however. Sol Worth stated, "It should be obvious that
just as pictures are not simple mirrors of what is out '
there, neither are they artifacts which have no relation
whatsoever to what they are pictures of" (1980). To the
2-year-old, this concept is not quite so obvious. Children
of this age are actively attempting to determine television's role in their home, its relation to the real world.
They see a box with some buttons and a piece of glass,
containing many kinds of people, objects, and events.
Some of these types of people, objects, and situations
they have seen before, and they comment upon that
fact. Others they have never seen before and comment
on them as well. In their attempt to determine television's
reality status, children of this age appear to be more
aware of the similarities than of the differences between
the two worlds. Often they perceive similarities where
they do not actually exist. Children are attracted to the
characters on television and perceive them as readily
accessible to provide laps on which to sit, to receive
kisses, and to accept help from the viewer in solving
problems with which they are faced.
Even at this early stage children are beginning to become aware of a boundary, or membrane, between
themselves and the world presented on television. At this
time, however, the membrane is viewed as primarily permeable rather than impermeable. In fact, children of this
age often behave in ways which indicate that they at
times question the very existence of that boundary. Television is not yet understood to be a conveyor of symbol
systems, and its characters are perceived as real life
people, not as electronic images out of their viewers'
reaches and control.
The boundaries which organize the inner world of
television are perceived no more clearly than those separating television from real life. The various types of programming are not distinguished from one another, television shows are believed to be available at any hour that
the child wants to see them, show beginnings and endings are not recognized, television characters are considered able to appear on any show, at any time, and
their disappearance from the screen disturbs children
greatly. Not only is the television world viewed as part of
the child's own world, but its contents are viewed as a
melange without any organization and under the control
of children and their parents.
This phase is thus characterized by a lack of boundaries. Television's symbolic status has not been established, and its symbolic status has not been decoded. As
chii,.Jren acquire greater experience with this medium,
however, they discover that their attempt to influence it directly is unsuccessful and they are forced to reorganize
their conception of it. Near the end of this first phase of
development and during the next year, children begin to
recognize that there are separate television shows, that
they can be identified most easily by their characters, and

that the sequence in which they appear is consistent.
These findings conform to claims in the classification research that children as young as age 2 have acquired
rudimentary classification abilities (Goldberg, Perlmutter,
and Myers 197 4; Ricciuti 1965). Inasmuch as the programs and symbolic codes of television can be quite confusing, this is a remarkable achievement.

PHASE II
Begins

The Symbol System Established: Decoding

Between the ages of 3 and 4 years, children recognize
the fact that the television world is in fact separate from
their own. Its events do not actually exist in reality; they
cannot be acted upon directly. Rather, they have communicational significance. Television presents a separate world with its own rules and organization. But this
world does at times relate to experiences children have
encountered in real life, and its organizational system
parallels certain systems of organization they have encountered previously.
Children acknowledge that there are events on television similar to those in real life. The membrane between the two worlds is permeable at these times. The
televised events often symbolize or communicate real
world events. Children learn that there are other events
which never occur in real life. At these times the membrane is viewed as impermeable.
Children also learn that people have developed alanguage to help describe television's inner organization.
They begin to acquire definitions of some of the words of
this language-advertisements, cartoons, Sesame
Street-and come to understand that these words serve to
impose boundaries within the television world. As used by
the children, these first classifications seem to reflect immediately perceptible features (Denney and Acito 1975;
Rossi and Rossi 1965). For a time, children perceive the
boundaries between classes as rigid. A show can be in
one category or another and a character can be on one
show or another, never in or on more than one. As children begin to decode the rules of this symbol system,
they adhere to them strictly, consider one element at a
time, and are loath to acknowledge exceptions.
Yet, although children have begun to decode television's structure, they still remain confused about many
aspects. For instance, they still have difficulty recognizing show beginnings and endings, finding it difficult and
frustrating to accept the lack of control of this aspect of
the medium.
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PHASE Ill The Subtleties of Television's Symbolic
Status: Emergence of Flexible Categorizing
During the year spanning age 4 to age 5, children accumulate evidence that their cognitive schema is too
rigid: as a result, they relax the boundary between the
worlds of television and daily reality. They recognize the
membrane as a filter, having both permeable and impermeable components. A televised event may refer in part
to a real world event, but in part it may deviate from anything possible in real life.
Consider John's response to seeing Donald Duck on
television at age 4:1 0. He said that Donald Duck was like
his family's ducks, but his family's are a different color
and real. Donny at 4:11 sees a school on television and
comments on its relationship to his own school, but
says, "Mine isn't like this one, mine has toys." Such instances document the ability of children to overcome, to
some extent, the centration which characterizes this age
and to examine two aspects of a televised presentation
at one time. Their mental representations of televised objects, people, and events may now involve more than a
single element.
Along with their more sophisticated conception of
television's reality status, children between the ages of 4
and 5 advance in their understanding of its structure as
well . More categories of program types are establishednews, children's shows, and adult shows-and the
scheduling of shows is more clearly understood. Children seem to relinquish finally the notion of controlling
the timing of shows and recognize the various cues
which represent boundaries between or beginnings and
endings of individual programs.

Work for the Future
Our preschoolers have come a long way from their initial
perception of television as an extension of real life and
as an amalgam of confusing images. They have established certain subtleties of its relation to their own world,
and they have at least partially mastered the modes of
organization built into it. Despite the hypothesized
greater difficulty in making sense of the world of television, in contrast to the natural or social world, our subjects display principles of cognitive development which
have been reported by investigators of other domains.
That is, in defining a line between what is symbolized on
television and what is encountered in daily experience,
the children pass through the same steps they pass
through in coming to understand other kinds of mediated presentations (Gardner 1973). And, in effecting distinctions among the dizzying multiplicity of shows
presented on television, children once again exhibit the
basic tendencies to classify reported by previous
investigators.

Nonetheless, the unique nature of television, and the
special problems it poses, are noticeable in children's
early viewing experiences and will continue to be felt in a
number of areas. To begin with, children need to acquire
some degree of understanding of the technology behind
television. This understanding will enable them to comprehend better the flexible link between characters and
their shows and the ability of characters to appear on
more than one show. It will also enable them to understand better the role of production teams , that they are
the ones who control the programs and the characters
on them. At the same time, they will acquire an understanding of the concepts of producer's intent and target
audiences-the fact that the people who make the films
projected on television also design those films to be
watched by certain types of people.
As children 's ability to classify continues to develop,
and as this meshes with greater understanding of the nature of the medium, they will be able to evolve a more
sophisticated classification system, that conceived by
the makers of television. They will distinguish between
shows designed to make people laugh (comedies);
shows designed to frighten people (thrillers); those designed to teach (educational shows and documentaries);
and those designed to entertain (serials, dramas, etc.).
Children will also be expected to become more flexible
in their perception of these categories, to recognize that
certain programs may fall into more than one category
and that exceptions to the definitions of categories may
exist . Such understandings will allow children to apprehend shows in the manner in which they were intended
and thereby to avoid potentially misleading confusions
between, for example, documentaries and fictionalized
history, or between children's shows and satires of children's shows. Much recent work suggests that youngsters (and even adults) may adhere to these confusions
unless they are explicitly tutored about the lines that
separate potentially interchangeable kinds of shows
(Gardner, in press).
In addition, children will develop the ability to make
more sophisticated distinctions between reality and fantasy . They will acquire an awareness of varying levels of
reality, the contrast between surface reality and underlying psychological reality, the ambiguous reality statuses of characters such as superheroes, and the concept
of stagedness-the fact that certain content is presented
specifically for television and is rehearsed, scripted, and
nonspontaneous. Indeed, such reality-fantasy distinctions in older children have been documented by Morison, Kelly, ahd Gardner (1980).
The agenda for the ultimate mastery of television remains formidable. All the same, the attainments during
the first few years are so staggering that the ultimate
mastery of these distinctions falls within the purview of
every normal individual.
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Note
By use of this method of scoring , certain objective information was
lost . For example , children might have a different set of definitions, or
they might have an internally consistent way of classifying which differs from the classification system used by adults. Though aware of
this possibility, we felt it would be more useful to employ an objective
format in scoring . Given this decision , adult definitions of these program types appeared the most consistent .
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Photographs of the Piegan by Roland Reed 1 (Photo Essay)
Editor's Introduction: Jay Ruby

By the end of the nineteenth century the era of photographic exploration gave way to a period of photographic
documentation. We were becoming aware that our natural
resources, physical and human, were being irrevocably altered by the advance of civilization . Through the photographs of William Henry Jackson and the other explorer
photographers we had discovered the beauty of the West
and were now concerned for its preservation.
As western expansion caused us to come into increasingly less hostile contact with Native Americans
some people began to view them not as savages to b~
exterminated, or if possible converted to a civilized state,
but as remnants of a "vanishing race" whose style of life
must be recorded and preserved before it goes away.
Journalists, novelists, anthropologists, and photographers all shared in the desire to do salvage ethnography, to
find the last remaining person who could recall the good
old days, to collect the art and artifacts for museums, and to
obtain photographic images of their nobility.
During the first quarter of this century dozens of
people devoted their lives and fortunes to making a
photographic record of the Native American. Many of
these images are lost forever; most are scarcely known,
and only a very few have been subjected to any rigorous
study . While most people are aware of the work of Edward Curtis, virtually no one knows the photographs of
Roland Reed. A glance at the images reproduced here
makes a strong case for the idea that popularity and
obscurity are often due more to the whim of history and
happenstance than the merits of the works. Curtis traveled in influential circles and obtained hundreds of thousands of dollars from men like J. Pierpont Morgan to
support his work. Consequently, he was able to produce
a monumental study. Reed had no support outside of his
own savings and the revenue from the sale of his photographs. Most of his photographs were never published
in any form.
Roland Reed was born of Scottish ancestry in 1864 in
a l.og ca~in on hi.s parent's farm in the Fox River Valley in
W1scons1n. A tra1l used by the Menominie Indians to
travel from Lake Poygan to Fond du Lac ran close to his
home. In the notes which have survived with his photographs Reed wrote about his early experiences with Native Americans.
·
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Jay Ruby is Associate Professor of Anthropology at
Temple University and Co-Editor of Studies in Visual
Communication .

A ban.d of Menominies lived on the north shore of Lake Poygan directly across from my home . In the spring of 1871,
my schoolteacher and two of his pupils-boys about sixteen
years old-took a canoe and went across the lake to gather
some evergreens to decorate the schoolroom . Returning ,
their overloaded canoe overturned and the teacher was
drowned. When nearly exhausted, [the boys] were discovered by three Indians who brought them ashore, made
some hot broth for them, and then dug a hole deep in a
haystack where they stayed the night. This the Indians did
to bring back their circulation and warm them up. 1 knew
these Indians well , especially one called Thundercloud who
was chief of this band and who, after the rescue of the
b~y~ , b.ecame :he hero of my boyhood days. Undoubtedly,
th1s 1nc1dent stimulated in me a regard for the Indian which
has grown with the years.

Reed left home at an early age to seek the adventures
and fortunes that many Americans believed existed "out
there" somewhere. He traveled and worked in Canada
the Midwest, and the Southwest. By now his interest in'
Indian life had grown.
I don 't know why, but no trip I could plan satisfied me unless it led into Indian country.

By 1890 Reed began to make crayon and pencil
drawings, mainly portraits of Indians and landscapes.
None of these sketches has survived . But we do know
that he made these drawings along the route of the
Great Northern Railroad and that the Blackfeet people of
Montana were among his earliest subjects. Dissatisfied
with his own artistry, Reed contemplated the possibility
of using a camera.
If I could master this seemingly easy way of making pictures, I would have no trouble in getting all the Indian pictures I wanted .

In 1893 Reed became an apprentice to Daniel Dutro
Civil War veteran, prospector, and traveling photogra- '
pher. For the next four years Reed and Dutro traveled together from town to town doing portrait work and selling
some photographs of Indians to the News Department of
the Great Northern Railroad.
Reed left Dutro in 1897 to photograph the Alaskan
Gold Rush. In addition to covering the event for Associated Press, Reed attempted to photograph Indians in
Alaska . However, they did not appeal to him.
They made such a poor impression on me that I left for the
state~ on the first ship south in the spring without making
any p1ctures worthwhile .

Photographs of the Piegan
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Roland Reed (date
unknown).

Reed returned to the States and in 1890 founded a
photographic studio in Bemidji , Minnesota (later he also
opened one in Ortonville) near the Ojibway people.
Reed 's portrait business prospered and enabled him to
pursue on a part-time basis the photographing of some
Ojibway. Reed recounts his early attempts at gaining
rapport after an initial rejection.
" I stayed on thinking something would happen to soften
their distaste for me , and it did at last.
" One morning two small girls came in and asked if I
would take a picture of the ir brother who was sick-maybe
dying ." Reed went with them to thej r camp and photographed the little boy , but the next day he left for Bemidji. It
was several months before he made a second trip to the
Ponemah village-carrying a print of the Indian lad . As soon
as the father of the boy learned he was back, he approached Reed , asking if he had brought a picture of his
son . Reed handed the print to him. The Indian walked away
with the picture and stood for some time with his back to
Reed , looking at it. Then he returned to the photographer
and asked the cost of the portrait. Reed replied by asking
about the boy. The child was dead , he learned . Reed quietly
told the father that he was glad he had been able to make
the picture in time and that it was a gift. He wrote: "That
fine old father gave me his hand , and from that time on , I
was welcome to any part of Cross Lake Point. "
[Johnston 1979:]

Roland Reed 's studio
(date unknown).

By 1907 the conflict between earning a living photographing the middle class of small towns in Minnesota
and documenting the rapidly changing traditions of the
American Indian became unbearable. Reed closed his
studio and devoted the remainder of his life to producing
a photographic record of Indian life . Using an 11 by 14
glass-plate camera Reed photographed the Chippewa or
Ojibway, the Blackfeet (Piegan and Blood divisions), the
Cheyenne , the Crow, the Navajo, and the Hopi.

50

studies in Visual Communication

Reed was not a prolific photographer. According to
Johnston "his first three years among the Indians produced scarcely a score of negative .... Reed considered
a dozen superior photographs a worthwhile reward for a
year's effort'' (1979:56).
Reed did gain some recognition for one picture, "The
Pottery Maker" (Hopi) by winning a gold medal in 1915
at the Panama-California Exposition. Between his savings, and the monies received from the sale of his Indian
photographs to the National Geographic (the only authorized publication source for his work), Reed was able
to survive with some integrity. According to Johnston,
he once refused an offer of $15,000 from an advertising
firm for 200 of his negatives (1979:56).
Apparently Reed planned to publish a volume of his
Indian photographs. His plans for the book together with
any diaries, journals, or extensive field notes have not
survived. We have only his photographs, negatives, a
few letters, and some brief notes to reconstruct his life
and work.
It is not certain exactly how Reed worked, but in a letter he describes some of his procedures:
In approaching the Indian for the purpose of taking his picture, it is necessary to respect his stoicism and reticence
which have so often been the despair of the amateur photographer. A friend once characterized my method of attack
as indicative of Chinese patience , book-agent persistence,
and Arab subtlety. In going into a new tribe with photographic paraphernalia, although I hire ponies and guides, I
never once suggest the object of my visit.
When the Indians, out of curiosity, at last inquire about
my work, I reply casually, "Oh, when I'm at home, I'm a picture-taking man ." Perhaps within a few days an Indian will
ask, "You say you are a picture-taking man. Could you
make our pictures?" My reply is non-commital-"1 don't
know. Perhaps." "Would you try?" "Sometime, when I feel
like making pictures." Further time elapses; apparently the
picture-taking man has forgotten all about making pictures
until an Indian friend reminds him of his promise. Then the
time for picture-making has arrived .

And in a rare note Reed describes the actual taking of a
particular photograph in 1908.
The two Chippewas, in full hunting regalia, were monotonously paddling a canoe back and forth over the blue waters of a lake in northern Minnesota. I had the bow Indian
stolidly discharging an arrow at a certain buoy each time
the birch bark passed it. "More life to it, Yellow Face," I
cried. "You wouldn't shoot a deer in that fashion!" "I'm not
shooting a deer," he replied, "I am shooting a tree." "Imagine a deer," I rejoined. "Think you see a deer swimming,
trying to get away." "How can I see a deer when there is no
deer?'' he quietly came back at me.
To this there was no answer. The afternoon light was
growing yellow but the shadows and reflections in the shining lake were at their best. I had been paying these fellows
a regular wage for three days in an effort to get this one picture. Suddenly I drew out a handful of silver dollars and

Roland Reed as a young
man (date unknown).

stuck them targetwise in the crevices of the tree bark.
"Make one more round, Yellow Face, while the light lasts,"
I shouted. ''Shoot at these silver dollars as you pass the
buoy. Every one you knock down is yours." On the next
round the archer's eyes blazed with a savage light; his body
quivered with all of the thrill of the hunt as he centered five
silver dollars with seven whizzing shafts. When it was over
the air still hummed with the twang of his bowstring, and I
was out five dollars, but I had one of the very few animated
Indian photographs in existence.

By 1932 Reed concluded ''that it was no longer possible to obtain authentic Indian pictures, the Indians' historic costumes and accoutrements had all been sold to
tourists, and few examples of pure racial types were still
alive" (Johnston 1979:54).
After his death in 1934 Reed's collection was given to
his cousin Roy E. Williams, who used it in lectures to
school children. Recently the entire collection was acquired by the Kramer Gallery in St. Paul, Minnesota.
The.y are currently in the process of conserving the collection and making it available to the public.
The photographs contained in this essay were selected from the 70-odd negatives that remain of Reed's
~ork amon_g the Chippewa, the Cheyenne, and espeCially the P1egan and Blood divisions of the Blackfeet
tribe. While the Piegan were among the first Indians that
Reed sketched, these photographs as far as we can ascertain have never been published before now.
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The Piegan and other Blackfeet people live in Montana and Alberta, Canada. Traditional ly they were nomadic hunters and gatherers, living in tipis; th ey follow the
buffalo as their main subsistence source (Ewers 1958).
The hunting band was the basic economic, political, and
social unit. Men were organized into warrior and medicine societies. Small-scale raiding between bands was
endemic since it provided young men with a chance to
demonstrate their generosity, bravery, wisdom, and
skill-the basic values of the culture . Their religious system revolved around the personal acquisition of a guardian spirit and supernatural power through ceremonies
like the Sun Dance. In short, the Blackfeet fulfill most of
our popular images of what an Indian should be.
By 1787, when a Hudson 's Bay trader, David Thompson , spent a winter with the Piegan (Glover 1962:48), they
had already obtained horses, guns, metal, and smallpox
from indirect contact with Europeans. For the next hundred years the Blackfeet used the ''gifts '' of civilization to
hunt and roam the Northern Plains. Aftertwo unsuccessful
hunting seasons in 1883-1884 the Blackfeet came to the
UnitedStatesgovernmentagency , which had been established in 1855 , to ask for assistance . Ewers (1958:
293-294) estimates that in the winter of 1883-1884 one
quarter of all Piegans died from starvation.
In 1888 the Blackfeet signed a treaty relinquishing
most of their lands and agreed to settle on a reservation
in exchange for $150,000 in goods and services to be
given to them over a 10-year period. For the next 50
years the United States government instituted a series of
unsuccessful projects designed to turn these nomadic
hunters into cattle raisers and farmers.
In 1890 the Holy Family Mission school opened .
Christianity rapidly replaced the traditional religion.
Blackfeet children were forbidden to speak their own
language in school (U .S. Commission for Indian Affairs
1893:14). Other aspects of their culture were actually
outlawed. "Sun dances, Indian mourning, Indian medicine , beating of the tom-tom, gambling, wearing of Indian costumes .. . selling, trading, exchanging or giving
away anything issued to them have been prohibited,
while other less pernicious practices, such as horse-racing , face-painting, etc., are discouraged" (U .S. Commission for Indian Affairs 1894: 159).
When Reed photographed the Piegan in 1908 he obviously reconstructed (or, to be more accurate, constructed). His interest in portraits and landscapes where
a few people stand in very formal poses may be both an
aesthetic choice and a pragmatic decision based upon
the absence of traditional ceremonial or social life. With
the aid of elderly people who had lived the "old" life,
Reed constructed his version of these people. f=-le has
left us with an important resource. His photographs
speak of the complex collaboration between the photographed and the photographer, each conspiring with the
other to produce an image that satisfies their notion of
what life used to be.
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Figure 1 Buffalo Hump.
Cheyenne.

Figure 2 At the Spring.
Chippewa.
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Figure 3 The Fisherman.
Chippewa.

Figure 4 Unidentified.
Piegan male.
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Figure 5 Unidentified.
Piegan woman.
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Figure 6 Curley Bear.
Piegan.

Figure 8 Meditation.
Piegan.

Figure 7 Elderly
Blackfeet. Piegan.
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Figure 9 Watching the
Herd. Piegan.
Figure 10 Unidentified.
Piegan male.
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Figure 11 The Water
Hole. Piegan.
Figure 12

Blizzard.
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Figure 13 Up the
Cutbank. Piegan.
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Figure 15 Yellow Plume.
Piegan medicine man.

Figure 14
Pi egan.

The Horns.
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Figure 16
Piegan.

Powwow.

Figure 17 Song of the
Canyon. Piegan.

Performance and Reality:
Interpretation of Observed Behavior in Dreams, Hysteria, and Hypnosis
Aaron Honori Katcher
:$.;==.··:: ·. .

The themes of this paper arose withi n a long series of conversations with Sol Worth . The talks were informal, a part
of long, rambling walks through the Un iversity of Pennsylvania campus. These talks were a continuing seminar introducing me to ideas about the way in which we extract
meaning from the visual world. The most recurrent theme
was the therapeutic dream , the dream that becomes the
focus of the patient 's and the analyst's inquiry. Investigation of the dream brought us to the problem of intentand , indeed , the meaning of the concept ' 'intent' ' -when
the unconscious mind was assumed to be the origin of a
particular event, as in the case of dreams. Questions of intent led to considerations of situations in which there was
a problem in distinguishing simulated emotion or behavior from' 'real behavior,'' problems inherent to the understanding of feigned illness in hysteria, the behavior of
confidence men and spies, and even the behavior of the
hypnotized subject. Unfortunately Worth 's death left me
with only our notes for an initial paper, and I have had to
develop our once mutual thoughts alone and uncertainly
in a novel field of inquiry. Regretfully I must take responsibility for the argument inherent in this paper, and hope
that some of the value of the dialogue that preceded this
effort remains.

The Therapeutic Dream
The therapeutic dream is a construction of the patient and
his or her analyst, and has in its initial and final telling only
a tenuous relationship to the psychic events that occurred simultaneously with periods of rapid eye movements on the night previous to the therapeutic hour.
Since the dream is constructed as a communication by
both the analyst and the patient, it appears to have little
necessary relationship to the psychophysiological events
we recognize as a' 'dream.'' What then is the proper interpretive strategy for understanding the meaning of a
dream? One appropriate to a communication such a~ a
patient narrating a dream to an analyst and augmentmg
that narrative with his associative memories? Or one appropriate to a psychobiological event like a subject bei.ng
awakened after a period of rapid eye movement sleep 1n a
laboratory, and asked to rapidly recount his dream to a
recorder? This question was important to Worth, be~ause
of his differentiation between strategies used to decipher
interactive events and communications (Worth and Gross
197 4). Communication was defined by Worth as a class
of events in which the observer made an assumption that
there was an intent to communicate. Such communications were deciphered by the use of inferential strategies,
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dependent upon the context, structure, or grammar of the
entire event. Natural events , signs , or interactions were
deciphered by the use of attribution, that is, recognition of
invariant rather than context-dependent meanings of individual elements of the event.
Communicat ion therefore is defined as a social process,
wi thin a conte xt. in which signs are produced and transmitted , perceived and treated as messages , from which
meaning can be inferred .
Let us review briefly some of the terms we have introduced earl ier and place them within the context of communication . The concept of articulation and interpretation
must be seen as relevant to both the production and transmi ssion of signs as well as to the perception and subsequent treatment of them . While the perception and subsequent treatment of symbol ic events might be thought of
as acts of interpretation , and production and transmission
seen as acts of articulation , they can most fruitfully be seen
as parts of a process which could be called articulation / interpretation. Th is process will be further explained as being
similar to what we are calling implication /i nference .. . .
We will subsequently argue that the implication / inference process cannot take place without an assumption of
intention on both the part of the articulator as well as the interpreter . [Worth and Gross 1974]

Dreams trouble us not only because they seem like
unintended events, forced upon us by the operation of
some part of our brain quite different from that which
rules our conscious state , but yet must be shaped into
some kind of clearly intended narrative to be studied;
they also are problematical in their interpretation because they are essentially pictures which must be interpreted as narrative, as verbal descriptions. We tell others
our dreams; we do not draw them for others. Worth argued that there were important distinctions between pictorial art and verbal communication . In "Pictures Can 't
Say Ain 't " he stated:
... pictures and speech are different precisely because pictures are not a language in the verbal sense. That while
words mean primarily or basically because of lexicon and
syntax, pictures have no lexicon (in the dictionary sense)
nor a syntax in the formal grammarian sense. And yet I am
suggesting that we can interpret meaning from pictures. It
is clear , however, that if pictures have no grammar in the
strict linguistic sense, they have something like it: they have
form , structure , conventions and rules . It is clear that even
though a theory of correspondence is not sufficient to deal
with the truth in pictures, pictures must nonetheless correspond to something. Even the most un- or non-representational painting must refer to something or it would make no
sense at all. Although attributional strategies are convenient for the unskilled , no picture maker likes to think his
picture is totally up for grabs.
Earlier I suggested that the strategies we employ to interpret meaning from pictures-that is, how pictures meanare largely responsible for what pictures mean . I have suggested that if we use attributional strategies, pictures can
mean almost anything ....
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If, on the other hand, we use communicational strategies,
a particular set of meanings can be developed for pictures as
well as for that which we have often defined as art . In general
what we imply and infer through pictures are: first, an existential awareness of particular objects, persons, and events
that are ordered , patterned , sequenced, and structured so
as to imply meaning by the use of specific conventions,
codes, schemata, and structures. [Worth 1975]

The free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it. On the other hand, the repression, as far as this is
possible, of all outward signs softens our emotions. He who
gives way to violent gestures will increase his rage; he who
does not control the signs of fear will experience fear in a
greater degree ; . ..
Even the simulation of an emotion tends to arouse it in
our minds . [Darwin 1965 ed .: 365]

In this paper I argue that the problem of intent in the
interpretation of human behavior is compounded by a
difference between the way in which we evaluate words
and the way in which we evaluate pictures, like the "pictures" in a dream or the visual records of human behavior such as alteration of body posture, disturbances of
movement , facial expression, or the altered appearance
of a subject in a deep hypnotic trance . Those aspects of
behavior that we see or observe as having no recourse
to words are almost always accepted as signs of the operation of an unintentional causal event, a response to
an experimental stimulus, with much less suspicion than
words would be. Since everyone recognizes that it is not
possible to ''cause'' a sentence, observed behavior is favored over words as evidence of the operation of psychological causality. Moreover, any behavior we observe
can, by the simple mechanism of changing the sensitivity of the observing instrument, be reduced to behavior that is clearly unintended. So, for example, the motions of a skilled actor can be reduced to very minute
facial flickers with high-speed photography , and these
flickers studied as unintentional behavior. Words, however, are clearly and unequivocally distinguishable from
the character of the voice or the hand that produces
them. Thus human behavior that is observed visually
produces the same inherent problem of interpretation as
the images of the dream , even though such observed
behavior need not be translated into words to make it
part of a social process.
We can begin the investigation of how we make assumptions about intent and causality , in giving meaning
to dreams and the phenomena of hypnosis and hysteria,
by noting that Darwin struggled with the same problem
of differentiating intended or willed emotive behavior
from innate behavior.

Darwin then goes on to quote the first paragraph of Hamlet's soliloquy "Oh, What a Rogue and Peasant Slave Am
I. " That soliloquy is worth considering in detail because it
is concerned with the distinctions between signs and symbolic acts, between caused interactions and intended
communications , between stimuli and articulated events,
and between responses and interpretations:

Intention and Causality
In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
Darwin builds a persuasive argument that emotional expression is largely determined by inherited and hence innate patterns of behavior which are not subject to the
action of intent or the will . Yet in a very curious passage
in his concluding remarks he introduces will , intent, and
conscious simulation of emotion :

Is it not monstrous that this player here ,
But in a fiction , a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit
That from her working all his visage wan 'd;
Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect,
A broken voice , and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing !
For Hecuba?
What 's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba,
That he should weep for her? What would he do ,
Had he the motive and the cue for passion
That I have? He would drown the state with tears,
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech ;
Make mad the guilty, and appall the free;
Confound the ignorant and amaze indeed ,
The very faculties of eyes and ears.
Yet I,
A dull and muddy-mettled rascal , peak
Like John-a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause ,
And can say nothing ; ...
Why, what an ass am I! This is most brave ,
That I, the son of a dear father murder'd
Prompted to my revenge by heaven and hell ,
Must, like a whore, unpack my heart with words
And fall a-cursing .. .
I have heard
That guilty creatures, sitting at a play,
Have by the very cunning of the scene
Been struck so to the soul that presently
They have proclaim 'd their malefactions;
For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak
With most miraculous organ . I'll have these players
Play something like the murder of my father
Before mine uncle: I' ll observe his looks;
I'll tent him to the quick: If he but blench,
I know my course .. .
the play 's the thing
Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king.
[Shakespeare 1965 ed .: 1087]
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Hamlet clearly distinguishes between real feeling and
the fictitious emotion of the player, emotion which he describes as consciously intended- his soul forced to hi s
own conceit. The intended emotion which excited his
wonder is mimicked behavior, not words. Hamlet now
wonders at visual displays, " wan 'd" visage, tears, and
distracted facial expression. He wonders at the change
in form or representation worked by the intent of the
player. The player's conceit , that is "intent," changes
his usual form.
In the second paragraph, he contrasts the actor's performance with an imaginary natural or " caused" event.
He imagines what would happen if that actor had a true
cause for his feeling , or "motive and the cue for passion. '' That real emotion would then have very large
emotional effects on the audience, causing equally real
and large responses-the same augmentive effects that
Darwin speaks of when he refers to the power of simulated emotion . Hamlet, much like modern psychophysiological investigators, talks of emotion as both stimulus
and response. Hamlet describes the effect of intense
motivation (the murder of a father) on emotional display
and postulates a testable hypothesis which predicts the
results of that display on two classes of respondents, the
"guilty" and the "free."
Later, the emotive display of the actor charged with
"real" motivation is contrasted with his own behavior.
He uses that contrast to make a distinction between
words and observable behaviors, between lexical and
representational events. He chides himself for responding only in words, just as he marveled at the actor's capacity to respond with a visual display. The contrast between visual events is a critical distinction in Hamlet's
psychobiology , just as it is in modern psychological investigation. Words can never be just natural events; they
are always subject to the intent of the speaker (except in
certain cases where they were clearly unintended, as in
slips of the tongue and other psychopathologies of everyday life). Behavior can always be, Hamlet tells us, either a natural or a performed event. We are quite comfortable in accepting behaviors, visual displays, and
pictures as natural events, just as we are always uncomfortable and suspicious when we look at words as signs
of causal events or interactions. So Hamlet, like us, suspicious of words, scolds himself for showing emotion
"unpacking his heart" not with a change in form or behavior but with words.
In the last paragraph of the soliloquy Hamlet decides
to use a play as a stimulus and perform a real psychophysiological experiment of similar structure to the imaginary one described in the second paragraph. Only, the
stimulus in this experiment is feigned emotion-a play, a
communication-not a caused or motivated emotional
response . The play used by Hamlet as a stimulus is a
"dumb show," a play without words or a mime performance with only emotional display and representational
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acts to serve as stimuli. Thus Hamlet stands with the social psychologists who use stooges acting out emotion
to cause an emotional response in an uninformed or
duped subject.
In his experiment Hamlet assumes, as he did earlier,
that the guilty will respond differently from the "free"
and that the king, if guilty, will alter his own emotional
display, permitting Hamlet, the intent observer, to detect
the physiological changes caused by guilt "if he but
blench. " Hamlet intends to use a play as social psychologists use stooges or as a psychophysiologist such as
Lazarus might use a film depicting a subincision ritual
(Lazarus 1966:144). The film or the actions of the
stooge is used as a stimulus to produce an effect on the
audience which is recorded as the outcome of the experiment. In such experiments real or theatrical events
can be used interchangeably. A whole or a portion of the
film or the play can be used (the king does not wait for
the play 's conclusion before leaving). The experimenter
does not have to think about the interpretive strategies
used by the audience; indeed, most investigators, like
Hamlet, attribute an emotional meaning to the subject's
behavior and assume that the subject responds to rather
than interprets the film or the stooge's play. In most
modern psychophysiological investigations, films and
stooges can be used interchangeably with mechanical
stimuli, like painful emotional shock, to produce emotional responses. A film can then be compared to a stimulus like an electric shock: a communication equated
with a physical interaction. Hamlet creates the same kind
of confusion by using the mime performance as if it were
a natural event and constructing a causal chain of stimuli and responses in which the play is the stimulus and
the king 's actions the response .
The remainder of this paper will consider the confusions between intended communications and causally
related interactions in the study of three related phenomena: dreams, hysteria, and hypnosis. Each of these phenomena can be related by causal interactions to other
natural events. Each can be studied as communication.
Rarely have investigators considered the utility of alternately making one and then the other assumption, and
testing the results of such explorations against one another. All three events are particularly subject to the confusion of communication and interaction because they
are essentially events that are seen and described in
terms of what is seen. The confusion is inherent in
events that are described by sight, by change in form,
both because pictures are always edited, and the criteria
for such editing usually remain unarticulated, and because anytime form changes, there are some aspects of
that change which clearly cannot be shaped by our conscious intent. The paradox is perhaps most familiar in
the study of dreams.
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Dreams as Visual Events
Dreams are essentially visual events. Dreams with only
words do occur, and they have their own eerie character, but they are exceptional and notably in contrast with
the almost invariantly visual nature of dream life. The
logic of dreams is also the logic of pictures. Opposites
are combined. The dreamer asleep watches the dreamer
awake watching the dreamer murdered . People long
dead come alive, and people alive are represented as
dead. Night and day occur simultaneously, places
change into each other faster than a dissolving cut in a
film. Time has no fixed dimension and can be greatly
contracted or expanded. Not only are dreams visual
events, representations of ourselves and the world
around us; they are also events which are anchored to
definable physiological events: a particular pattern in the
electroencephalogram, rapid back-and-forth movements
of the eyes beneath closed eyelids, and a cessation of
movement in the rest of the body. Since dreams have
such a clearly representational character, and are associated with definable physiological events, they should
have the character of signs or caused mental events. Indeed, we recognize a general agreement (no matter
what variation there may be in the acceptability of particular theories about the meaning of dreams) that dreams
are not intended by the dreamer, that they are in some
way forced upon the dreamer, unlike reverie or daydreaming in which the dreamer, no matter how passive,
is a willing accomplice. Dreams come from somewhere
else and are not a product of our intentional or volitional
consciousness. We recognize their alien character by
our continual mystification about their meaning. We may
consult a ten-cent dream book or a hundred-dollar-anhour psychoanalyst, or even a religious prophet without
price, but we recognize the wisdom of searching out a
hidden meaning.
If dreams seem to be a kind of natural event, the evidence of the working of part of our mind that is free from
our own intentions, they should be ideal tools for the
study of causal relationships within mental activity. Unfortunately, they are private events, and to be studied,
the visual dream must be translated into words. This
translation and the subsequent verbal operations used
to discern the meaning of the dream permit the operation of intentional behavior to such an extent that we
can no longer be sure that the translated dream, or even
the dream as represented after the process of translation, still has the character of a natural event. It could
just as well be an elegantly constructed performance reflecting the mutual intentions of dreamer and analyst.
This ineluctable confusion of cause and intent is not
merely the result of the translation of the dream from
memories of visual events known only to the dreamer
into words that can be shared by dreamer and analyst; it
is intensified by the application of the only method we
have for decoding dreams; psychoanalytic free association. This method makes the basic assumption that the

dream is a disguised wish . The wish is "censored" but
not eliminated by the partially aroused ego. The ego
censors the wish in such a way that the wish is still represented and hence gratifying to the unconscious organ
of tbe wishing activity, and yet the wish is sufficiently disguised that the anxieties of the ego are not overaroused.
With this happy result, both mental organs achieve at
least a partial satisfaction and sleep continues. The
dream is assumed to be censored in a peculiar fashion:
the representation of the wish is replaced by the representations of events or images associated with that wish,
but different enough to effect a disguise.
The dream is decoded by searching for associations
of the "manifest" dream that will be closer to the hidden
wish and permit either the analyst or the patient to reconstruct that wish. To start the decoding process, the
dream is broken into fragments and the patient free-associates to these fragments. The first part of this association may lead to the amplification of the verbal detail in
which the dream is described, resulting in a change in
the dream narrative. Fragments rather than dreams are
used in the associative process, following Freud's dictum that a dream is more like a rebus than a poem (in a
rebus, the visual representations spelling out the words
of the message have no necessary associations with
each other; Freud 1961 ed.). The dream is not required
to have the unity of image required of a poem.
The free associations that are linked by the patient to
the dream fragments are, of course, free from the conventions of narrative, free from intention, and hence
causally related . These associations are assumed to be
chains of thoughts or images that are not shaped into
any conventional narrative sequence. Images, thoughts,
ideas, and words can be linked by any one or more of
the thousands of potential criteria for grouping percepts.
The patient's associations are expected, with many false
starts and diversions, to travel backward over the
branching chains of associations to the hidden impulses
that generated the dream. Thus after the associative
process the dream consists of fragments, each surrounded by its own skein of interconnected chains of associations. This assembly is very much larger than the
original dream narrative and, more importantly, very
much larger than either the interpretation of the dream
fragment offered by the psychiatrist or even the associations actually used to justify the interpretation. Dream
images are assumed to be very condensed expressions
of a potentially large group of associations available for
disguised expression of the dream wish. Dream interpretations are very condensed expressions of a very
long list of the patient's associations. This peculiarly
symmetrical relationship-between, on one hand, a condensed dream and a large set of potential associations
and, on the other, a condensed interpretation and a
large set of the patient's actual associations-suggests a
change in the name of the ego's dream maker, a change
from dream censor to dream editor.

Performance and Reality

The generation of dreams can be reimagined using
the concept of editor. The editor has at its command all
the chains of associations that have been built around a
certain genera of wish. This is a very large pool of material stretching backward into the far and infantile past,
very much larger than the chain of associations that a
patient will uncover at any single analytic session devoted to dream analysis. In order to prevent an unacceptable wish from becoming conscious, the operator does
not remove material; it searches the large file of related
material until it finds images that are at a suitable distance along the chain to permit the disguise of the unacceptable wish but not at too great a distance to represent the wish at all. But using nodes, or places where
chains cross, the operator can, by skillful editing,
choose associations that are part of many different
chains, achieving both condensation and the representation of contradictory or opposing concepts (the wish
and its negation).
Another editing process begins as soon as the physiological events of dreaming are over. A sleeper remembers only a few of the many dreams he experiences during a night. Of those that are remembered on waking,
only a few are brought to the analyst. In the course of an
analysis, perhaps weeks or months go by without
dreams being part of the analytic work. Of those dreams
that are analyzed, few are analyzed completely; most
dream analyses concern themselves with some but not
all of the fragments. This condensation was described
by Freud in his Introductory Lectures:
These last dreams provide splendid material and are in no
respect inferior to those of healthy persons, but the technique of the treatment obliges us to subordinate dream-interpretation to therapeutic purposes and to desist from the
attempt to interpret a large number of the dreams as soon
as we have extracted from them something of use for the
treatment . Again many dreams which occur during the
treatment elude full interpretation altogether; since they
have their origin in the whole mass of material in the mind
which is as yet unknown to us ....
The literature of psycho-analysis shows no lack of good
and detailed dream-analyses; I myself have published some
which formed part of the history of certain pathological
cases. Perhaps the best example of a dream interpretation
is that published by 0. Rank, consisting of the analysis of
two mutually related dreams of a young girl. These cover
about two pages of print, while the analysis of them runs
into 76 pages. [Freud 1943 ed.: 163-164]

Some dreams that are analyzed in a satisfying way do
not remain in the memory of either the patient or the
an&:yst, and of the ones that do, only a few are recorded
for discussion at meetings or published in the psychoanalytic literature. Although millions of analytic hours have
passed since the publication of The Interpretation of
Dreams, only a few thousand dreams and dream fragments are part of the analytic literature and available to
shape our ideas about the interpretation of dreams.
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From the natural event of REM sleep and dreaming by
the patient to the published dreams which shape our
ideas about the meaning of dreams, there is an editing
ratio of millions to one. Because of the postulated editing
activity within the dreamer, the editing and selective forgetting of dreams by the now-conscious dreamer, and
the enormous condensation we have described between
the dream in therapy and dreams in published accounts,
we have no idea whether the analyst is more like a filmmaker editing his raw documentary footage into a filmic
performance or a scientist recording the texture of natural events. The problem is confounded by our ignorance
of the conventions and skills used by dream maker, patient, analyst, and editorial board in creating the edited
material we are able to read. We cannot separate the
laws of dream process from the conventions for analysis.
of dreams and editing the analytic material. This inability
to separate editorial convention from natural law is
present any time we edit our pictures of reality from a
large set of observations to a small set of illustrations.
For example, home photographs are pictures of the
external realities of a person's life. We would like to use
these objective representations of events to describe a
historical reality for the families that took those pictures.
Any person with a camera and the ability to use it has a
potentially infinite number of sights and events that he
could record with a "snapshot ." Where a family does
accumulate a large number of snapshots, relatively few
of these are organized for social presentation. The inherent narrative or meaning within the ones that are organized cannot be understood directly but apparently requires the associations of the person who took the
picture, associations which describe the occasion and
purpose for taking the picture, and are part of a larger
narrative the picture was designed to preserve. Ruby
(1976) asserts that the snapshot is an "aide-memoire"
and is linked to a chain of narrative and the conventions
for taking home photographs. Convention instructs the
editing of visual images into filmic ones, and within that
convention particular constellations of events give
meaning to the pictures that are taken. Pictures must
then be treated like the fragments of a dream, understood through recognition of the conventions of filming
and the associations to particular film imaaes.
Just as analysts would like to use dreams to obtain a
clear picture of the reality of the internal unconscious,
just as social scientists would like to use home photographs to describe the objective realities of social relationships within a family, anthropologists, ethologists,
and naturalists would like to use the photographs they
take during their investigations to represent the reality of
their observations to their readers. However, almost all
those illustrative photographs are selected from a large
corpus of photographs, and the method of making the
selection is never articulated. In a recent review of a
book on the life of one species of Japanese fox, thereviewer mentions with admiration that the tens of pictures
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in the book were selected from 70,000 photographs the
author had taken in the course of his study (Breslin
1980:94). Since the technique of editing pictures to
present reality is unarticulated by the observer, we do
not know if those editorial processes are as conventional
and undefined as the editing which permits the construction of the most unreal and dreamlike representations. When photographs or film are used in this fashion ,
we are always caught between convention and cause in
our search for meaning. The intent of the observer can
never be separated from the natural events he observes,
and there will always be an unfortunate similarity between the dream and the documentary, or any other
technique of representing reality in which pictures are
selected to be placed side by side.

Hysteria and Hypnosis
Any natural event, even one so far removed from human
intention as the explosion of a volcano , can be edited
into a sequence of photographs that reflects more of the
intent of the photographer and editor than the causal
relationships between the components of the event. Yet
there are some phenomena in which the confusion of
natural event and performance are so ingrained that the
audience cannot choose an appropriate strategy for the
interpretation of the event. Two such events, hysteria
and hypnosis, are intimately related to the dream and
the display of human emotion. Freud's first psychological investigations were explorations in the therapy of
hysteria, and in that therapy he first used and then abandoned the use of hypnosis. The associative techniques
he used to puzzle out the meaning of hysterical symptoms were later used to analyze the images of dreams.
Both hypnosis and hysteria can be described as simulated, performed, or acted behavior, or, alternatively, as
behavior "caused" by unconscious mental processes.
Both are in large part dumb show, or mimed behavior,
and we recognize their presence by looking at the form
or motion of the body rather than the words used by the
subject or patient. The hysteric does not tell the physician about his or her symptoms; he or she acts the part
with fantastically contorted limbs, paralysis, convulsions,
swoons, anaesthesias, blindness, or the inability to walk
or talk. The hypnotic subject may not be called upon to
speak at all. He or she sits, walks, or acts like a somnambulist, performing the part with anaesthesias, paralysis,
floating limbs, rigid limbs, floppy limbs, and actions indicative of positive or negative hallucinations. If the hysteric only complained of aches and pains like a hypochondriac or a malingerer instead of acting out the
illness, and if the hypnotized subject only told us he was
in trance and generated no novel behavior, we would
not believe the hysteric to be diseased and the hypnotic
subject to be in an altered state of consciousness. These
two phenomena are believable because they are, in

large part, acted out. The acting, in the absence of
words, permits us to define that behavior as a sign or a
natural event and to dispense with the problem of assigning intent to the performance.

Hysteria
Charcot, the great nineteenth-century neurologist,
brought the study of hysteria into the domain of neurological investigation by differentiating the "functional"
convulsions of hysterical epilepsy from the convulsions
of true epilepsy, which were associated with pathological change within the brain. The differentiation of real
and "imitated" convulsions was made by observing the
patient for signs of organic illness and distinguishing
them from the signs of functional illness. The functional
illness, which was thought to be caused and hence not
intentional, was differentiated from malingering or intentional imitation of illness by demonstrating that the signs
of hysterical illness could not be imitated by the "normal" individual.
The emphasis on signs , visual demonstrations of illness, rather than on words was the essential characteristic of scientific medicine of the nineteenth century.
Charcot exemplified Foucault's conclusion that the perceptual organization of nineteenth-century medicine
centered on the gaze of the clinician:
Clinical experience-that opening up of the concrete individual , for the first time in Western history, to the language
of rationality, that major event in the relationship of man to
himself and of language to things-was soon taken as a
simple conceptualized confrontation of a gaze and a face,
or a glance and a silent body; a sort of contract prior to all
discourse, free of the burdens of language by which two living individuals are "trapped" in a common but non-reciprocal situation. [Foucault 1975: xv]
Charcot exemplified Foucault's clinician, and this
exemplification was noted by his students and contemporaries, especially Freud :
He was not much given to cogitation , was not of the reflective type, but he had an artistically gifted temperament-as
he said himself, he was a visuel. a seer. He himself told us
the following about his method of working : he was accustomed to look again and again at things that were incomprehensible to him, to deepen his impression of them
day by day, until suddenly understanding of them dawned
upon him. [Zilboorg and Henry 1942: 362-364]
Charcot's interest in the visual extended beyond clinical
observation. He was one of the first medical investigators to use photography as part of his research method.
He brought Duchenne de Boulogne to the Salpetriere
and with Duchenne's aid established a photographic
laboratory. Duchenne published, in 1862, a photo-
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graphic study of facial expression , " Mecanisme de Ia
physionomie humaine, " wh ich was one of those used by
Darwin in illustrating The Expression of the Emotions in
Man and Animals. Charcot went on to foster the publication of Bourneville and Regnard 's " La grande hysterie;
iconagraphie photographique de Ia Sal petri ere. " Charcot himself examined the representations of hysterical ill ness in art in "Les demoniaques dans l'art," which was
succeeded by " Les difformes et les malades dans l'art "
(Owen 1971 ).
The argument I am making about the role of behavioral signs in the interpretation of hysteria can be
strengthened by noting Darwin's use of photographs in
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals and
his struggle with the problem of intent. He used pictures
of madmen and actors, one assumed to be acting unintentionally and the other intentionally . He used pictures ,
derived from Duchenne, of a real and a simulated smi le,
to distinguish between intended and inherited behavior.
He expressed his conclusions as follows:
We will now consider how far the will and consciousness
have come into play in the development of the various
movements of expression. As far as we can judge , only a
few expressive movements, such as those just referred to,
are learnt by each individual ; that is , were consciously and
voluntarily performed during the early years of life for some
definite object or in imitation of others, and then became
habitual. The far greater number of the movements of expression, and all the more important ones , are , as we have
seen , innate or inherited; and such cannot be said to depend on the will of the individual. [Darwin 1965 ed .: 352]

Although Charcot treated hysteria as a functional neurological disturbance, a true disease, he did recognize that
the symptoms and signs were not without purpose, but
represented an imitation of illness, and that the patients
actively sought treatment for disease. Charcot spoke of
a ' 'mania operativea pass iva'' to describe the avidity of
hysterics for surgery. Modern physicians talk of " compensation neurosis," implying that the hysterical symptoms are not only directed at seeking treatment but also
at reaping the rewards of disability which is validated by
treatment. When psychiatrists speak of hysteria, they
recognize that the symptoms are imitations of illness and
that the functional disturbance reflects not the anatomical mechan.ism of a limb or an organ but the patient's
"idea" of a limb or an organ . Thus hysterical anaesthesia of the hand does not follow the anatomic pathways of nerves (unless the patient is a physician or a
nurse and knows the anatomy of nerves and muscles)
but follows the patient's representation of a hand-the
anaesthesia ceasing at the wrist, having the form of a
glove. Physicians of Charcot's time also recognized that
hysterical symptoms changed with patients' ideas about
iliness and the function of limbs. Now psychiatrists no
longer see the grand hysterical seizures that Charcot
demonstrated to the medical audiences of the Sal pet-
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riere . Modern hysterical symptoms reflect modern ideas
about illness . The fact that the patient presents his or her
self as a patient seeking help with an illness, and the fact
that the patient acts out the illness, constructs the dilemma for the physician. Is it simulation or is it real?
Freud, unlike Charcot, did not study the form of hysterical illness. He treated hysterical symptoms as he later
treated dream images. He had the patient translate them
into words , then built associations upon those words unti l the pat ient put into words the repressed traumatic
memory that was the '' cause '' of the symptoms. The
symptoms, caused by unconscious repressed images,
ceased being causes when they were translated into
words. Freud in his cathartic therapy respected the distinction between words which are intended behavior and
images which are signs or natural events. The translation of a repressed image into words deprives that image of its power to " cause ."

Hypnosis
From the time of its introduction by Mesmer, hypnosis
seems to be a kind of behavior display which is caused
by some force exterior to the subject 's will. The behavior
of the hypnotic subject as seen and described by the
hypnotist or the observer seems to be caused by a force
that is normally not operative when the subject is in his
normal state. Mesmer believed, or said he believed , that
the hypnotic phenomenon was caused by the influence
of magnets. He first used real magnets to induce the
state, later used objects that were treated by exposure to
magnets, and still later developed the idea that living
bodies have a kind of magnetic force he called "animal
magnetism. " He believed that the passage of his hands
over the patient caused changes in the magnetic forces
within the body, producing the results he observed. His
subjects twitched and convulsed upon entering the hypnotic state, a behavior linked in Mesmer's mind with the
twitching of a limb when a nerve is electrically
stimulated.
Mesmer's detractors, however, observed the public
performances at which he produced his trances and saw
his patients' behavior in terms of suggestion, acting, and
imitation. A royal comm ission was appointed to decide
on the reality of the phenomenon. They proposed sophisticated social psychological experiments in which
patients would be blindfolded and unaware of the identity of the person treating them or the object used to
treat them . Mesmer refused to be part of these experiments, and the commission made its report without
them . They concluded:
The commissioners, having found that the fluid animal magnetism can not be perceived by any of the senses and that it
has no effect upon themselves or upon the patients submitted to them ; having assured themselves that pressure
and contact produce changes that are seldom favorable in
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the organic economy and agitations which are always unfavourable, in the imagination; having finally demonstrated
by decisive experiments that imagination without magnetism produces convulsions and that magnetism without
imagination produces nothing; they have unanimously concluded, on the question of the existence and the utility of
magnetism, that there is no proof of its existence, that this
fluid without existence is consequently without utility, and
that the violent effects observed in public clinics are to be
attributed to the touching, to the aroused imagination, and
to that mechanical imitation which lead us, in spite of ourselves, to repeat that which strikes our senses .... touching,
and the repeated action of the imagination for the purpose
of producing crises can be harmful, that the sight of these
crises is likewise dangerous because of the imitation which
nature seems to have imposed upon us as a law ... . [Pattie
1967:21]

The causal action of natural events is rejected in favor
of imagination and imitation. For them hypnosis was a
performance, but a strange kind of performance. Their
last sentence in the quoted portion of their text, "imitation which nature seems to have imposed upon us as a
law," takes the problem full round, much in the manner
of the psychoanalytic definition of hysteria, by proposing
that the imitation was not an intended act but an imposition of natural law. They both denied and asserted the
naturalness or lawfulness of the performance. This ambivalence about hypnosis still persists and troubles the
most sophisticated of the social psychologists who study
hypnotic phenomena.
Hypnosis and hysteria were united by Charcot, who
used hypnosis both to evoke and to terminate hysterical
symptoms and who defined hypnosis as an artificial form
of hysteria, a temporary neurosis caused by the hypnotist. The play of hypnosis and hysteria can be illustrated
in this account of the hypnosis of a female hysteric,
''Greuz'':
After this preamble Charcot proceeded to introduce a hysterical girl, ''Greuz,'' who had a left hemianesthesia with full
sensibility on the right side . Charcot remarked that she had
been subjected to hypnotism on only four or five occasions .. . .
Greuz was put into somnambulism. ''Your right hand is
paralyzed, " said Charcot firmly. Greuz demurred, saying
Charcot was mistaken . But Charcot insisted in an accent of
authority, and after a few minutes of this discussion, the
hand hung flaccidly. All active movement of the arm was
abolished , as well as all resistance to passive movements.
Very interestingly, the hand, the arm, the shoulder and part
of the chest-previously normal-now showed complete
anesthesia. The genuineness of the anesthesia was verified
by demonstrating to the class that violent torsion of the
joints produced no sign of feeling, and that no pain or sensation was evident in Greuz's face on faradizing the nerve
trunks of the arm even to the extent of causing violent contraction of the muscles. Charcot now pointed out to the
class, with a certain air of justifiable satisfaction , that the

symptoms produced artificially under hypnosis in Greuz
were in almost all respects identical with those occurring as
hysterical symptoms in the previously mentioned patients
Pen. and Porcz. [Owen 1971: 118:-119]

In reading the account of the patient Greuz, it is perhaps too easy to assume that Charcot was being deceived by the patient, especially when we recognize the
implications of the statement that the patient had ''only''
been hypnotized three or four times previously. Yet
Charcot was an astute observer, and many of his observations stand as part of our neurological and psychiatric
knowledge. To illustrate that hysteria and hypnosis are
still entwined phenomena let me cite an example from
my own practice. I had been treating a patient with a
classic hysterical conversion reaction which in her case
consisted of hysterical epileptiform seizures, an ataxic
gait, and a speech disturbance. During that time we had
slowly withdrawn her medication for epilepsy, which included phenobarbital . The withdrawal of barbiturate
medication can cause severe symptoms including tremors, agitation, stereotyped ticklike movements, motor incoordination, convulsions, and, in some instances, a
series of convulsions terminating in death. After the last
and lowest dose of medication had been stopped, she
was well for two days but then was brought at her own
request to the local hospital. The resident in charge of
admissions called me and informed me that the patient
had the classical symptoms of barbiturate withdrawal
and that she required hospitalization for remedication. I
described the care with which the medication was withdrawn and my diagnosis, conversion hysteria or simulated illness . He then changed his diagnosis from real illness to simulated illness and suggested psychiatric
hospitalization . The family then asked me to see the patient. She was brought in by four of her family, hardly
able to walk, arms and legs flailing about as she struggled to regain her balance, unable to talk, except in a
voice so slurred as to be almost unintelligible, sounding
for all the world like a drunk about to lapse into alcoholic
coma, and picking and scratching at her skin in the classic manner of someone in barbiturate withdrawal. With
her family seated about the consultation room, I ordered
her to sit down, ·told her to fix her eyes on ' 'a spot where
the ceiling joins the wall," and began a conventional
trance induction suggesting relaxation and "deep"
trance . Within thirty seconds all her tremors ceased . She
seemed deeply relaxed in another five minutes. I awoke
her from the trance; her speech was normal , and she
was able to walk out of the room unassisted, with her bewildered relatives following.
What had happened? What was real? What was unconscious behavior? What was conscious? What was intended? What was not? To answer one question , the patient was a nurse who had worked in psychiatric services
and therefore had enough information to mimic barbiturate withdrawal symptoms. lt was possible for her to "in-
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tend" all the behavior she manifested. Given our knowledge of this ability we have to make a decision about the
performance or the two performances, the performance
as a patient with barbiturate withdrawal symptoms and
the performance as a hypnotized subject loosing the
symptoms of a hysterical neurosis. The first performance
had three separate audiences: the resident at the local
hospital, the family, and me. The second had only two,
unless the patient is to be counted as both audience and
performer. The last parenthetical thought is no simple
aside. If one believes that hypnosis is a psychobiological
phenomenon, and that the intent is not conscious intent
but unconscious intent, then the patient is an audience
to her own performance. And the patient expresses the
same wonderment as the other audiences and acts as if
he or she has been watching an event much the same
way as a patient might watch an operation being performed on his or her abdomen through a mirror.
The subjects of Charcot were demonstrated on the
stage of amphitheaters with an audience of visiting medical scholars, students, interns, and house staff. The patients were in almost perpetual care in the hospital, were
used over and over again in lecture demonstrations, and
were trained in other sessions in which subordinate staff
would practice the uncovering of the same phenomenon
demonstrated by the professor. More importantly, patients were trained for the grand performance by being
hypnotized by the house staff to determine if they were
of sufficient interest to be displayed at lectures. Apparently Charcot himself, impressed by the visual impact of
demonstration, practiced the mimicry of patients' symptoms and incorporated acted symptoms into his own lecture repertoire.
The three patients used most often by Charcot were
trained by the descendants of one school of animal
magnetism. They had been trained so well that they exhibited an invariant form of hypnotic behavior-they
knew their lines too well, and Charcot made the mistake
of confusing an invariant performance for an invariant
psychological or psychobiological law. He described
rigid stages of hypnosis which were not seen outside the
Salpetriere by investigators who did not have the same
trained subjects. Janet, a contemporary of Charcot, recognized that Charcot was dealing with trained performers. Janet was able to do so because he could elicit
Charcot's stages of hypnosis from only one subject.
That subject was a trained somnambulist used in stage
demonstrations and trained for the stage by the same
school of animal magnetizers that trained Charcot's patients (Owen 1971 :155).
We now recognize the correctness of Janet's insights.
The stages of hypnosis described by Charcot were welllearned parts of his patients' performance. Different patients, then and now, have their own performances.
There are no apparent "natural laws" governing the behavior of hypnotic subjects, and what a subject believes
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is part of hypnosis usually becomes a part of his hypnotic performance. We are left agreeing with the conclusions of the commission that investigated Mesmer's hypnosis: it succeeds more from imitation than from
physical force. Yet upon looking at the kinds of behaviors included in these subjects' repertoire, everyone
finds it hard to accept the conclusion that it was all an
act with nothing "real" embedded in the performance.
This paradox still plagues the study of hypnosis. Martin Orne (1972) and Theodore Barber (1967) have used
exemplary experimental techniques to demonstrate that
it is not possible to distinguish people simulating hypnosis from people who are deeply hypnotized. Both
kinds of subjects can accomplish the same feats, stiffen
limbs, act as if limbs are paralyzed, appear to regress in
age, stiffen their bodies so that they can be supported by
two chairs and have someone stand on their abdomen
and so on. Trained hypnotists cannot detect the deception, yet simulators always know they are simulating.
These studies leave the investigators with an interesting
paradox: If all the events of hypnosis could be simulated
by a motivated subject, and if there were nothing "left
over" that he could not simulate or include in his repertoire of conscious intended behavior, then hypnosis is
nothing more than a social convention, a performance of
the subject and the hypnotist for each other and any audience present. Hypnosis defined as a social convention
does not require that there be any causal interaction between the behavior of the hypnotist and the "unconscious'' or any other portion of the subject's mind not
governed by intent. Without special attributes that could
not be simulated, hypnosis might be a useful social convention for anxiety relief or enhancement of memory, but
it could not be a kind of psychological interaction indicating causal relationships between social acts and unconscious motivational structures of the subject's mind.
Barber (1967) has been willing to accept hypnosis as
a mere social convention, but Orne (1972) has attempted to find something more than simulation that
could be an essential characteristic of the hypnotic
state, free from the intent of the subject. His demonstration of essential characteristics of hypnosis is interesting
but far from convincing. He arrived at the conclusion
that hypnotic subjects use a special kind of logic called
trance logic. The following circumstances would be an
example.
A subject is told to hallucinate a person sitting in an
empty chair. He is then told to sit in that chair. The simulator operating under those commands will sit on the
edge of the chair as if he were sharing the chair with another. He indicates that he recognizes the incompatibility
of two people occupying the same chair at once. The
truly hypnotized subject will sit directly and squarely on
the chair. He sees no incompatibility with two people simultaneously occupying the same space at the same
time. Trance logic operates in the same way as the unconscious mind. It is capable of asserting both of two in-
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compatible statements simultaneously. In trance logic,
as in dream and the unconscious, it can rain and not
rain at the same time. One can be living and dead at the
same time. One can watch one's self from a distance.
The kind of logic called trance logic is not only the logic
of the unconscious and the representation of the unconscious called dreams, or the characteristic of the hypnotic state, it is, as we have stated earlier, characteristic
of the logic of pictures. The essence of hypnosis seems
to be much like the essence of dreams, and both seem
to owe some of their character to the ways in which visual images carry meaning .
The psychological investigators who have attempted
to see if there is more than simulation in hypnosis have
also used new strategies in interpreting their subjects'
behavior. In attempting to see if their subjects were ruled
by psychological cause and effect, they have attempted
to rule out the operation of intent and, specifically, tried
to rule out the possibility that the subject is performing
for the experimenter. They have tried to determine if the
elegant performances they use to "stimulate" their subjects might be perceived as performance by the subject.
Their concern is not so much the penetration of their deception, but the prospect that the subject might interpret
the performance and define a role for himself. Orne
(1972: 399-444) developed the twin ideas of "demand
characteristics of the experiment " and "quasi-control "
to deal with this process . The demand characteristics of
the experiments are those aspects of the experimental
performance that indicate the subject 's role or tell the
subject how the experimenter wants him to behave. The
quasi-control is a set of procedures which are used to
determine if the subject is correctly informed about the
experimenter's intent. If the subject knows how he
should perform , then the operation of psychological law
can never be determined by that experiment. The experimenter is constructing a performance to communicate
with a subject , and the subject is performing for the experimenter. Only if the subject cannot guess how he
should perform , can the experiment be used to discern
psychological reality .

Unfortunately the investigation of intent in the study of
hypnosis and other "psychological interactions" is difficult for investigators because they do not wish to study
communication and because they are alarmed by the
proposition that where there is communication there is
no cause and effect. Rosenhan has described the tacit
conspiracy in which subjects and experimenters conceal
from each other their knowledge that they are performers and audiences:
The term " muted awareness " designates the phenomenon
whereby subjects in many experiments sense what is expected of them , sense also that they are not supposed to
have this awareness, and behave accordingly. Thus, on
brief or unsophisticated inquiry, subjects will often deny
that they have "intuited " the main hypotheses of the experiment or that they have understood the purpose of the experimental manipujations. The denial satisfies their need to
be "good " subjects and at the same time satisfies the experimenter that he has concealed his biases . Thus, a pact
of naivete is established [Orne terms it a pact of ignorance] ,
with both parties sufficientry invested to play their roles well
and to retain their secrets. [Rosenhan 1967:487]

We can still wonder with Darwin and Hamlet that simulated emotion embedded in an actor's performance can
change the way in which people behave. We cannot,
however, forget that performance and reality are two aspects of any social event, and failure to see the performance as a performance does not construct a reality.
This paper has made a simple argument about three
troublesome events, dreams, hysteria, and hypnosis.
These events cannot be studied as either a performance
or a natural event. We increase our knowledge of these
phenomena by alternately studying them as if they were
intended and as if they were unintended . We must recognize that they are both performance and reality. The
necessary logic of these events, which calls for such a
dual strategy for interpretation , is in part determined by
the logic of visual events: images, pictures, and observations about human behavior that rely on visual impressions. The peculiar character of dreams, hysteria, and
hypnosis, and their ability to include such a high order of
contradiction, is characteristic of the logic of pictures. In
the interpretation of dreams, the abil ity of dreams to be
so allusive and evocative and carry such a high order of
meaningful contradiction is augmented by the editorial
process that occurs when we construct a dream or an
interpretation of a dream . One conclusion which follows
from this argument, but which will have to be justified in
another paper, is that much of what we feel is peculiar to
unconscious thought, and the logic of unconscious
thinking , derives from the simple fact that the unconscious thinks in pictures.
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The National Gallery Presents Ethnographic Art
from Oceania
Review Essay by William H. Davenport
University of Pennsylvania
The most ambitious and comprehensive exhibition of
ethnographic art from Oceania ever to be presented in
the United States-probably the world-was shown at
the National Gallery of Art, Washington , D.C., between
July 1, 1979, and February 17, 1980. The exhibition,
modestly titled ''The Art of the Pacific Islands,'' was ten
years in the planning, consisted of well over 400 pieces
from the three culture areas-Polynesia, Micronesia, and
Melanesia-and was lavishly installed on the concourse
of the new East Building. An attempt was made to represent every major local and regional tradition of material
culture with aesthetic merit and to include as many objects collected during the initial periods of European exploration as possible. In addition, Douglas Newton , the
organizer of the exhibition, tried to include worthy pieces
from many private collections that have not been shown
or published before .
One of the reasons for producing a major exhibition of
Pacific Island art, according to J. Carter Brown, Director
of the National Gallery, was to acknowledge that exotic
art from the vast reaches of Oceania is as aesthetically
interesting and important as better-known traditions
from sub-Saharan Africa and the New World. In order to
accomplish all these goals, materials were borrowed
from 56 museums (many of them national museums)
and 28 private collections in 12 countries besides the
United States. Only the prestige and resources of the
National Gallery of Art could command cooperation and
participation on this scale.
What does this exhibition of 400-odd objects represent
in relation to the collected materials now in museum and
private collections? The totality of Oceanian art is best
thought of as divided among several pools of materials.
One such pool consists of collections from the central and
northern island groups, known as Polynesia and Micronesia, plus a few more islands in the southwest Pacific,
known as Melanesia. Because these were the earliest
islands or parts of islands to be ''discovered'' and explored by Europeans, and because the cultures and societies of these islands have been enormously affectedsometimes completely obliterated-by colonialism, the
material culture traditions which produced the art are
dead. All objects from these societies not preserved in collections have long since disintegrated; nothing more is
being produced, unless in recent years there have been
self-conscious attempts to revive forgotten skills in order

to produce tourist curios or new symbols of cultural identity . In this pool are, perhaps, 10,000 pieces of sufficient
aesthetic interest to be considered for inclusion in an exhibition of this sort. About 200 were selected.
A second pool of objects, mainly from the large island
of New Guinea plus a few other small islands nearby, all
in Melanesia, is much larger and is still growing. The
number is increasing as more are being "found" in neglected museum collections and more are being collected from villages that are producing them, because
the traditions have not entirely faded, or still have them
lying around. There are , perhaps, 40-50,000 objects in
this pool from which, again , about 200 were selected for
this exhibition. Certainly, one noteworthy success of the
exhibition was the selection and presentation of the
obejcts from New Guinea and nearby islands, which, because so many have come to light only in the past few
decades, are less well known than those from the pool
first described.
Figure 1 Figure, New Ireland, Papua New Guinea,
wood and paint, 133 em.
high, collected before
1894, Barbier-Muller Collection, Geneva.
Large displays of carvings such as these were
made for a memorial ceremony called malanggan.
The ceremony was also
an initiation for boys, at
which the "secrets" of
the carvings were revealed to the initiates.
Women and uninitiated
persons were not to see
the sculpture. The complex compositions were
dreamed by the carvers,
who use most of the
same elements and motifs over and over again
without special meanings
attached. The ceremony
is still celebrated in an
abbreviated form and in a
Christian context.
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By way of comparison, the total quantity of art from
Pacific island cultures is but a fraction of what has come
out of sub-Saharan Africa. And Africa continues to produce. This difference is due to the difference in scale of
African and Oceanian societies. A tribe, linguistic group,
or political division in black Africa may embrace hundreds of thousands of people, while in Oceania most societies have (or had) populations of only a few thousand,
sometimes only a few hundred. Moreover, the smaller
the society, the more susceptible it is to disruption from
outside influences. Hence, drastic change and devastation of tradition are far more evident in Oceanian
societies than in black Africa.
Obviously, the character of an exhibition is heavily influenced by the knowledge, taste, and purposes of those
who put it together. Douglas Newton, Chairman of the
Department of Primitive Art at the Metropolitan Museum
of Art, New York, is a Pacific art specialist who has done
field research in New Guinea and also has a distin-

Figure 2 Mask, New Caledonia, Northeastern area, wood, 44 em. high, University
Museum, Philadelphia.
This is the face piece only of an elaborate
construction of human hair, fiber, and feathers. The masks were used in a ritual which
seems to have been directed at ensuring the
return of rains and the wet season, and the
perpetuation of growing things. New Caledonian cultures were among the very first in
the southwest Pacific to succumb to European influences and colonial domination.

A third pool, much smaller than the other two, is composed of archeological specimens. Many are surface
finds of unknown date, but a few have been unearthed in
stratigraphically controlled excavations. Since field archaeology in the Pacific islands is young and a great
deal of development lies ahead, the size of the pool will
grow. At present there are only about 100 entire objects
and a larger quantity of fragments (mostly pottery) in the
pool; 20 examples were displayed in this exhibition.

Figure 3 Door jamb, New
Caledonia, wood, 167
em. high, collected during the second half of the
eighteenth century, Barbier-Ml.iller Collection,
Geneva.
The sacred-men's
houses followed a round
plan with conical roofs
over which towered a
spire. The door was ornamented with massive
jambs such as this one,
lintels, and threshold figures. The human representations were those of
ancestral spirits. In New
Caledonia the style of
carving varied progressively from north to
south; in the south human features were often
reduced to geometric
shapes.
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Figure 4 Suspension
hook, Yenshamanggua
village, Niyaura latmul
people, East Sepik District, Papua New Guinea,
wood and paint, 97 em.
high, collected about
1914, University Museum,
Philadelphia.
Suspension hooks of
this kind are elaborated
versions of simpler food
hooks used in dwellings.
The food hook is basically a rat guard, hung
from a rafter, to which
food in baskets is hung
between meals. The decorated forms, such as this
one, are made for use in
men's clubhouses and
represent spiritual beings
that are also present in
the men's house. The
face painting is similar to
that used by men in rituals of several kinds that
honor the spirits.

Figure 6 Food pounder,
Truk, Caroline Islands,
Micronesia, coral, 15 em.
high, made in Romonum
1950-1960, University
Museum, Philadelphia.
Pounders, or mashers,
are used to reduce
cooked staples to a soft
consistency. Nearly every
island group in Oceania
has a distinctive shape or
form for such pounders.
The four knobs on this
one are one kind of ornamentation that also designates one hereditary tradition of the specialists
who do such skilled work.

Figure 5 Dish, Wuvulu Island, Western Islands,
Papua New Guinea,
wood, 47 em. long, University Museum,
Philadelphia.
Dishes and bowls for
eating, serving, and conveying food, usually prepared as oily puddings,
are used in almost every
community of coastal
New Guinea and the islands of Melanesia. Each
society has its distinctive
form. The dishes, or
bowls, of Wuvulu are famous for their simple,
clean lines, which resemble styles found in Micronesia more than those
of Melanesian neighbors.

Figure 7 Canoe stem ornament, Truk, Caroline
Islands, Micronesia,
wood and paint, 42 em .
high, collected
1899-1900, National Museum of Natural History,
Smithsonian Institution,
Washington, D.C.
Ornaments of this kind
were attached to both
bow and stern of paddling canoes. They were
also used to signal the intent-peaceful or aggressive- of a landing crew
as it approached a foreign community. Such
stem pieces show very
little aesthetic variation.
The top figures represent
a pair of aquatic birds,
beak to beak; if there is
any signification to the
bottom forms, it is not
known . Decorative art in
Micronesia is rarely figurative and mostly made
up of geometric elements
which are not iconographically rich.
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guished record of exhibitions and catalogs dealing with
his specialty as well as ethnographic areas outside of
Oceania. Only with his incomparable knowledge of the
great European collections, public and private, could
such a splendid show of Melanesian works , especially
from New Guinea, have been assembled. With very few
limitations on transportation costs and exhibition space,
Newton chose many large, even monumental, pieces
over other, smaller pieces of the same type that perhaps
have equal aesthetic appeal. However, he also carefully
included the small and the miniature to show how similar
formal concepts could be rendered at any scale.
In an art exhibition that covers the entirety of Pacific
cultures and in which sculpture is the dominant medium,
Micronesia cannot compete. There is little sculpture from
these many small societies where the finest artisanship
is to be found in the so-called minor arts of plaiting and
weaving. Nevertheless, the fact that Micronesia was included is a credit to the planners who wished to present
Oceanian art in its entirety.
Assisting with the Polynesian sections were Dr.
Adrienne L. Kaeppler, then a research anthropologist at
the Bernice P. Bishop Museum, Honolulu , and now at the
Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution, and
Dr. Peter Gathercole, also an anthropologist and Curator
at the University Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge, England. Both are field researchers and
know Polynesian material culture collections around the
world. There have been several big and impressive exhibitions of Polynesian art in the past decade, and there are
fine permanent and changing exhibitions of it usually to be
seen in Honolulu (Kaeppler has done one of these) and
London, but the Washington exhibition, bringing together
the best and most sensational pieces, both topped anything that went before and matched the dazzling impact of
the Melanesian representation.
While it is usually assumed that the works themselves
should be the main attraction, the design of this exhibition produced competition . In fact, in some sections the
design presented such an overwhelming effect that it
was difficult to shut it out in order to concentrate upon
one piece or a small grouping of pieces. Movement
through the exhibition was along a prescribed course
that suggested a tour of the major island groups, region
by region. It was a guided tour that commenced with
Hawaii in the northern Pacific, as though it were the
gateway to Polynesia, and Polynesia had some primacy
with respect to the rest of Oceania. From Hawaii one
moved south to the Marquesas, followed by Easter
Island, the Cook Islands, the Society Islands, and the
western Polynesian groups, ending with New Zealand, a
zigzag course which made no culture-historical sense,
for it was apparently dictated by matters of style and
taste of the designers. For each island group a small gallery was constructed, one gallery leading into the next.
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Figure 8 Head for decorating a sacred flute, Timbunke village, Waliagwi
latmul people, East Sepik
District, Papua New
Guinea, wood, 32.5 em.
high, collected about
1914, University Museum,
Philadelphia.
The sounds of flutes
and choirs of flutes made
of bamboo were associated with the presence of
powerful spirits at certain
ceremonies. The flutes
themselves were not only
sacred but were kept out
of the sight of females
and uninitiated males.
The decorative components, however, were not
as sacred as the flutes
themselves; hence there
are many of them in museum and private
collections.

The tour of the Polynesian islands was followed by a
single display unit of archaeological specimens drawn
from all over Oceania. This interlude asks the viewer to
ponder aspects of time and cultural evolution.
Underway again, the cruise steered to Melanesia, entering it in the south at New Caledonia and continuing
northward with calls at the New Hebrides, the Solomon
Islands, and major islands lying off New Guinea. The
mood of this sequence was somber, the lighting in
higher contrast, the art more dream- and fantasy-like .
A pause again at an array of pieces from Micronesia
and some odd-lot cultures of Melanesia and Polynesia
which happen to have similar sculptural styles. From this
association , I suppose, one is urged to think about both
stylistic similarities that span vast reaches of open sea
and the problems of the diffusion of art forms.

Figure 9 Cult carving,
Bahinemo people, Hunstein Mountains, East Sepik District, Papua New
Guinea, wood and paint,
108.3 em. long , Bruce
Seaman, Tahiti.
This object was used in
a male initiation ceremony in July 1967. The
Bahinemo are now Christian and probably no
longer celebrate initiations. Characteristic of
this area is the' 'opposed
hook" style, the motifs of
which in this piece are
said to represent birds'
beaks and catfish antennae which themselves
are representations of
natural forces . In other
localities nearby, the
hooks represent features
of the human body.
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The final leg of the journey took the viewer to the immense island of New Guinea, wh ich was displayed in a
commensurately large gallery with seven display groups,
each representing one style region such as the Northwest Coast, Southeast Coast, and the western half,
called Irian Jaya, and ending with some closely associated islands off to the southeast. Nearly half the pieces
of the exhibition were mounted in this single space.
Major groupings were mounted in the center of the gallery so that as one moved about many foreground and
background associations presented themselves . From
dozens of angles one or several objects could be sighted against groupings of pieces representing different
styles. The possibilities of visually aligning and merging
forms were almost limitless. The most monumental
works of the show were to be found here, and there
were also some of the smallest. The effect was a visual
kaleidoscope of exotic forms, colors, textures, and compositions-a climactic cacophony of visual experience. Too,
the stunning variety of art displayed here conveyed theethnographicfact that nowhere in the world are so many different languages and distinct cultures to be found distributed over the landscape as there are in New Guinea.
Reflecting on this exhibition , I am struck-troubled,
really-by the visual impression it leaves and the knowledge of how very far from the ethnographic reality the
objects are when displayed in a great museum of fine
arts. In this exhibition objects were grouped according
to some facet of style, and a style facet could be any feature such as form, subject, technique, or use. Larger
groupings were partitioned off into geographic lots
which, with special lighting designed to dramatize the
dominant forms and create moods, gave the illusion that
these carefully selected specimens really did belong together. Nowhere, however, is there a suggestion of what
knowledge or information the pieces conveyed in their
ethnographic setting. Even the labels were reduced to a
cryptic minimum of information, as though anything said
about the work would detract from the display or from
the contemplation of the aesthetic experience. One
comes away from the exhibition realizing that the design
and production of the exhibition were as significant as
the objects in it. What about the productions and settings of rituals and beliefs that enveloped the objects in
their own cultural settings? An example: a human sculpture from ·the Asmat area of West New Guinea, labeled
"Figure" (Catalog no. 21 .8), a seated man with spindly
limbs, elbows resting on knees, hands clasped to an
open mouth, and a pointed ovoid head ridged by a long
curving nose. Has not something very significant been
lost by not knowing that such a depiction is an attempt
to see the human male as an insect, a praying mantis in
fact, whose reproduction cycle symbolizes Asmat ideas
about death and life and to which their headhunting
practices are linked? Is it also irrelevant to know that the
stunning introductory work of the show, a temple image
from Hawaii, is not just an anthropomorphic depiction of
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a god, but a god who was conceived as a direct descendant and embodiment of animate physical forces of
the universe, which also gave birth to creatures of the
sea, of the land, and humans, and that the image was
"born" in a ritual as it was installed at the temple? Most
of Oceanian art is depiction of myth, supernatural personality, social and natural processes, and social position, or it signifies the expenditure of skill of the artist as
an offering. When works such as those shown at this exhibition are displayed in this way, the viewer is permitted
to see only form and style. Yet this is art that, for the
most part, is not only representational; it is didactic as it
stands as testament to the central beliefs and values of
the cultures that produced it.
Every object selected for this exhibition has been
through at least two stages of removal from its original
context. Initially, at the site where it was made or used, a
collector obtained objects that could be bought and carried away with the resources available. Almost always
pieces obtained were parts of something more complex-an architectural fragment , a piece of sculpture
which was but one object among many used in a ritualand more often than not the ideational, utilitarian, and didactic aspects were entirely left behind. Thus the great
bulk of exotic material culture ending up in museums
and private collections are fragments of larger cultural
entities. The second selection is made when pieces are
picked from collections for the exhibition. Many objects
are deemed unworthy of aesthetic consideration because we see no art in them; some pieces from the assemblages a~e left out because only a part is seen as
being aesthetic. What the final selection for an exhibition
ends up being is a very small percentage of possible objects selected under our criteria of art, and all are fragments of larger material and ideational wholes . Finally,
the works are mounted in an architectural setting and
exhibit design created by persons who are interpreters
of our contemporary ideas of art. A cultural transformation, not a translation , has occurred. Thus, exotic objects are made to seem familiar to us, because they are
presented in a way in which we are accustomed to viewing fine art. We, the viewers , are invited to project our
cultural values and knowledge upon them, to compare
our impressions with others that we recall from other exhibitions. We are experiencing art, but that experience is
derived from knowledge of our culture, not from any culture in the South Seas.
The catalog is every bit as ambitious and spectacular as
the exhibition . In it are three essays, by Newton, Gathercole, and Kaeppler, and more than 250 pages devoted to
the listing of the pieces, together with abstracts from documentation about them and black-and-white photographs.
In addition there are 13 color plates and 2 additional color
photographs used for cover and frontispiece.
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The introductory essay, "Continuities and Changes in
Western Pacific Art, '' by Douglas Newton is an attempt to
see all the regional art traditions of Melanesia in some historical perspective. In order to do this he gives a very condensed resume of the current hypotheses about culture
history of the western Pacific as drawn from recent archaeological excavations as well as from ethnographic
and linguistic distributions. He also discusses historical
documents that bear on art. The problem is, there are not
many archaeological and historical data on the art-not
yet, anyway. It is a fine job of summarizing material that
can be interpreted several ways . As an introduction to
current scholarly ideas about culture history in the western Pacific it is excellent , and it is well referenced for
those who wish to pursue the matter more deeply.
Peter Gathercole 's essay, "Polynesian Cultural History,'' does for Polynesia what Newton does for Melanesia. The important difference, however, is that the culture history of the central Pacific is shorter, less
complicated, and far better worked out by archaeologists
than it is for the western Pacific islands. Again, this is a
very appropriate summary for the exhibition, and Gathercole provides key references to more detailed studies for
the reader who wishes to get more deeply involved.
Adrienne L. Kaeppler's essay, "Aspects of Polynesian
Aesthetic Traditions,'' gets close to the heart of the matter : the differences between art and aesthetics from our
point of view as contrasted with Polynesian orientations
which we think of as aesthetic. One of her most telling
points is that material culture-objects, that is-is neither
the only nor the most important way in which Polynesians expressed ideas and values about the cosmos and
society. This essay is a reminder that art in Pacific island
societies, even when defined and presented in terms of
our cultural conceptions, is not confined to what can be
hung and mounted in a museum gallery. This essay is
also a signal contribution to a small but growing literature on comparative aesthetics.
Considering the catalog separately from the exhibition
but alongside other art books on the Pacific, this volume
deserves special mention. For the person not already
familiar with but eager to learn something about Pacific
island art it is the best place to begin. It is the only book
that will try to place the art objects in the contemporary
view of culture history as currently interpreted by archaeologists. Other books will give culture historical
backgrounds, but they will be based upon diffusionist
and highly subjective methods of historical reconstruction. The considerations of what constitutes style similarities and dissimilarities are well supported by the objects
and tend to be explained in less emotional terms than is
usual in writings of this kind. There are good maps, the
photographs are excellent, and, of course, there is the
fact that so many of the pieces are illustrated here for the
first time. Unfortunately, some small but glaring errors
have crept into the catalog. The editors have assured

Figure 10 Temple image,
Hawaiian Islands, wood,
198 em. high, the Peabody Museum of Salem,
Massachusetts.
Large images of this
sort were set up at the important temples which
were dedicated to the
major deities and supported by the political
system. Often groups
were arranged around an
altar, each image representing a different aspect
of the god . Each major
god was attended by a
special hereditary priesthood . In 1819 the political
sponsorship and recognition of the major deities
came to an abrupt end.
Temples were abandoned and images were
destroyed. The next year
missionaries from New
England arrived to convert the political leaders
to Christianity. Only three
of these large images survive today.

this reviewer that all have been noted, and in a soon-tobe-published revised edition the errors will be corrected.
On the other hand, an overview as gained in this volume has definite limitations. Only brief mention of the
social function of art is made, even though all three authors mention some aspects of it. Similarly, iconological
and symbolic aspects are touched on-most cogently by
Kaeppler-but they are downplayed in favor of considerations of style. After all, the exhibition was about style
and history, and the catalog is the enduring artifact of
that effort.
It is well to remember that at the same time the oldest
pieces included in this exhibition were being collected
and brought to Europe, about two centuries ago, they
were considered to be "curiosities," the intriguing productions of savages. They were certainly not art, which
could only be produced by civilized peoples. The first
systematic collection of ethnographic exotica and scientific specimens also marks the beginning of natural history museums, but it was another century before art museums were founded, and still a few decades more
before some artifacts were considered worthy of transfer
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Figure 11 Female figure,
Ha'apai Group, Tonga Islands, whale-tooth ivory,
12.7 em. high, Raymond
and Laura Wielgus
collection.
Whale ivory figures of
humans were made and
used in both the Tonga
and Fiji Islands, which, although having different
cultures and languages,
had economic and political relationships before
European intrusion into
the area. The precise use
and significance of the
figures is not known, although some seem to
have been neck pendants. In both societies
whale-tooth ivory was
among the most valued
materials, and objects
made of it were associated with persons of high
rank and transactions of
great social value.

from natural history to art museums. Since then the very
concept of art in our culture has undergone such drastic
revision that the inclusion of certain artifacts from nonliterate societies among collections of fine art from Europe and Asia is no longer controversial. These changes
are linked, too, to our changing conceptions of the nature of man . Two centuries ago primitive peoples were
thought to be lesser humans in comparisons with civilized peoples. Now we believe in the universality of human nature, and according to our cultural definition of
the nature of man, he/she is, among many things, an
aesthetic being, and that is what exhibitions of this kind
are fundamentally about. They are the visual proof of our
late-twentieth-century cultural assumptions that art is
universal to man. One knows that such an assumption
would have been rejected by artists, patrons, and connoisseurs of the eighteenth century. One wonders what
eighteenth-century Hawaiians would think about their religious images and symbols of political rank being
placed alongside effigies and idols from many cultures
they never knew existed . My guess is that they too
would reject the entire idea.
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Robert Rosenthal, ed. Skill in Nonverbal
Communication: Individual Differences. Cambridge,
Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, & Hain, 1979. xviii + 270
pp. No price (cloth).
Reviewed by Robert E. Kraut
Cornell University and Bell Laboratories
We all know people who seem especially skilled at nonverbal communication , flashing their emotions at will or
divining ours even better than we can. The essays in this
collection promise to reveal some of their secrets, telling
us how to measure who is nonverbally skillful, showing us
who they are and how they achieve their skill , and demonstrating the consequences of their skill for social interaction. This book fails to live up to its promises, and I
was left doubting the value of the individual difference
approach to nonverbal communication that Rosenthal
and his fellow authors advocate. My skepticism stems
from both the structure of individual differences in nonverbal behavior, which the book reveals, and important
Iimitations in the scope of the book itself.
Friedman's introductory essay argues that individual
differences in nonverbal communication should be
thought of as an ability akin to intelligence rather than as
a personality trait like extroversion. Abilities can be directly sampled by tests that have intrinsic meaning , while
measures of traits require complex and controversial inferences about how items are related to underlying dispositions. In addition, Friedman claims that individual
attributes thought of as abilities predict behavior more
strongly than do attributes commonly thought of as traits
(Mischel 1968).
The rest of this volume belies the simplicity and power
which the ability concept tries to bestow on nonverbal
skill. If success at nonverbal communication were an
ability like intelligence, then one might expect it to have a
simple structure Iike the general factor in intelligence,
perhaps with subskills overlaid on the general factor. Unfortunately, nonverbal skill does not appear to be structured so simply. At a minimum one must distinguish
between skill at transmitting nonverbal messages (encoding) and at reading them (decoding). Research by
DiMatteo and other research reviewed by DePaulo and
Rosenthal in the present volume shows that these two
dimensions of nonverbal skill are only slightly related
(mean r = .13).
Even within these two subareas, skills do not appear to
be general. It is true that people whose spontaneous expressions of emotions are easy to read also exhibit expressions which are easy to read (Cunningham 1977;
Zuckerman et al. 1976). However, success at both encod-
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ing and decoding nonverbal messages is extremely sensitive to the dimension or category being portrayed and
to the modality about which the judgment is made. For
example, in his paper Zuckerman notes that four measures of success at nonverbal encoding are unrelated
(median r = .05), as are five measures of success at
nonverbal decoding (mean r = .02). DiMatteo also presents data showing the weak associations of different
measures of nonverbal encoding and nonverbal decoding. For example, a person 's success at decoding tone of
voice depends on how the voices were prepared (mean
r = .10 for content filtered and random-spliced PONS
scores) . Success at judging the voice stimuli was not
strongly correlated with success at judging the face or
body (mean r = .09).
In summary, while the authors conceive of nonverbal
behavior as a skill , with the implication that it is a unitary
phenomenon strongly predicting behavior, the data show
it to be much more fragmentary. Different ways of measuring nonverbal ability are weakly correlated , and none of
the measures strongly predicts behavior. This pattern,
similar to that which made Mischel (1968) challenge the
validity of the trait concept, also makes me doubt the
value of an individual difference approach to nonverbal
behavior. To the extent that researchers do find stable
individual differences in nonverbal skillfulness, these
may be caused by individual differences on an array of
dimensions only some of which are traditionally thought
of as compon ents of nonverbal communication. The dimensions range from voluntary control of facial musculature to visual acuity to a conscientiousness in completing
rating forms.
As I have illustrated , some of the difficulties in the book
inhere in the phenomenon of nonverbal abilities. But
other problems result from the book's limited scope. The
essays are a showpiece for Rosenthal , his students, and
his colleagues. Of the seven chapters, Rosenthal or his
former students and colleagues wrote six. Only Ross's
chapter on nonverbal expressiveness and physiological
activity shows clear independence from the Rosenthal
modus operandi. Other highly relevant approaches to individual differences in nonverbal ski II , including those
of Trower, Bryant, and Argyle (1978) and Kagan (e.g.,
Danish and Kagan 1971), have been completely ignored
in this volume .
One consequence of inbred authorship is an overrei iance on a single set of materials for assessing nonverbal abilities. Much of the research reported here is
based on Rosenthal , Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, and
Archer's Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS; 1979). In
this test of decoding skill, a woman acted out twenty brief
scenes that differed in the positivity or negativity of the
emotion and the dominance or submission of the relationship being portrayed. These scenes are repeated
with different combinations of information available to the
decoder: facial expression, bodily movement, and tone of
voice. The decoder's task is to guess what scene was

being portrayed. Two derivative tests use the PONS material but either combine visual and auditory information
inconsistently or shorten viewing times. Five of the six
essays which report data rely on the PONS or its derivatives, with varying degrees of importance.
The major deficiency in the PONS is its use of only one
actress to enact all the scenes, making highly inconclusive claims, for example, that decoders show a bias toward visual or facial information (p. 211 ). The authors
attribute to perceivers' biases what may be an idiosyncratic feature of this actress's expressive face and dull
voice . Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1972) strongly
urged the sampling of stimulus people in their evaluative
review of the Iiterature on facial expressions of emotion.
The emphasis that Rosenthal and his colleagues place
on individual differences in nonverbal skill makes the use
of a single stimulus person in their testing materials especially surprising .
As in any collection, the essays here vary in quality.
Hall's analysis of sex differences in encoding and decoding nonverbal communication is a very strong piece. She
compiled a lot of ev idence to demonstrate that women
are indeed better than men at both displaying and interpreting nonverbal signs. She then tested the quality of
several developmental explanations for this difference.
Accord ing toan empathy explanation, the sex difference
would result from the ability of women to share emotions
or moods with others. A femininity explanation credits the
sex difference to traditional sex role norms which require
nonverbal skill of women. According to a power explanation , women get special benefit from correctly interpreting others' moods and intentions because of their lower
status, and, therefore, learn to do it well . Finally, an outsider explanation claims that women get more practice
viewing and interpreting nonverbal communication because they are observers of, rather than participants in,
most social encounters. None of these factors seems able
to account for the sex difference. Indeed, contrary to prediction, greater masculinity and less traditional sex roles
lead to more nonverbal skill.
DePaulo and Rosenthal's use of the concept of nonverbal accommodation to account for some of the subtleties
of sex differences in nonverbal skill is interesting but less
successful. They reason that women, in trying to make
social interaction run smoothly, learn to read nonverbal
signs meant for public consumption and to make their
own behavior easy to read. Their interesting extension is
that women's superiority over men in reading nonverbal
communication decreases as the cues become more difficult for the sender to control (i.e., women refrain from
decoding messages they were not meant to see). While
DePaulo and Rosenthal's data are consistent with this
hypothesis, they do not seriously consider a major alternative explanation, that nonverbal signs which are difficult to control, like micromomentary facial expressions,
are also not informative. Thus women may lose their
superiority over men when both become increasingly in-
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accurate because the stimulus is uninformative. DePaulo
and Rosenthal 's failure to do the appropriate analyses to
test this alternative (for example, by partialing out overall
accuracy or by computing transformations of the original
data) is symptomatic of Rosenthal's and his colleagues'
general neglect of stimulus information.
Buck's literature review and analysis of individual difference in internal and external responses to emotional
stimuli is well done. Other papers in this volume, howe~er, are less successful. For example, the paper by
D1Matteo concludes that a physician's success with patients depends in part on his or her nonverbal skill; yet the
data for this conclusion are very weak. Zuckerman and
Larrance describe new measures of subjects' perceived
nonverbal abilities; while they provide an elaborate justification for why these self-perceptions might have importance in their own right, the failure of the selfperceptioin tests to correlate with actual nonverbal success undercuts their value.
In summary, this is a book that promises more than it
delivers. Its self-appointed task is to show the value of the
idiographic approach to the study of nonverbal communication. Despite several excellent and provocative
chapters, I was left unconvinced of the value of this enterprise.
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Paul Ekman. The Face of Man: Expressions of
Universal Emotions in a New Guinea Village. New York:
Garland STPM Press, 1980. 154 pp., illustrations.
$25.00.

Reviewed by Robert Bates Graber
Millsaps College
This book is an engaging little volume. On the surface,
however, it seems never quite to have decided what to be
about. On one hand, the reader finds sixty pages devoted
mainly to answering affirmatively a very old question: Are
facial expressions for human emotions the same in all
cultures? On the other hand, one is presented with about
eighty pages of heart-warming black-and-white facial
expressions (of Woman and Child as well as "Man") in a
single village of a single tribe (the Fore of New Guinea).
At first glance, one cannot understand how the two sections might have landed between the covers of one book.
The sense of incongruity is heightened when one places
the sometimes technical and closely argued text in juxtaposition with the tone of the plates and their captions,
which are sometimes playful and always informal. Thus,
for example, Plate 336 of a photogenic young woman in a
crouching position is labeled , "A better view of that tightlipped embarrassed smile"; and Plates 46 to 52 "were not
selected to illustrate facial expression but to show the
beauty and appeal of these people." Furthermore, not a
single one of the plates is specifically cited in the test, yet
Ekman assures the reader that the pictures "tell the story
of what I found" and are, after all, "the best argument" for
the case of cultural universality of facial expressions
(p. 12).
But when one finally sees the Iight, the apparent lack of
integration in the book's structure dissipates somewhat,
for it turns out that Ekman's research among the Forethough not the pictures themselves-did play a pivotal
role in his argument for universality; and if the claim of
universality is valid, then the faces of the Fore-like the
faces of any other human beings-are nothing less than
perfectly representative of the whole species. Granting
the plates this much relevance to the book's thesis, and
admitting that they are quite entertaining , I turn to the
book's weightier portion: the section entitled "Darwin and
Cross-Cultural Studies of Facial Expression ."
Ekman begins by summarizing the view of Charles
Darwin (1965) on the subject. While Ekman ultimately
finds himself squarely in Darwin's camp on the basic
issue of universality, he attempts to put a little distance
between Darwin and himself. He does so by attributing to
Darwin the belief that establishing the cultural universality of facial expressions would prove that "they must
be inherited" (p. 93). But, says Ekman,
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this last step in Darwin 's thinking can be disputed. Universality increases the likelihood that inheritance determines the
form and appearance of facial expressions, but it does not
prove an innate basis for facial expression, since there are
other explanations available. [ibid.]

Ekman then states that he himself has previously outlined
several alternative explanations which could also account for universality, but he offers only the sketch iest
description of them . Next, Ekman proceeds to a brief but
competent discussion of methodological deficiencies in
Darwin's work, being careful, however, to credit him with
originating "judgment studies of the face ,'' in which observers are asked to interpret emotions depicted in paintings, photographs, or motion pictures. Most of Ekman's
own research has been of this type.
Ekman's discussion of Darwin illustrates four mixed
qualities that recur in the subsequent analysis and that
typify its best and worst sides. These are (1) careful explication of valuable conceptual distinctions (as between
the problems of establishing universality and explaining
it), (2) an excellent eye for defects in the logic and
method of other research in the area, (3) overly cryptic
references to his own previous research, and (4) overdrawn battle lines between himself and ostensible
opponents.
Did Darwin actually believe, as Ekman implies, that
establishing universality would be tantamount to demonstrating biological heredity as the basis of facial expression? Apparently not, for in the very passage cited by
Ekman (p. 92) , we find Darwin asserting only that universality allows one to "infer with much probability" a
hereditary basis. This does not really sound much different from Ekman 's own statement that universality "increases the I ike! ihood " of a pan specific genetic derivation of facial expression. Another respect in which Ekman
overstates his disagreement with Darwin concerns the
question of whether a// facial expressions are universal.
In the text, Darwin is portrayed as an extreme advocate of
universality; only in a footnote does Ekman admit that
Darwin, like himself, does not claim that all facial expressions are universal , only those for certain emotions.
Ekman next identifies the opponents of the universality
position: three "extremely influential" behavioral scientists who have asserted that "the existence of universal
facial expressions is dubious or disproved" (p. 96). They
are Otto Kl ineberg, Weston La Barre, and Ray Birdwhistell. To make a twelve-page story short, Ekman finds that
(1) Kl ineberg's data against universality were misinterpreted , (2) La Barre's were irrelevant, and (3) Birdwhistell's were never even revealed!
Kl ineberg's data consisted of descriptions of facial expressions he located in Chinese Iiterature, anecdotal reports by observers of different cultures, and a 1935 study
by J. P. Foley which, according to its author, indicated
that undergraduates at Columbia University were unable
to correctly identify the emotion underlying facial expres-

sions of chimpanzees. As for the literary and anecdotal
evidence, Ekman points out that it is questionable in
terms of reliability, accuracy, and generality. Furthermore,
even if true it would not suffice to prove the case against
universality. This is because cultures differ in the specific
conditions ("elicitors") which evoke a given emotion, and
also because they differ in norms ("display rules") regarding the expected management of facial appearance (p.
97). Thus, were we to find a culture in which people generally exhibited smiling expressions at funerals, it would
not necessarily be because smiling in this culture indicated sadness; instead, it may be that the event actually
does elicit joy among most of those attending-perhaps
owing to differing conceptions of death-or that the culture considers it proper to mask the underlying sadness
with a happy face . Surely these are cogent concepts
which represent a significant contribution to this area of
research.
Ekman next attempts a statistical reinterpretation of
Foley 's above-mentioned chimpanzee study, but I do not
believe that statistically adept readers will find it altogether satisfactory. The technical argument need not be
taken up here, however, since, as Ekman himself points
out, this whole cross-specific approach is of dubious
relevance .
In placing La Barre among the "extremely influential"
opponents of universality, Ekman once again, as with
Darwin, conjures up a conflict that is more apparent than
real . La Barre has indeed been influential as an anthropologist but certainly not as a cultural particularist, as
would seem likely from the role in which he is cast by
Ekman. In fact, psychoanalytic anthropology, the subdiscipline to which La Barre has made his truly singular
contributions, has since its inception been characterized
by its insistence on the fundamental significance of cultural similarities or universals, even when this interest
was rejected by anthropology as a whole (Roheim
1950:2-3). In the first of his major works, La Barre begins
by observing:
Anthropologists now see that we have been so successful in
establishing the relativity of culture as to risk throwing out the
baby with the bath: the universal similarities of all mankind.
[1954:xi i i]

One begins to suspect that it was not easy for Ekman to
come up with his opponents on the issue of facialexpressive universality when it is found that La Barre
himself (1978:289) regards the piece criticized by Ekman
as among his least-developed studies in the area of nonverbal communication . This suspicion grows when
Ekman himself points out that La Barre's position is by no
means directly opposed to the universality position, but
complementary to it:
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La Barre was really writing about gesture, not emot ional expression , and in that sense does not contradict Darwin, who
was more concerned with emotional expression . [p. 102]

At least Ekman manages to put this rather artificial
opposition to constructive use, by taking the opportunity
to give a summary (p. 102)-all too brief-of a noteworthy
classification of nonverbal behavior devised by himself
and Wallace Friesen . As in several other places in the
book, scholars wi II be disappointed by the sketchy reference to an intriguing idea developed thoroughly only in a
previous and possibly less accessible place. It is therefore important not to be led by the book's main title into
mistaking it for a scientific magnum opus; indeed, nearly
the whole text is itself reprinted from a brief, previously
pub I ished summary of Ekman's research (p. 91 ). The volume, after all, is primarily a pleasant picture book.
Undoubtedly, Ray Birdwhistell comes off as the most
recalcitrantly wrong-headed of the opponents of universality: Ekman (p. 107) declares him a "captive of his own
. .. model ," who simply asserts his views without offering
any documentation to support them.
Ekman then moves through a systematic critique of
research attempting to prove the culture-specific
hypothesis. This section is well executed and leads to the
following conclusion:
The experiments failed to establish cultural differences because of the I imited number of people whose faces were
shown, or because of contradictions in the findings within or
across studies, or because of the possible presence of
blends of two or more emotions in the stimuli . [p. 123]

Finally, Ekman examines research-mostly his ownattempting to demonstrate universality. In literate
societies, use of word lists along with photographs of
expressions make cross-cultural judgment studies relatively effective. While the results of such studies clearly
favored the universality hypothesis, they left open one
loophole: the possibility that widely disseminated
mass-media portrayals of recent times account for the
observed cross-cultural similarity of facial expressions.
Ekman knows well how to use his opponents for his own
purposes, and at this moment he calls on one in order to
heighten the reader's sense of drama. Of the mass-media
argument, he writes:
While this seemed improbable, the argument was made, presumably with some seriousness, by one of the advocates of
the view that there are no universal facial expressions of emotion: Birdwhistell. [p. 127]

Thus, the "only way" to seal the case for universality
would be to obtain comparable results in a visually isolated, pre Iiterate culture. A note of urgency is injected,
since very soon visually isolated peoples will disappear:
"This was one of the last chances ... to settle the question first raised by Darwin" (p. 129). Enter the Fore at last!

85

After devising emotion-inducing stories (word lists being
obviously useless), Ekman found that extremely high percentages of the Fore subjects selected the same picture
to illustrate each story as had the members of Iiterate
societies. Karl and Eleanor Heider replicated the experiment among the Dani of New Guinea and obtained similar results.
The psychoanalytically oriented reader will find oversimple Ekman's assumption that human emotions, in the
absence of consciously controlled display rules, will be
directly manifest in facial expression. For example, the
concept of reaction formation imp Iies that extremely
powerful emotions may be effectively masked by a totally
unconscious process. In this view, the effect of culture on
emotional expression is seen as running far deeper than
Ekman seems to recognize. The defense mechanism is
erected due not to what people are taught to display but
to an unconscious conflict between ego and id over what
to feel. While this does not contradict Ekman's findings, it
does suggest that he deals with human emotion at a
rather superficial level.
Perhaps the least charitable characterization which
could be made of the whole Iine of research summarized
in this book is that it seems a roundabout path to an
unremarkable conclusion. Nonetheless, the road from
"common sense" to scientific verification is long , and
Ekman deserves credit for having clarified and
strengthened the case for cultural universality of facial
expressions.
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Howard Gardner.

Artful Scribbles: The Significance
of Children's Drawings. New York: Basic Books, 1980.
269 pp. $15.00.

Reviewed by Brent Wilson and Marjorie Wilson
Pennsylvania State University
At the beginning of his important and insightful book,
Artful Scribbles, Howard Gardner presents us with some

provocative works by children under the age of 7, bearing at least a superficial resemblance (in small blackand-white reproduction) to the work of twentieth-century
artists such as Van Doesburg, Pollack, and Klee. The
purpose of drawing these parallels is to introduce one of
the three major tasks Gardner sets for himself "toward
understanding the meanings and import of children's
drawings," that is, "the aesthetic status of the work he
[the child] produces ." In other words, the author explores the question "Is it art or is it something else?"
The question may be a matter of categories and of
children knowing them. An artist friend of ours related
this story of his young son's first experiences with art:
The friend, it seemed, maintained a studio in a part of the
house that was easily accessible to his son, who was
free to come and go as he pleased and to explore the
media and processes of art at will. At the time of his
son's emergence into the educational milieu of nursery
school and kindergarten , the friend was deeply involved
in a style of painting best described as nonobjective, in
which areas of color and shapes were paramount. His
son would come home from school with the usual
bounty of papers, filled with the same amorphous
shapes and colors; and our friend began to become
concerned at the lack of any propensity on the boy's
part to draw the figure in the manner of his friends and
classmates. Time and the example of his friends failed to
bring forth, in the school drawings of the boy, the ubiquitous tadpole person or, indeed, any other semblance of
a figurative schema. When father and son came finally to
a discussion of this perplexing state of affairs, the boy
demonstrated that he could easily draw-a man , a
house, a tree . Why then, the father puzzled , did the child
not bring home paintings like those of his friends? The
forthcom ing answer should have been apparent. The
kinds of things that the father was involved in-the color
and the abstract forms-that was "art " ; the other-the
tadpole, the house, the tree, and the rest-that was
"something else."
We find this analogy to be an important key to the entire premise of the book. We do not wish to dredge up,
one more time, the thorny question of "what is art " but
merely to establish, at the outset, the view that one person 's " art " is another person's "something else." The

addition, then, of a well-placed question mark to the title
of Gardner's book forms the basis for argument with one
of the most provocative issues raised by him-Artful
Scribbles: Artful? Scribbles.
Gardner uses as a "framework against which to contemplate" this and other "riddles, " "the normal trajectory of development, as achieved by most children in
Western culture and quite possibly throughout the
world." It is this framework we also wish to examine in
order to review this important addition to the knowledge
of children and their graphic productions.
The first task Gardner sets for himself in the pursuit of
understanding children's art is to determine the reasons
that it follows its characteristic developmental course .
Those who have studied the course of that development
have most often described a series of stages through
which each child passes; each description neatly slices
the whole loaf of graphic development into different
stage segments. Luquet's (1927) slices included Intellectual Realism, where the drawing reflected more what
was known than what was seen, and Visual Realism,
where an attempt was made to approximate appearances in the phenomenal world. In his age-based system, Burt (1921) charted the path this way: (1) The
scribble stage at age 2 or 3; (2) Line at age 4 ; (3) Descriptive Symbolism at age 5 to 6; (4) Realism at age 7 to
9 or 10; (5) Visual Realism age 10 to 11 or so; (6) Repression, where drawing shows regression or decline, at
age 11 to 14; and (7) Artistic Revival at early adolescence, a stage Burt maintained most young people
never reached . The systems of Rouma (1912), Lowenfeld (194 7), Lark-Horovitz, Lewis, and Luca (1967)
also follow the same general schema.
Gardner, however, avoids the trap of naming precise
age-based stages and prefers to characterize development as a continuous process with advances made relative to those in other symbol systems; and whereas most
students of children's art have taken into account only
innate factors as they chart development, Gardner sensitively illustrates the rapid development of young children
under the influence of the media-his son 's Batman
series and Steps to a Dol/house, for example, two of the
most insightful segments in the book. Curiously, however, Gardner, like Burt, sees the developmental route
not as a steady upward climb but rather as aU-shaped
curve. Burt locates his decline at puberty; Gardner locates his at middle childhood . For Gardner, the early
scribbling period is followed by an artistic flowering, a
period occurring during the preschool and early school
years, in which children produce drawings and paintings
of great intuitive expressiveness, spontaneity, and inventiveness. In middle childhood, however, this flowering
goes into a marked decline, as the child persists in the
quest for skills which will allow him/her to render drawings with the precision dictated by the culture. The U
curves upward for only a few young people who, intent
upon becoming artists, master the cultural conventions
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and then go on to regain an "intentional" spontaneity,
inventiveness, and expressiveness in place of their earlier intuitive efforts.
Gardner's conception of development requires careful
examination. First, what is the nature of the early artistic
flowering? Since this "summit" is achieved at the end of
the preschool period, it is a time when the work of the
child is still highly, but by no means totally, influenced
by innate factors . The child tends to use the simplest
shapes possible; an innate sense of order and balance
predictably allows him/her to create works in which the
maximum amount of horizontal /vertical contrast is
achieved; the combination of the availability of pots of
paint and large brushes or 64 (or more) crayons in a
box, to say nothing of the bright, easily manipulated
magic marker and the child's inclination for experimentation, produces wonderfully colorful works; children's lack of motor control also contributes to their apparent expressivity, producing lines that often appear to
be sensitive and eloquent but are, in reality, merely lines
gone awry. Thus these early works, described by Gardner as "colorful, balanced, rhythmic" are certainly all of
those things, but are also highly preconventional, and although charming and unconstrained, they are the most
predictable (they never have, and never will have, the
potential to bring about a new artistic style) and certainly
no more or less inventive or expressive than the work of
children at other ages. The young boy who was emulating his father's mature efforts was intentionally working
within a particular paradigm; but were these children,
whose work Gardner cites, even aware of the paradigm?
Again we come to the matter of categories. On a recent
trip to Spain, every broken window, every graffitied wall,
reminded us of the paintings of the Spanish artist Tapies.
They were not art, even in the broadest sense, and yet
they affected our sensibilities in the way that the artist's
work had done. Indeed, Tapies had shown us a way to
look at the world. It may be that the early work of young
children appears to us artlike and to convey, as Gardner
would have it, ''something of the range and the vitality
associated with artistic mastery'' merely because of its
similarity to the work of abstract expressionists. These
artists have shown us a way to look at children's paintings. In another time and place when another, more realistic or more idiosyncratic art was valued, these early
manifestations might be seen in a very different way. In
short, Gardner's "flowering" may be no flowering at all,
or at best a mid-twentieth-century flowering.
And what of the middle childhood years, during which
Gardner sees a decline in "artistic" or "aesthetic" quality in children's work? There is evidence that as young
people acquire more competence in some of the more
abstract symbol systems-written language, numbers,
maps, musical notation, and the like-there is less use of
the graphic system. This reduction of graphic activity
may even slow the rate of graphic growth. Nevertheless,
when children are asked during middle childhood to pro-
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duce works that require delineation skills, inventiveness,
and ability to design, the data show that their mastery increases with age in this span (National Assessment
Technical Report, 1978).
So how might we characterize Gardner's view of development? When young children's work bears a superficial resemblance to abstract expressionism, it is considered to have reached a seldom-again-to-be-achieved
peak. When middle-childhood graphic work begins to
appear tight, more controlled, and conventional, it is
considered to be in decline. This is a curious and perhaps biased interpretation of the data. It may be that
young people do actually lose something, some flavor in
their work, but then again it may simply be the replacing
of one flavor for another during the middle yearsFrench vanilla for strawberry marshmallow.
Thus it seems possible that, in spite of the insights that
Gardner provides into the developmental path, he might
have misread the data or have been working from an incomplete sample of the graphic production of middleyear youngsters. Our own collection of thousands of
story drawings from children of all ages shows little of
the decline that Gardner cites.
In order to approach the subject of deviations in the
characteristic course of development and to ask whether
there is a shortcut to graphic development, Gardner
looks at a long-standing controversy in children's artthe role of copying in graphic development. Raising the
issue of the two ends to which copying may be put-the
first, as an end in itself; the second, as the use of bits
and pieces culled from the images of others that become
the material for one's own inventions-Gardner neatly
dispatches the question "to copy or not" and asks, "Is it
possible to achieve artistic heights without [emphasis
added] a program of copying ... by pursuing a strikingly
different route?'' The search for an answer to this question leads Gardner to examine two extreme cases of
seeming graphic "mastery" that appear to have been
achieved without the copying or step-by-step building
upon and altering of simple graphics characteristic of
most children.
The first case he describes is that of the astounding
young British child, Nadia; the other, the cave painters
of Lascaux. Nadia, although autistic, or perhaps because of her autism, was producing fluent copies of the
illustrations in her picture books by the age of 3%. Her
drawings contain such an expressive fluidity of line and
incredible detail of foreshortening, overlap, and figure
orientation that it seems as if the heights of '' representational grandeur" reached by this 3-year-old child may be
attained by few adults.
It seems to Gardner that both Nadia and the cave
painters arrived at mastery in one giant step-by merely
copying what was in their mind's eye. Here we think that
Gardner, in an attempt to be provocative, ignores some
of the most pertinent aspects of Nadia's production. It
appears that Nadia was able to hold images in her
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mind's eye with such clarity that she was able to "trace
around" those images with a line here and a line there
until she arrived at a sort of Xerox machine or cameral ike accuracy. Amazing, yes, but sad , too, because it
seems that Nadia was little able to form standard graphic
programs or routines, or basic conceptions of the parts
of the images she drew. In one sense, she did not appear to develop from her earliest drawings (Arnheim
1980); and yet if one looks closely at the remarkable
drawings, there is evidence that there was a development of sorts in the pattern of the normally drawing
child, evidence that Gardner either ignores or overlooks.
The first drawing of a horse we are shown was drawn by
Nadia at 3%. The horse has almond-shaped eyes. By the
age of 5 or so, Nadia's horses, humans, roosters, pelicans, and lions all contain a curious oversized Pop eye
consisting of a heavy dot surrounded by a large circle.
This seems not to be a product of Nadia's Xerox-like
mental facility, but a typical child's schema. It is only
here that we begin to see the vast gulf between Nadia's
Xerox-like capacities (for copying what she had seen in
books) and her ability to form a graphic concept of a
simple eye. The same manifestation is evident in the formation of the pea-sized head found in her drawings,
both formed by the most basic of graphic configurations-the circle. From this circle stem the normal child's
inventive and creative abilities; in Nadia these abilities
were minimal at best. Her Xerox-like copying capabilities
were not mastery at all; there was no shortcut to graphic
development, merely a dead end.
And what of Gardner's assertion that cave painters
copied from their mind's eye as Nadia did? Perhaps it is
not ''tantamount to heresy,'' as Gardner himself fears the
idea will be viewed, but merely another instance of his
blindness to the evidence to be found in the cave paintings. It is not difficult to find in these paintings manifestations of the copying of highly conventional schemata as
well as of innately derived features, such as the use of
simple forms to achieve graphic ends, the horizontal /vertical orientation of lines and shapes, the exaggeration of
parts, and so on. Only the eyes, the pea heads, and a few
geometric shapes in some of Nadia's drawings were thus
innately derived. It seems clear to us that the cave painters achieved their mastery in quite ordinary developmental ways, and in ways quite different from most of
Nadia's configurations. There seems no general shortcut
to a useful graphic mastery. Gardner himself recognizes
this as he illustrates the way in which gifted individuals
move rapidly through developmental stages.
Perhaps it is in these case studies and in answering
the question of the "precise relation between the child's
drawing and other aspects of his mental, social, and
emotional development'' that the greatest strength of the
volume lies. Gardner's descriptions of individual children
are keen and penetrating and, we might even say, exciting . Designated "interludes," these studies provide a
perceptive narrative account of the various ways in

which art contributes to the lives of children who choose
the graphic symbolic mode. (There is one important note
that we must add concerning the quality of the illustrations throughout the book. In a book whose entire premise depends upon visual and aesthetic qualities, it is disappointing, even frustrating, that it is not possible to
assess the virtue of its illustrations because the publisher
has used inappropriate paper and reproduction processes.) Not only does Gardner understand the necessity
of considering the child's graphic development as it relates to other symbol systems (play, language, and music, for example), but he also continues to view that development throughout childhood and adolescence, in
contrast to those who would cease inquiry when the
child reaches the age of 6 or 7. In addition, contrary to
the position of psychologists and others who have
viewed drawing as a window on the contents of children's minds, as a key to their intellectual growth or as a
means of understanding cognitive development, Gardner, in the interest of artistic development, sets himself
quite another cognitive task. Our concern will be to
judge how well he determines the artistic or aesthetic
status of children's graphic productions, the third major
task Gardner undertakes.
In attempting to accomplish the task, he works within
Nelson Goodman's aesthetic theory. Goodman holds
that the question "What is art?" is inappropriate, the
more appropriate question being "When is art?" Goodman's answer is that when a work contains "symptoms
of the aesthetic'' such as (1) repleteness-a knowing exploration of the qualities of the medium, in drawing, for
example, the thinness and thickness of lines and shading, and (2) expressiveness-the use of the medium to
produce qualities such as happiness, sadness, power,
liveliness, and anger-then the conditions for when are
at least on the way to being met. Gardner presents studies (Carothers and Gardner 1979) that report that first
grade children, given partially completed drawings said
to contain repleteness, were unable to reproduce the
qualities of repleteness and expressiveness in the drawings, while sixth graders could quite easily. Gardner
avoids the error of saying that since sixth graders can
produce these features they are capable of creating art.
He does imply, however, that they are probably more capable of it than young children are since they can at
least reproduce the ''symptoms.'' And he does use this
experimental evidence to call into doubt the assumption
that the young child is an artist-a curious and contradictory state of affairs since Gardner implies that the
child's artistic peak occurs years earlier.
Does this mean, paradoxically, that those children
whose work is most highly prized for its seeming ''aesthetic qualities'' are the very ones least capable of willfully producing it? Or is it that Gardner, in adopting
Goodman's notions of the aesthetic, in order to avoid
the pitfalls of adopting the popular notion that more realism equals a higher degree of artistry, merely falls into
another, equally seductive trap?
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Perhaps a more useful approach might have been to
adopt the view (Weitz 1966) that it is not possible to
specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for art;
that it is possible only to look at paradigms or "good"
cases that are conventionally considered to be art. Thus
there are all types of art-high art or fine art, folk art,
popular art, comic strip art, tribal art, children's art. Following this line of reasoning, then , it is possible that children's art is, indeed, art, but art of a kind that is quite different from other classes of art.
From this position, it would be possible to observe the
child's shift from the paradigm of children's art to that of
fine art, comic book art, or some other type of art. Gardner, in fact, presents the work of two teenage brothers,
the younger of whom works within the fine-art paradigm.
The boys ' parents were artists and provided the rare
fine-art model, as had our friend in the opening account.
The older brother worked within the comic strip paradigm-one that many children in our culture model easily and readily . It seems that Gardner has asked too
simple a question regarding the aesthetic and artistic
status of children's art. It would seem more appropriate
to apply the ideas of expressiveness and repleteness to
spontaneous work, work that follows one of several paradigms in the fine- and popular-arts areas. Then the
question could be asked: When do children become fine
artists or comic strip artists? The answer, it would seem,
is not just when they are able to reproduce the expressivity and repleteness of those art forms but when they
also employ the themes, subject matter, symbols, and
compositional conventions of the given paradigm. Children's art is children's art; the question is when does it
become some other kind of art?
Gardner is at his best when he speaks from the
strength of his interactionist position of artistic development, as he does in the final chapter, where he criticizes
those who would provide simple, one-dimensional explanations of development. Notably he singles out for
analysis Schaefer-Simmern, who supposed that artistic
development or unfolding is a matter of passage through
a number of preordained evolutionary stages, and Suzi
Gablik, who sees general cultural artistic development in
terms of mankind's acquisition of new and hitherto unavailable cognitive competencies. ''Gablik sees a parallel between what normal children do and the periods of
'childh·o od' in our culture." Although Gardner concedes
the value and importance of some of the insights from
these positions, he proceeds to point out their inadequacies as tools for the explanation of artistic development. Certainly the route to an adequate theory of artistic development has been shown to be an arduous one;
it may even be that the necessity for a deep grounding in
both psychology and art may put the end beyond the
reach of a single individual. This is where, we believe,
Gardner's work becomes problematic, where his psychological acumen outweighs his aesthetic perception.
Nevertheless his work points the way to a much fuller
explanation than has been previously posited.

If Gardner has meant Artful Scribbles to be provocative, it is certainly that, but b'rilliant and significant as
well. It makes a substantial contribution to the still sparse
but growing body of literature on children's graphic and
artistic development.
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Dorothea Lange and the
Documentary Tradition. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1980. 277 pp. $15.00 (cloth).

Reviewed by HowardS. Becker
Northwestern University
As Allen Sekula (1975) has remarked, photography
swings between the two aims of expression and information, or art and documentation, usually seen as mutually
exclusive. As expressive art, the photograph works as a
self-contained object, generating its own meanings, intended for contemplation and enjoyment on its own
terms. As informative documentation, the photograph
stands as evidence of how things are and have been, its
meanings arising out of its relation to the world of reality.
We judge its truth and its ability to help us understand
that world. Photographic documents (many of which
have, and have been seen to have, considerable artistic
value) are made in the worlds of journalism and social
science investigation, rather than in worlds of art.
Dorothea Lange spent most of her life making documentary photographs. She made her aims clear in a 1940 statement from which these fragments are excerpted:
Documentary photography records the social scene of our
time . . . man in his relation to mankind . . . his customs at
work, at war, at play, or his round of activities through
twenty-four hours of the day, the cycle of the seasons, or
the span of a life . . . his institutions . .. the manner in which
they work .. . methods of work ... a record of change. [p. 37]

She added some more personal and artistic considerations
in her later years, but never gave up on these. She thought,
too, that photography ought to do some good, help people
improve things, he Ip them understand so that they would
want to and be able to improve things .
Her work met those goals to a surprising degree-surprising because they are hard goals to meet. Her photographs embodied a serious and deep social science understanding of the changes that took place in America
from the thirties to the fifties, especially in agricultural
America, from, for instance, the feudal organization of
tenant farming to the capitalist impersonality of agribusiness. They were effective and integral parts of reports
which seem actually to have affected what Congress,
state legislatures, and bureaucracies did.
How can photographs embody a social science understanding of anything? It is easy to see that some do,
but we have very little serious analysis of how, or, indeed, how we can make our photographs do so.
Lange's life and work provide the ideal case for the exploration of what documentary photography is and how
it can be effectively done. Karin Ohrn has written a thor-

Figure 1 Bob Lemmon, a photograph by Dorothea Lange
(Library of Congress, FSA Collection; plate 14, page 59 in
Ohrn, published in 1980 by the Louisiana State University
Press) .

oughly researched, wonderfully perceptive account of
this life, pointed mainly to the work, the conditions under
which it was done, the ingredients that went into it, and
the way the resulting images did the job. In this emphasis, it differs from the Meltzer (1978) biography, which is
a much more conventional "life." Ohrn has interviewed
many people who knew Lange's working methods well
and makes effective use of the Lange Collection in the
Oakland Museum (so that we see, for example, the contact sheets from which some of Lange's famous images
were selected). I will not try to summarize all the author's
results here but will simply comment on a few of the
things that seemed especially interesting.
How do you learn to think so effectively in social science terms that your photographs actually come out of
that understanding instead of having it forced on them
afterward? The easy answer, in Lange's case, is that she
worked with and then married a social scientist (Paul
Taylor, a distinguished agricultural economist). That, of
course, is a belittling and trivial answer. But it points to
something important: a photographer has to learn to
think like a social scientist to get those results, and this
does not happen by taking a course in anthropology; the
insights of social science must be applied, day in and
day out, to the phenomena of social life, ideally in collaboration with someone who can help pinpoint their significance, until, eventually, the visually striking and scientifically significant fuse in one head. Marriage is only
accidentally how that is achieved.
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Lange's work makes clear that good results are less a
matter of striking single images than of sustained series of
images connected by as much text as necessary to make
the analytic point clear. (Not that Lange failed to make
striking images. The catalog of her posthumous retrospective exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art [Lange
1966] is full of them.) But this poses a serious problem.
What format should be used to present sequential imagery and text? When Lange was doing her major work
on agriculture, very few photographic books were being
published. Even today, I wonder how much of a market
there would be for a book that combined serious photographs with a sustained social science analysis, as the
Lange-Taylor reports of the thirties seem to have attracted. (The nearest thing to those reports today may be
the collaborations of John Berger and Jean Mohr, as in A
Seventh Man [1975].) When Lange ceased working for
the government, she lost the possibility of using that format and never really found another. Photographers attempting such extended statements since then have usually slighted the analysis Lange considered so crucial,
providing, at most, simple date-and-place captions or
short quotes from the people in the pictures, so that even
full-length books like Frank's The Americans lack the
analytic bite of a Lange image accompanied by one of her
extended explanatory captions. Lange ended by treating
her work as a file that could be dipped into for this or that
purpose, letting the file be the format. But files are not
usually as available as Lange's now are in Oakland, and
even if they are, they tend to transfer the analytic job to
the file's user. This lack of standard formats for the presentation of social science photography is perhaps its
major problem today.
Finally, Ohrn's extended comparison of Lange's and
Ansel Adams's documentation of the World War II relocation of Japanese-Americans demonstrates the differences between an "artistic" approach, in which unacknowledged political commitments work under the surface, and a forthrightly political one. Lange knew what
she was doing. Her understanding of the economics and
politics of California led her to conclude that the Japanese-American operation was illegitimate. Adams, more
na·lve, thought the internees were doing well, making the
best of a tough situation which circumstances had
forced on the country. The differences in their photographs, which Ohrn analyzes in detail, are striking.
Their treatment of the environment is a case in point.
Not surprisingly, Adams made beautifully composed pictures of people at work under the majestic beauty of the
Sierras. Lange, in contrast, made closer-up pictures of
the dust and sweat that accompanied that labor, dust
that Adams's faraway views hid. (Ohrn also makes very
effective comparisons of Lange with others doing similar
work under similar circumstances, with Imogen Cunningham, a portraitist in the twenties, and with Arthur
Rothstein and Russell Lee, members of the FSA staff.)

Ohrn has seta high standard for the monographic examination of a photographer. It is an example that needs to be
followed by others with respect to such other major figures
as, say, Walker Evans, Brassai, and Robert Frank.
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View. An Addison House Photographic Survival Kit.
Danbury, N.H.: Addison House, Publishers, 1978.
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Publish Your Own Photo Book (A Guide to SelfPublishing). Published by Bill Owens, P. 0. Box 687,
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Reviewed by Ellan Young
S.U.N.Y. at Purchase
Bill Owens was in the enviable position of doing exactly
what he wanted for one year-one day each week. This
is the time he gave himself to work on the project which
culminated in his book Suburbia. In Documentary
Photography Owens uses his strategies in producing the
work as a way of discussing the field .
For 11 years Owens was a general news photographer for a small-town paper in Livermore, California, a
position he considers ideal. It enabled him to have the
time and energy to create the books for which he is
known . He appreciates the amount of control he had in
his assignments, with much more freedom and variety
than is ever possible on a large city newspaper-a good
point in this reviewer's experience, although the latter
does have more glamor. The book begins with Owens'
describing his start on a college newspaper where his
pictures of the student riots during the sixties earned him
money as well as a valuable portfolio. Next comes some
good advice for the aspiring photographer such as this
example: ''The only way to learn it is to do it. One needs
to make all the photographic mistakes-in the streets, in
the darkroom and in selling your photographs. The mistakes are a necessary part of learning to 'do' photography professionally ." Owens warns against attempting
at the beginning of a career to make it as a free-lance
photographer, especially outside New York City or Los
Angeles . He feels that too often free-lancers drift toward
commercial work for the money and never manage to
develop a personal style. For those still intent on trying it
there is helpful advice here on what types of publications
to approach; portfolios; the importance of selling oneself; and the help available when one shares information
with colleagues.
Book publishing is also covered. Owens tells exactly
what he did to get his first book accepted . His study of
suburban lifestyles began close to home with the area
he knew best, and he persuaded the city council of
Livermore to give him $500 for fifty photographs of historical importance. He worked hard for three weekends
and gave the city archival prints for its library files.
Toward the end of his year's self-allotted time he worked
every weekend and holidays to get the shots he needed

to record his neighbors' lives. He used his newspaper
contacts to get subjects, and he even ran classified ads
asking people to cooperate on the project. Straight Arrow Books agreed to publish Suburbia. Five hundred
prints were edited to select the one hundred twentyeight final images. Acknowledging that having a photo
book published will never make one rich and famous,
Owens rightly stresses the importance to a photographer
of being published for the other rewards it brings, such
as grants and teaching assignments. It took six more
years of work as a small-town news photographer and
the publication of two more books (Our Kind of People
and Working) before he felt able to leave the paper and
continue on a free-lance basis. Owens discloses the
hard facts about the economics of photo book publishing. On the first printing, which takes a year or more to
sell for most photographic books, the publisher makes
less money than the author. Many of these books fail to
earn back their production cost. At the end of this chapter Owens ' description of two rushed assignments he did
for Newsweek in 1976 brings him back to his original
thesis: shooting for a big commercial magazine is no
fun . Doing one's own book with time and only inward
pressure is the most rewarding photojournalism.
It is well to study Owens' ideas on grants since he has
been quite successful with them . Still he emphasizes
that they really only pay for film and supplies and that his
projects are labors of love.
The excellent suggestions offered under the heading
"General Rules" may seem obvious when one is reading
them, but they are things which can easily be overlooked
in the excitement of a shooting session . In the chapters on
cameras and lighting Owens proclaims his love for the
larger than 35mm format camera, and after such enthusiasm it is tempting to think of running out and buying
one of the new 6 x 7 models. Like Bruce Davidson,
Owens feels that carrying a heavy camera shows his subjects that he means business and distinguishes him from
all the Nikon-toting amateurs. I disagree with him that the
medium format is preferable for documentary work in
general. For posed portraits in peoples' homes and in studios, yes, but in the field and in the streets where one is on
foot all day even two small35mm bodies and a couple of
lenses weigh heavily on the shoulder. Since 11 x 14 enlargements of good quality can be made from 35mm negatives, and since projectors are standardized to 35mm
slides, why make life more difficult with a big camera?
Owens acknowledges that a candid photograph usually
gives more information and insight than a posed one. It
would seem preferable to increase the possibilities of getting this type rather than to decrease them by using a
large and noisy camera. For establishing one's credentials and genuine interest with subjects, and for being admitted to occasions and locations where these desirable
pictures are likely to be found, I recommend giving photographs to people whenever possible. From the way Bill
Owens talks about his subjects I feel sure that he did this
as well on all his projects.
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The chapter on lighting is clear and to the point, with
more good concrete advice. The book concludes with a
list of stock agencies, examples of how to fill out a grant
application, and recommendations on photography
books and magazines. Altogether there is much valuable
material in this book, and it is made more interesting by the
feeling the reader gets of Owens ' commitment to his work.
For the photographer struggling to make a living as a
pro and interested in documentary work the message
here is the importance of setting aside time to photograph what interests you most.
After being thoroughly inspired by Bill Owens' book
on documentary photography a photographer could well
decide that he has something to say and that it would be
worth the effort to see it through to book form. Owens
himself has done this, in Publish Your Own Photo Book
(A Guide to Self-Publishing). This book, then, is recommended reading . More than anything else today, a book
furthers a photographer's career, says the author, since
the photojournalists of the picture magazines now have
too much competition from television. He cites Les
Krims as a person whose own special vision plus the will
to publish his own books have made him a name in the
photographic art world. Owens is bitter about what is
considered "art," but sticks to his guns as one who
would rather tell us something about the walls of
peoples' homes than make pretty pictures to hang on
those walls.
The book begins with book contracts with publishers-how they should differ when a photo book is involved (since they are written mainly for other types of
works). For those who want to try the regular publishing
route there are lists of photography book publishers,
large trade publishers, and packagers as well as figures
concerning production costs. Next is a list of step-bystep rules for publishing one's own book: lists of good
printers, helpful ideas in the form of letters from other
self-publishers describing their experiences, and su·ggestions as to how to go about getting publicity for your
book. As a photographer the self-publisher is in a much
better position than the regular commercial publisher to
know the photographic market place and to find hundreds of newspapers and magazines to review the book.
Also included are an example of a press release, lists
of magazines which review books (including foreign
ones), and some of the better-known photo critics, and
Sunday magazines of large metropolitan newspapers
which might publish photo essays from the book. Another chapter covers various avenues of distribution including lists of mail order photo houses, book store
chains, small book distributors, book clubs, and museum book stores. Then there are a few pages on book
design, tax and legal problems, and terms used in publishing, along with a list of volunteer lawyers for the arts.
The book ends with a blow-by-blow account of how this
particular book was published.
Bill Owens does everything for the photographer but
stake out an original idea for a new book.
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Society for the
Anthropology of
Visual
Communication

Formed in 1972, SAVICOM continues to bring together and support researchers, scholars, and practitioners in
all fields in their study and recording of
of human behavior through visual
means.
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quarterly
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4. Reduced registration fee for the conferences sponsored by the
society.
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Studying Visual Co:nununication
Sol Worth
Edited, with an Introduction, by Larry Gross
One of the central figures in the development
of the study of visual communication and
founding editor of Studies in the Anthropology
of Visual Communication, Sol Worth was a
filmmaker and painter before he turned to
academic pursuits. He began with the question
of how film could be understood and studied as
a medium of communication rather than
merely an art form. From there he moved to
larger and more profound questions about the
nature of visual media"in general and the role of
visual images in the processes of shaping and
constructing reality.
The papers in this volume trace the
development of Worth's thinking and research
as he outlined the problems and issues that
must be faced in the study of visual communication. He went further and deeper than anyone
else in setting the intellectual agenda for the
field, drawing upon such diverse disciplines as
anthropology, sociology, psychoLogy, linguistics, and semiotics. Among the seminal papers
in this volume are A Semiotic of Ethnographic
Film, Pictures Can't Say Ain't, eeing Metaphor
as Caricature, and The Uses of Film in
Education and Communication.
Worth's contributions to the serious task
of understanding the role and potential of
visual media and visual communication extend
far beyo nd the intellectual realms of theory and
speculation. Indeed, they offer some of the most
important challenges that face all of us in a
world that is so much shaped by visual
communications. A new volume in the Conduct and Communication series. $20.00,
cloth; $9.95, paper.

Available in May at your local bookstore
or dire ctly from

G University of
\.e.' Pennsylvania Press
3933 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

